Так ли был ужасен "пакт Молотова-Риббентропа"?
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SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 22 августа 1939
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 августа 1939
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"Ужасный пакт Молотова-Риббентропа", который, как сейчас уверяют наши либералы, стал главной причиной развязывания Второй мировой войны, в момент своего появления никак не рассматривался западной прессой таковым - может быть сенсация, но никак не катастрофа.
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Его значение, и вообще роль СССР в тех событиях, было крайне преувеличено задним числом. Такой вывод можно сделать, в частности, из рассмотрения тогдашней британской дипломатической переписки и иных документов, касающихся ситуации в Польше, где СССР упоминается крайне редко.
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В полутора сотнях документов весны-лета 1939 года
.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/blbkmenu.asp
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/tp.asp
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THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939)
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939
Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty
Digital Version Published by Permission of Her Majesty's Government. Decemeber 1997.
СССР упоминается всего несколько раз.
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В частности, министр иностранных дел Галифакс 29 июня мельком упомянул об англо-франко-советских переговорах
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk25.asp
Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Chatham House on June 29, 1939
"we are now engaged with the Soviet Government in a negotiation, to which I hope there may very shortly be a successful issue, with a view to associating them with us for the defence of States in Europe whose independence and neutrality may be threatened".
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Основное внимание британцы уделяли кризису вокруг Данцига (причем они никогда не называли его Гданьском!) и серьезно рассматривали возможность того что либо местные власти организуют там путч и присоединятся к Германии в одностороннем порядке, либо сама Германия начнет войну с Польшей - и это было еще до заключения "пакта". Причем влияние позиции СССР на действия Германии в этих документах вообще никак британцами не учитывалось.
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Британцы знали о советско-германских переговорах и еще до их завершения, 22 августа, Чемберлен уведомил Гитлера, что их результат никак не повлияет на позицию Великобритании в отношении гарантий Польше
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk56.asp
Letter of August 22, 1939, from the Prime Minister to the German Chancellor
"These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfil."
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24 августа Чемберлен в выступлении в Палате общин и Галифакс в выступлении в Палате лордов практически в одних и тех же словах сообщили о заключении советско-германского договора и о том что он не повлиял на позицию Великобритании. О какой-то катастрофе и неизбежности начала войны ничего сказано не было.
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk64.asp
Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 24, 1939
"That was the situation on Tuesday last, when in Berlin and Moscow it was announced that negotiations had been taking place, and were likely soon to be concluded, for a non-aggression pact between those two countries. I do not attempt to conceal from the House that that announcement came to the Government as a surprise, and a surprise of a very unpleasant character. For some time past there had been rumours about an impending change in the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, but no inkling of that change had been conveyed either to us or to the French Government by the Soviet Government. The House may remember that on the 31st July I remarked that we had engaged upon steps almost unprecedented in character. I said that we had shown a great amount of trust and a strong desire to bring the negotiations with the Soviet Union to a successful conclusion when we agreed to send our soldiers, sailors and airmen to Russia to discuss military plans together before we had any assurance that we should be able to reach an agreement on political matters. Well, Sir, nevertheless, moved by the observation of the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that if we could come to a successful conclusion of our military discussions, political agreement should not present any insuperable difficulties, we sent the Mission.
The British and French Missions reached Moscow on the 11th August. They were warmly received, in friendly fashion, and discussions were actually in progress and had proceeded on a basis of mutual trust when this bombshell was flung down. It, to say the least of it, was highly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were proceeding on that basis, the Soviet Government were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects of their foreign policy, as we had understood it. I do not propose this afternoon to pass any final judgment upon this incident. That, I think, would be premature until we have had an opportunity of consulting with the French Government as to the meaning and the consequences of this agreement, the text of which was published only this morning. But the question that the Government had to consider when they learned of this announcement was what effect, if any, this changed situation would have upon their own policy. In Berlin the announcement was hailed, with extraordinary cynicism, as a great diplomatic victory which removed any danger of war, since we and France would no longer be likely to fulfil our obligations to Poland. We felt it our first duty to remove any such dangerous illusion.
The House will recollect that the guarantee which we had given to Poland was given before any agreement with Russia was talked of, and that it was not in any way made dependent upon any such agreement being reached. How, then, could we, with honour, go back upon such an obligation, which we had so often and so plainly repeated? Therefore, our first act was to issue a statement that our obligations to Poland and to other countries remained unaffected. Those obligations rest upon agreed statements made to the House of Commons, to which effect is being given in treaties which are at present in an advanced stage of negotiation. Those treaties, when concluded, will formally define our obligations, but they do not in any way alter, they do not add to or subtract from, the obligations of mutual assistance which have already been accepted.
…
In view of the attitude in Berlin to which I have already referred, His Majesty's Government felt that it was their duty at this moment to leave no possible loophole for misunderstanding, and so that no doubt might exist in the mind of the German Government, His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to seek an interview with the German Chancellor and to hand him a message from me on behalf of the British Government. That message was delivered yesterday and the reply was received today. The object of my communication to the German Chancellor was to restate our position and to make quite sure that there was no misunderstanding. His Majesty's Government felt that this was all the more necessary having regard to reports which we had received as to the military movements taking place in Germany and as to the then projected German-Soviet Agreement. I therefore made it plain, as had been done in the communiqué issued after the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, that if the case should arise His Majesty's Government were resolved and prepared to employ without delay all the forces at their command."
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk65.asp
Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords on August 24, 1939
"That, in outline, was the situation when on the 22d August, the day before yesterday, it was officially stated in Berlin and Moscow that negotiations had been in progress, and were to be at once continued, for the signature of a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. I do not conceal the fact that this announcement came as a surprise to His Majesty's Government. For some time past there had been rumours of a change in the relations between the German and Soviet Governments, but no hint of such a change was conveyed by the Soviet Government to His Majesty's Government or the French Government, with whom they were in negotiation; and on the 31st July last the Prime Minister remarked in another place that His Majesty's Government were showing a great degree of trust, and a strong desire to bring their negotiations with the Soviet Government to a successful issue, when, before any agreement had been finally reached on political matters, they agreed to send a Military Mission to Moscow to discuss military plans. The Military Missions of France and this country reached Moscow on the 11th August, and the conversations were proceeding to all appearance on a basis of mutual confidence, and it is, I do not conceal from your Lordships, certainly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were taking place the Soviet Government were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects, as we had understood them, of their foreign policy.
I would not now pass any final judgment on this matter. That would be premature until we have had time to consult with the French Government as to the meaning and the consequences of the agreement, the actual text of which has been published this morning, but one matter forces itself upon the immediate attention of His Majesty's Government. They had to consider what effect this changed situation should have on their policy. In Berlin the agreement was somewhat cynically welcomed as a great diplomatic victory which removed the danger of war, since, so it was alleged, Great Britain and France would no longer fulfil their obligations to Poland, and His Majesty's Government felt it their first duty to remove this dangerous illusion. It should be recalled, if it is not in mind, that our guarantee to Poland was given before any agreement with Russia was in prospect, and without condition that such agreement should be reached. His Majesty's Government therefore at once issued a statement that their obligations to Poland and other countries remained unaffected; and throughout these days, as noble Lords will imagine, we have been in close and constant contact with the French Government, whose attitude is identical with our own. Our obligations rest on the agreed statements which were made in this House and in another place, and which are binding. Effect is being given to them in treaties, which are in an advanced stage of negotiation, and these treaties will formally define the mutual obligations of the parties, but they neither add to nor subtract from the obligations of mutual assistance which have been already accepted."
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Британский посол в Германии поставил об этом Гитлера в известность 25 августа
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk69.asp
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 25, 1939
"Conversation lasted an hour, my attitude being that Russian Pact in no way altered standpoint of His Majesty's Government, and that I must tell him quite honestly that Britain could not go back on her word to Poland and that I knew his offer would not be considered unless it meant a negotiated settlement of the Polish question.".
В оставшуюся до начала войны неделю СССР упоминается в документах только в части привлечения его к переговорам о судьбе Данцига и "коридора". 30 августа Британия дала согласие на германское предложение привлечь СССР к обсуждению судьбы Польши - "любое урегулирование должно стать предметом международных гарантий. Вопрос о том, кто будет участвовать в этих гарантиях, необходимо будет обсудить дополнительно, и правительство Его Величества надеется, что во избежание потери времени правительство Германии предпримет незамедлительные шаги для получения согласия СССР, участие которого в гарантиях правительством Его Величества всегда предполагалось.".
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk78.asp
Reply of the German Chancellor to the Communication of August 28, 1939, from His Majesty's Government.
This reply was handed to Sir N. Henderson by Herr Hitler during the evening of August 29, 1939
"The Government of the Reich felt, however, bound to point out to the British Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith.".
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk89.asp
Reply of His Majesty's Government to the German Chancellor's Communication of August 29, 1939.
This reply was handed by Sir N. Henderson to Herr von Ribbentrop at Midnight on August 30, 1939.
"His Majesty's Government understand that the German Government accept in principle the condition that any settlement should be made the subject of an international guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His Majesty's Government hope that to avoid loss of time the German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the assent of the U.S.S.R., whose participation in the Guarantee His Majesty's Government have always assumed.".
И лишь 4 сентября Чемберлен в обращении к немецкому народу упоминает германо-советский пакт, негодуя на то, что Гитлер, вопреки своим прошлым заявлениям об антикоммунизме, заключил договор с большевиками
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk144.asp
The Prime Minister's Broadcast Talk to the German People on September 4, 1939.
"He (Hitler) gave his word that he would respect the Locarno Treaty; he broke it. He gave his word that he neither wished nor intended to annex Austria; he broke it. He declared that he would not incorporate the Czechs in the Reich; he did so. He gave his word after Munich that he had no further territorial demands in Europe; he broke it. He gave his word that he wanted no Polish provinces; he broke it. He has sworn to you for years that he was the mortal enemy of Bolshevism; he is now its ally.
Can you wonder his word is, for us, not worth the paper it is written on?
The German-Soviet Pact was a cynical volte face, designed to shatter the Peace Front against aggression. This gamble failed. The Peace Front stands firm. Your Leader is now sacrificing you, the German people, to the still more monstrous gamble of a war to extricate himself from the impossible position into which he has led himself and you.".
Ирония в том, что сам Гитлер еще за полгода до этого обвинял Англию в беспринципном заигрывании с Советской Россией
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp
Speech by Herr Hitler at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, 1939.
"And our friends think just as we do, especially the State with which we are closely bound and with which we march, now, and in all circumstances, and for all time. When hostile journalists do not know what else to write about, then they write of cracks in the Axis. They can be at ease.
This Axis is the most natural political instrument in the world. It is a political combination of ideas which owes its existence not only to reason and the desire for justice, but also to strength inspired by idealism.
This structure will hold out better than the present alliances of non-homogeneous bodies on the other side. For if anybody tells me today that there are no differences in world outlook or ideologies between England and Soviet Russia, I can only say: I congratulate you, Gentlemen.
I believe we shall not have long to wait before we see that the unity in world outlook between Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany is, after all, different from that between democratic Great Britain and the Bolshevik Russia of Stalin.".
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Позволительно спросить - если роль и вина Советского Союза, и "лично товарища Сталина", в последующих печальных событиях были так велики, как ныне утверждают, то почему им тогда не уделялось большого внимания? Почему британский МИД не забрасывал своих послов запросами о ходе советско-германских переговоров, которые велись в течении восьми месяцев - формально о торговом соглашении - и не разрабатывал серьезных контрмер, чтобы сорвать их, а стоически взирал на развитие ситуации в Москве? Даже если в Лондоне рассматривали переговоры СССР с Германией как вероятный сталинский блеф для оказания давления на англо-французов.
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Следует отметить, что британская пресса, еще с весны 1939 года, проявляла большой интерес к переговорам с СССР и требовала - даже консервативные газеты - скорейшего заключения договора с СССР. Те же настроения показывали и проводимые в Великобритании опросы общественного мнения - в апреле 1939 года опросы общественного мнения показали то, что почти девяносто процентов британского населения хотели антигитлеровского союза с СССР. Однако все это не смогло победить стойкий анти-большевизм Чемберлена и заставить его действовать быстрее. См. Daniel Hucker "Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France".
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Заключение "пакта Молотова-Риббентропа" было, тем не менее, встречено британской прессой довольно спокойно - большинство газет написали, что это ничего не меняет
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Договор о ненападении между Германией и СССР от 23 августа 1939 г. и дополнительный секретный протокол к нему
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/nonagres.asp
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/addsepro.asp
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Реакция Великобритании на германское вторжение в Польшу
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/gbmenu.asp
Реакция Франции на германское вторжение в Польшу
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/frmenu.asp
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Последний шанс избежать начала Второй мировой войны
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/167512.html
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/168565.html
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/168721.html
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Солонин: Как Чемберлен Гитлера напугал
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/169127.html
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Как поляки с Гитлером поссорились - начало
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/167289.html
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Поляки и словаки
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/167693.html
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Как польские моряки с нацистами дружили
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/162864.html
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Польское искусство в нацистской Германии
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/162723.html
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https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/166507.html
СССР, ИТАЛИЯ И ГЕРМАНО-СОВЕТСКИЙ ПАКТ 23 августа 1939 г..
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SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 22 августа 1939
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 августа 1939
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"Ужасный пакт Молотова-Риббентропа", который, как сейчас уверяют наши либералы, стал главной причиной развязывания Второй мировой войны, в момент своего появления никак не рассматривался западной прессой таковым - может быть сенсация, но никак не катастрофа.
.
Его значение, и вообще роль СССР в тех событиях, было крайне преувеличено задним числом. Такой вывод можно сделать, в частности, из рассмотрения тогдашней британской дипломатической переписки и иных документов, касающихся ситуации в Польше, где СССР упоминается крайне редко.
.
В полутора сотнях документов весны-лета 1939 года
.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/blbkmenu.asp
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/tp.asp
.
THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK
Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939)
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939
Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty
Digital Version Published by Permission of Her Majesty's Government. Decemeber 1997.
СССР упоминается всего несколько раз.
.
В частности, министр иностранных дел Галифакс 29 июня мельком упомянул об англо-франко-советских переговорах
.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk25.asp
Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Chatham House on June 29, 1939
"we are now engaged with the Soviet Government in a negotiation, to which I hope there may very shortly be a successful issue, with a view to associating them with us for the defence of States in Europe whose independence and neutrality may be threatened".
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Основное внимание британцы уделяли кризису вокруг Данцига (причем они никогда не называли его Гданьском!) и серьезно рассматривали возможность того что либо местные власти организуют там путч и присоединятся к Германии в одностороннем порядке, либо сама Германия начнет войну с Польшей - и это было еще до заключения "пакта". Причем влияние позиции СССР на действия Германии в этих документах вообще никак британцами не учитывалось.
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Британцы знали о советско-германских переговорах и еще до их завершения, 22 августа, Чемберлен уведомил Гитлера, что их результат никак не повлияет на позицию Великобритании в отношении гарантий Польше
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk56.asp
Letter of August 22, 1939, from the Prime Minister to the German Chancellor
"These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfil."
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24 августа Чемберлен в выступлении в Палате общин и Галифакс в выступлении в Палате лордов практически в одних и тех же словах сообщили о заключении советско-германского договора и о том что он не повлиял на позицию Великобритании. О какой-то катастрофе и неизбежности начала войны ничего сказано не было.
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk64.asp
Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 24, 1939
"That was the situation on Tuesday last, when in Berlin and Moscow it was announced that negotiations had been taking place, and were likely soon to be concluded, for a non-aggression pact between those two countries. I do not attempt to conceal from the House that that announcement came to the Government as a surprise, and a surprise of a very unpleasant character. For some time past there had been rumours about an impending change in the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, but no inkling of that change had been conveyed either to us or to the French Government by the Soviet Government. The House may remember that on the 31st July I remarked that we had engaged upon steps almost unprecedented in character. I said that we had shown a great amount of trust and a strong desire to bring the negotiations with the Soviet Union to a successful conclusion when we agreed to send our soldiers, sailors and airmen to Russia to discuss military plans together before we had any assurance that we should be able to reach an agreement on political matters. Well, Sir, nevertheless, moved by the observation of the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that if we could come to a successful conclusion of our military discussions, political agreement should not present any insuperable difficulties, we sent the Mission.
The British and French Missions reached Moscow on the 11th August. They were warmly received, in friendly fashion, and discussions were actually in progress and had proceeded on a basis of mutual trust when this bombshell was flung down. It, to say the least of it, was highly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were proceeding on that basis, the Soviet Government were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects of their foreign policy, as we had understood it. I do not propose this afternoon to pass any final judgment upon this incident. That, I think, would be premature until we have had an opportunity of consulting with the French Government as to the meaning and the consequences of this agreement, the text of which was published only this morning. But the question that the Government had to consider when they learned of this announcement was what effect, if any, this changed situation would have upon their own policy. In Berlin the announcement was hailed, with extraordinary cynicism, as a great diplomatic victory which removed any danger of war, since we and France would no longer be likely to fulfil our obligations to Poland. We felt it our first duty to remove any such dangerous illusion.
The House will recollect that the guarantee which we had given to Poland was given before any agreement with Russia was talked of, and that it was not in any way made dependent upon any such agreement being reached. How, then, could we, with honour, go back upon such an obligation, which we had so often and so plainly repeated? Therefore, our first act was to issue a statement that our obligations to Poland and to other countries remained unaffected. Those obligations rest upon agreed statements made to the House of Commons, to which effect is being given in treaties which are at present in an advanced stage of negotiation. Those treaties, when concluded, will formally define our obligations, but they do not in any way alter, they do not add to or subtract from, the obligations of mutual assistance which have already been accepted.
…
In view of the attitude in Berlin to which I have already referred, His Majesty's Government felt that it was their duty at this moment to leave no possible loophole for misunderstanding, and so that no doubt might exist in the mind of the German Government, His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to seek an interview with the German Chancellor and to hand him a message from me on behalf of the British Government. That message was delivered yesterday and the reply was received today. The object of my communication to the German Chancellor was to restate our position and to make quite sure that there was no misunderstanding. His Majesty's Government felt that this was all the more necessary having regard to reports which we had received as to the military movements taking place in Germany and as to the then projected German-Soviet Agreement. I therefore made it plain, as had been done in the communiqué issued after the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, that if the case should arise His Majesty's Government were resolved and prepared to employ without delay all the forces at their command."
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk65.asp
Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords on August 24, 1939
"That, in outline, was the situation when on the 22d August, the day before yesterday, it was officially stated in Berlin and Moscow that negotiations had been in progress, and were to be at once continued, for the signature of a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. I do not conceal the fact that this announcement came as a surprise to His Majesty's Government. For some time past there had been rumours of a change in the relations between the German and Soviet Governments, but no hint of such a change was conveyed by the Soviet Government to His Majesty's Government or the French Government, with whom they were in negotiation; and on the 31st July last the Prime Minister remarked in another place that His Majesty's Government were showing a great degree of trust, and a strong desire to bring their negotiations with the Soviet Government to a successful issue, when, before any agreement had been finally reached on political matters, they agreed to send a Military Mission to Moscow to discuss military plans. The Military Missions of France and this country reached Moscow on the 11th August, and the conversations were proceeding to all appearance on a basis of mutual confidence, and it is, I do not conceal from your Lordships, certainly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were taking place the Soviet Government were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects, as we had understood them, of their foreign policy.
I would not now pass any final judgment on this matter. That would be premature until we have had time to consult with the French Government as to the meaning and the consequences of the agreement, the actual text of which has been published this morning, but one matter forces itself upon the immediate attention of His Majesty's Government. They had to consider what effect this changed situation should have on their policy. In Berlin the agreement was somewhat cynically welcomed as a great diplomatic victory which removed the danger of war, since, so it was alleged, Great Britain and France would no longer fulfil their obligations to Poland, and His Majesty's Government felt it their first duty to remove this dangerous illusion. It should be recalled, if it is not in mind, that our guarantee to Poland was given before any agreement with Russia was in prospect, and without condition that such agreement should be reached. His Majesty's Government therefore at once issued a statement that their obligations to Poland and other countries remained unaffected; and throughout these days, as noble Lords will imagine, we have been in close and constant contact with the French Government, whose attitude is identical with our own. Our obligations rest on the agreed statements which were made in this House and in another place, and which are binding. Effect is being given to them in treaties, which are in an advanced stage of negotiation, and these treaties will formally define the mutual obligations of the parties, but they neither add to nor subtract from the obligations of mutual assistance which have been already accepted."
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Британский посол в Германии поставил об этом Гитлера в известность 25 августа
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk69.asp
Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 25, 1939
"Conversation lasted an hour, my attitude being that Russian Pact in no way altered standpoint of His Majesty's Government, and that I must tell him quite honestly that Britain could not go back on her word to Poland and that I knew his offer would not be considered unless it meant a negotiated settlement of the Polish question.".
В оставшуюся до начала войны неделю СССР упоминается в документах только в части привлечения его к переговорам о судьбе Данцига и "коридора". 30 августа Британия дала согласие на германское предложение привлечь СССР к обсуждению судьбы Польши - "любое урегулирование должно стать предметом международных гарантий. Вопрос о том, кто будет участвовать в этих гарантиях, необходимо будет обсудить дополнительно, и правительство Его Величества надеется, что во избежание потери времени правительство Германии предпримет незамедлительные шаги для получения согласия СССР, участие которого в гарантиях правительством Его Величества всегда предполагалось.".
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk78.asp
Reply of the German Chancellor to the Communication of August 28, 1939, from His Majesty's Government.
This reply was handed to Sir N. Henderson by Herr Hitler during the evening of August 29, 1939
"The Government of the Reich felt, however, bound to point out to the British Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith.".
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk89.asp
Reply of His Majesty's Government to the German Chancellor's Communication of August 29, 1939.
This reply was handed by Sir N. Henderson to Herr von Ribbentrop at Midnight on August 30, 1939.
"His Majesty's Government understand that the German Government accept in principle the condition that any settlement should be made the subject of an international guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His Majesty's Government hope that to avoid loss of time the German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the assent of the U.S.S.R., whose participation in the Guarantee His Majesty's Government have always assumed.".
И лишь 4 сентября Чемберлен в обращении к немецкому народу упоминает германо-советский пакт, негодуя на то, что Гитлер, вопреки своим прошлым заявлениям об антикоммунизме, заключил договор с большевиками
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk144.asp
The Prime Minister's Broadcast Talk to the German People on September 4, 1939.
"He (Hitler) gave his word that he would respect the Locarno Treaty; he broke it. He gave his word that he neither wished nor intended to annex Austria; he broke it. He declared that he would not incorporate the Czechs in the Reich; he did so. He gave his word after Munich that he had no further territorial demands in Europe; he broke it. He gave his word that he wanted no Polish provinces; he broke it. He has sworn to you for years that he was the mortal enemy of Bolshevism; he is now its ally.
Can you wonder his word is, for us, not worth the paper it is written on?
The German-Soviet Pact was a cynical volte face, designed to shatter the Peace Front against aggression. This gamble failed. The Peace Front stands firm. Your Leader is now sacrificing you, the German people, to the still more monstrous gamble of a war to extricate himself from the impossible position into which he has led himself and you.".
Ирония в том, что сам Гитлер еще за полгода до этого обвинял Англию в беспринципном заигрывании с Советской Россией
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp
Speech by Herr Hitler at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, 1939.
"And our friends think just as we do, especially the State with which we are closely bound and with which we march, now, and in all circumstances, and for all time. When hostile journalists do not know what else to write about, then they write of cracks in the Axis. They can be at ease.
This Axis is the most natural political instrument in the world. It is a political combination of ideas which owes its existence not only to reason and the desire for justice, but also to strength inspired by idealism.
This structure will hold out better than the present alliances of non-homogeneous bodies on the other side. For if anybody tells me today that there are no differences in world outlook or ideologies between England and Soviet Russia, I can only say: I congratulate you, Gentlemen.
I believe we shall not have long to wait before we see that the unity in world outlook between Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany is, after all, different from that between democratic Great Britain and the Bolshevik Russia of Stalin.".
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Позволительно спросить - если роль и вина Советского Союза, и "лично товарища Сталина", в последующих печальных событиях были так велики, как ныне утверждают, то почему им тогда не уделялось большого внимания? Почему британский МИД не забрасывал своих послов запросами о ходе советско-германских переговоров, которые велись в течении восьми месяцев - формально о торговом соглашении - и не разрабатывал серьезных контрмер, чтобы сорвать их, а стоически взирал на развитие ситуации в Москве? Даже если в Лондоне рассматривали переговоры СССР с Германией как вероятный сталинский блеф для оказания давления на англо-французов.
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Следует отметить, что британская пресса, еще с весны 1939 года, проявляла большой интерес к переговорам с СССР и требовала - даже консервативные газеты - скорейшего заключения договора с СССР. Те же настроения показывали и проводимые в Великобритании опросы общественного мнения - в апреле 1939 года опросы общественного мнения показали то, что почти девяносто процентов британского населения хотели антигитлеровского союза с СССР. Однако все это не смогло победить стойкий анти-большевизм Чемберлена и заставить его действовать быстрее. См. Daniel Hucker "Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France".
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Заключение "пакта Молотова-Риббентропа" было, тем не менее, встречено британской прессой довольно спокойно - большинство газет написали, что это ничего не меняет
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Договор о ненападении между Германией и СССР от 23 августа 1939 г. и дополнительный секретный протокол к нему
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/nonagres.asp
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/addsepro.asp
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Реакция Великобритании на германское вторжение в Польшу
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/gbmenu.asp
Реакция Франции на германское вторжение в Польшу
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/frmenu.asp
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Последний шанс избежать начала Второй мировой войны
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/167512.html
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/168565.html
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/168721.html
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Солонин: Как Чемберлен Гитлера напугал
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/169127.html
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Как поляки с Гитлером поссорились - начало
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/167289.html
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Поляки и словаки
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/167693.html
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Как польские моряки с нацистами дружили
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/162864.html
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Польское искусство в нацистской Германии
https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/162723.html
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https://pluto9999.livejournal.com/166507.html
СССР, ИТАЛИЯ И ГЕРМАНО-СОВЕТСКИЙ ПАКТ 23 августа 1939 г..