Retconning Neville Chamberlain and Munich

[jordan179]

As we approach the end of the Strauss-Howe Generational Cycle that began with the Crisis of 1929-53, and we gradually forget or deny the lessons of history taught us by World War II as the generation which actually fought the war dies out, I've noticed that history is repeating itself with regard to appeasing (Obama) or allying with (Putin) the

Comments

[affablestranger]

What they rely on, indeed they do work hard to encourage, forgetfulness of the past.

[jordan179]

The stupidity of what they are doing is that they have to know Chamberlain's mistake in order to suppress it. What makes them think that a Chamberlain-like approach will produce a different result this time? Especially since radical Islam is if anything less peaceful and rational than was German National Socialism?

[maxgoof]

Einstein's definition of insanity.

[tagryn]

* The French military pre-WWII had an exclusively defensive mindset, exemplified by the Maginot Line but also manifested in the lackluster toe-in-the-water offensive into the Saar in 1939 in reaction to the invasion of Poland. This attitude wasn't something that emerged suddenly in the 1-year interim between '38 and '39; they weren't going to be players unless they were forced to be. To reverse something you say in your post, "Allied strengths mean nothing if one fails to fight

Germany Vs. Czechoslovakia

[jordan179]

* The French military pre-WWII had an exclusively defensive mindset, exemplified by the Maginot Line but also manifested in the lackluster toe-in-the-water offensive into the Saar in 1939 in reaction to the invasion of Poland. This attitude wasn't something that emerged suddenly in the 1-year interim between '38 and '39; they weren't going to be players unless they were forced to be. To reverse something you say in your post, "Allied strengths mean nothing if one fails to fight."

Yes, this is quite true. But the French military was not so defensive-minded that it would have stayed put had the Germans not defended their western borders. The French would probably have launched probing attacks, as they did before May 1940 in OTL, and if the Germans had not stationed troops on their border, the French would have begun (cautiously) marching in

Re: Germany Vs. Czechoslovakia

[tagryn]

* Lets remember that the German reoccupation of the Ruhr happened in 1936, two years before the '38 crisis happened. France was in an even more superior military position vis-a-vis Germany in '36, and still refused to confront with force over this violation of Versailles. They had the resources - we haven't even discussed the Marine Nationale, which could have closed off the Mediterranean to the Axis on its own - just not the will

A Mistake in Judgement

[jordan179]

* Last paragraph: incorrect, Chamberlain and the other Allies had the very recent example of German aggression in WWI, less than a quarter-century before. Most of the leaders of the time had living memory and firsthand experience of how wars could start, but also how devastating war could be, which is probably why they went with diplomacy until the bitter end, because they'd seen with their own eyes what its failure would mean.

German aggression in World War One was hardly unprovoked. World War One was in fact started by the Serbians, a fact of which Chamberlain would have been well aware. Austria responded to the Serbian assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by declaring war on Serbia; the Russians then declared war on Austria; and that dragged in both France and Germany. The single unprovoked act of German aggression in World War One -- and the one which made British intervention inevitable even given public treaties -- was the German invasion of Belgium ... and the Germans there would have been satisfied with rights of

[maxgoof]

[ford_prefect42]

Interesting, however, that article leaves off one VERY important detail. WHY was Britain's military in such a state? It's not like Germany had been making a secret of their military expansion and expansionist intent! Churchill was advocating as loudly as possible for a rearmament of Great Britain starting as early as 1932! That's 6 years during which Great Britain was, under the "wise" auspices of Chamberlain and Baldwin (same party), doing nothing to counter what was a clear and obvious threat!

So, while Chamberlain may legitimately not have had any particularly viable options in 1938, whose fault IS that anyway? That would be one Neville Chamberlain!

[jordan179]

It was very much the fault of the British establishment, by which I mean almost all the political leaders. They were united in the delusion that a glorious new age in which warfare was utterly-impractical had dawned and that real power was now what the Europeans term "soft power" -- which is to say money and diplomatic influence -- with the believers in "hard power" (military might) being men of the past.

Like the "soft power" advocates of today, they resolutely refuse to think things through -- to work out in their heads what happens if the potential aggressor states refuse to be enticed or impressed by the wealth or influence. Usually, they refuse to even think in terms of "potential aggressor states" -- they assume mirrored capabilities and intentions, which means that they avoid thinking too clearly about the nature of their potential opposition