Retconning Neville Chamberlain and Munich

[jordan179]

As we approach the end of the Strauss-Howe Generational Cycle that began with the Crisis of 1929-53, and we gradually forget or deny the lessons of history taught us by World War II as the generation which actually fought the war dies out, I've noticed that history is repeating itself with regard to appeasing (Obama) or allying with (Putin) the

Comments

Germany Vs. Czechoslovakia

[jordan179]

* The French military pre-WWII had an exclusively defensive mindset, exemplified by the Maginot Line but also manifested in the lackluster toe-in-the-water offensive into the Saar in 1939 in reaction to the invasion of Poland. This attitude wasn't something that emerged suddenly in the 1-year interim between '38 and '39; they weren't going to be players unless they were forced to be. To reverse something you say in your post, "Allied strengths mean nothing if one fails to fight."

Yes, this is quite true. But the French military was not so defensive-minded that it would have stayed put had the Germans not defended their western borders. The French would probably have launched probing attacks, as they did before May 1940 in OTL, and if the Germans had not stationed troops on their border, the French would have begun (cautiously) marching in.

This means that the Germans would have had to defend their border with France, which (given the relatively smaller size of the Wehrmacht in 1938 as opposed to 1939) would have limited the forces available for the Czech campaign. I'm not saying that the Germans still wouldn't have won in Czechoslovakia, simply that it might not have been such a walkover as Baumann assumes.

And note that what happened, instead, was that the French didn't attack in 1939-40, and then were overrun in 1940, in part because the Germans had the resources of Czechoslovakia and Poland added to their own by that time. Generally speaking, it's better to fight an aggressor earlier rather than later, because the longer one waits, the more the aggressor conquers, enhancing his own position against oneself.

One additional thing: the French had a much stronger diplomatic committment to Czechoslovakia than they did to Poland. They might have been more willing to fight in 1938 than in 1939, even though the British position was the opposite. The French only backed down in 1938 because, without Chamberlain, the French might have found themselves fighting alone.

* ...and without the French leading the way, it really didn't matter what the British managed to scrape together for a BEF in '38, which as Baumann states wouldn't have been much, symbolic at best.

Oh, it's not so much the BEF as the Royal Navy. If the war starts in 1938 rather than 1939, that's a whole year of imports denied the Germans by naval blockade. This further weakens any future German invasion of France.

* So we're left with what the Czechs were faced with in reality, the option of fighting Germany alone.

No, if the Czechs had to fight Germany alone, this would mean that the Germans could deploy the whole Wehrmacht backed by supplies imported from overseas, instead of the Wehrmacht minus the Western frontier force with an inability to purchase supplies abroad. That would be a much tougher row to hoe, and that's why the Czechs capitulated in 1938 when the Western Allies betrayed them.

so the real question isn't why Chamberlain and the French leadership capitulated at Munich, but why the Czech leaders went along with it, instead of hunkering inside their fortifications and daring Hitler to come take them, if they dared. Considering the Brits and French would have been fighting for honor, while the Czechs for their homes and land, the expectation would be that the latter would put up more resistance than the former.

The Czech long-term position was hopeless unless they had the Western Great Powers on their side. Absent France, the Germans could send their whole army against Czechoslovakia; absent Britain, the Germans would have had plenty of supplies for that army. In a one-on-one fight, even with World War One technology, the Germans would have won if only by attrition -- and even in World War One, the Germans were famous for their tactical skill, so they might have been able to break through anyway.

Re: Germany Vs. Czechoslovakia

[tagryn]

* Lets remember that the German reoccupation of the Ruhr happened in 1936, two years before the '38 crisis happened. France was in an even more superior military position vis-a-vis Germany in '36, and still refused to confront with force over this violation of Versailles. They had the resources - we haven't even discussed the Marine Nationale, which could have closed off the Mediterranean to the Axis on its own - just not the will.

* Agreed about the Royal Navy being the real threat. If they'd been willing to violate Norwegian neutrality, closing off the iron ore route from Sweden would have caused the German rearmament program major problems. However, I don't think even Churchill was cold-blooded enough to advocate sinking neutral shipping, even after war had been declared.

* The Czech internal disputes, which that site discusses somewhat, were a big problem for them as well. The Suden Germans loyalty was a real question, and as as national entity they hadn't been together long enough to resolve the myriad issues between the Czechs and Slovaks AFAIK. On the face of it they had the manpower and fortifications to "hedgehog" enough to make the Germans think twice, a strategy that worked for Switzerland all during the war, but the military considerations were not the only considerations for them.