Retconning Neville Chamberlain and Munich

[jordan179]

As we approach the end of the Strauss-Howe Generational Cycle that began with the Crisis of 1929-53, and we gradually forget or deny the lessons of history taught us by World War II as the generation which actually fought the war dies out, I've noticed that history is repeating itself with regard to appeasing (Obama) or allying with (Putin) the

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[jordan179]

It was very much the fault of the British establishment, by which I mean almost all the political leaders. They were united in the delusion that a glorious new age in which warfare was utterly-impractical had dawned and that real power was now what the Europeans term "soft power" -- which is to say money and diplomatic influence -- with the believers in "hard power" (military might) being men of the past.

Like the "soft power" advocates of today, they resolutely refuse to think things through -- to work out in their heads what happens if the potential aggressor states refuse to be enticed or impressed by the wealth or influence. Usually, they refuse to even think in terms of "potential aggressor states" -- they assume mirrored capabilities and intentions, which means that they avoid thinking too clearly about the nature of their potential opposition.

The British assumed that "the bomber will always get through" (fighter interception impossible) and furthermore that the bomber would be totally devastating (only one raid needed to utterly destroy one city). They also assumed that ground defenses were essentially impenetrable. So their mental model of a future war would be that both sides would sit behind their own fortified lines, launching air raids against each other's cities, until one or both sides collapsed from attrition -- kind of a slowed-down version of a 1980's concept of strategic nuclear war. A good example of what they were expecting can be seen in H. G. Wells' movie The Shape of Things to Come.

This model also meant that any war between two sides possessing both air fleets and professional armies would be utterly-devastating even to the winner, who would as a matter of course target each other's greater cities first. This is why the Western Allies were afraid to fight Germany even when Germany was much weaker -- they truly believed that, whatever the outcome, cities like London, Birmingham, Paris and Orleans would be leveled.

So men like Chamberlain assumed that their only options were either to avoid war at all costs (and Hitler, being reasonable, would surely realize the same thing and also try to avoid war at all costs); or for the Western Allies to be devastated. This led him to try so hard to avoid war that Hitler noticed what he was doing and gamed this aversion to Hitler's own advantage.

The result, ironically, was that Britain and France were devastated (though not as thoroughly as had been feared) in a war which became inevitable because of Chamberlain's attempts to avoid it. I trust that the relevance of this tale to the present day is obvious?