I thought validity applied to the form of an argument (i.e. when the truth of the premises entails the truth of the conclusion), not a judgment.
I'll try to articulate my understanding here. Judgments have a syllogistic form which we reference for the validity of a judgment. So, iirc, for Kant validity of a judgment requires that it have a major and minor premise; so my judgment that Caius is mortal is valid because it is composed of the argument that all humans are mortal (major) and Caius is human (minor). These premises achieve validity as judgments likewise - all humans are animals, animals are mortal, etc. And reason, to unify its reflections on experience, tends to the unconditioned of judgments (the ideas of reason, God, world, and soul, which ground theology, cosmology, and anthropology). And I think this is why we need an account of dialectical logic as well as analytic logic... but this is getting off topic.
I don't understand why "experience obliges us to consider our appearances as subsumed under the limits of our
( ... )
But since things as they appear to us are subsumed under the limits of our understanding, we are obliged to think of things as if they are exactly as they appear.
Expand on this? I don't see the logical path. Why does the subsumption of things as they appear to us under the limits of our understanding oblige us to think of things as if they are as they appear?
Because our understanding is obliged to judge about things within its own limits, and its limits are constitutive of the way things appear to us (e.g. causal), we can only regard things as they appear as the relevant things in themselves to judge about.
Consider, if you were to deny a plainly causal event, for example in billiards, we would consider you unreasonable, even if you in fact are right to judge that no cause is in the appearance of one ball coming up against another and stopping whilst the other ball began to move (as Hume showed). Thus to be reasonable is to judge with respect to the obligations of your understanding, even though we can't know (i.e. we don't have any sense confirming) that these obligations actually correspond to things in themselves.
But if there is an eternal possibility of being deceived about the world, how does testing let us make sure we are correct? Oh that's easy; by the eternal possibility of not being deceived about the world. I fixed it!
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I'll try to articulate my understanding here. Judgments have a syllogistic form which we reference for the validity of a judgment. So, iirc, for Kant validity of a judgment requires that it have a major and minor premise; so my judgment that Caius is mortal is valid because it is composed of the argument that all humans are mortal (major) and Caius is human (minor). These premises achieve validity as judgments likewise - all humans are animals, animals are mortal, etc. And reason, to unify its reflections on experience, tends to the unconditioned of judgments (the ideas of reason, God, world, and soul, which ground theology, cosmology, and anthropology). And I think this is why we need an account of dialectical logic as well as analytic logic... but this is getting off topic.
I don't understand why "experience obliges us to consider our appearances as subsumed under the limits of our ( ... )
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Expand on this? I don't see the logical path. Why does the subsumption of things as they appear to us under the limits of our understanding oblige us to think of things as if they are as they appear?
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Consider, if you were to deny a plainly causal event, for example in billiards, we would consider you unreasonable, even if you in fact are right to judge that no cause is in the appearance of one ball coming up against another and stopping whilst the other ball began to move (as Hume showed). Thus to be reasonable is to judge with respect to the obligations of your understanding, even though we can't know (i.e. we don't have any sense confirming) that these obligations actually correspond to things in themselves.
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Oh that's easy; by the eternal possibility of not being deceived about the world. I fixed it!
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