The past five days or so have been one of those rare times in my life when my social life expands to the exclusion of all my concrete projects. It's been real good.( Read more... )
I would say that attitudes, beliefs, and feelings are not memories per se. Well, I guess, but then I'm not too sure about any distinction between memory and knowledge. If I learn that south american monkeys have a different kind of nose from old world monkeys, and I remember that, is that memory or knowledge? Similarly, if I learn to ride a bike, is that procedural memory or procedural knowledge? I'm honestly asking, is there some clear distinction that's drawn? 'Cos it seems to me that 'memory' can be stretched to any information stored in the mind that's derived from past experience, which is almost all of it. And if knowledge counts, then belief would have to count, insofar as they differ in terms of how reality is. And I think beliefs and attitudes blur into one another ('I hate him' blurs into 'he is a bastard').
And Freud was a fraud. You take that back!
if your hypothesis (that most memories have some of each), it would be much harder to explain these cases.Well fine, I guess - I'm not (yet) an empirical neurophysiologist,
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Re: reason + empathypaulhopeAugust 29 2006, 23:22:47 UTC
See, I think what this is likely to come down to is us both recognising the problems the other is talking about but saying 'yeah but your problems are BIGGER'.
That may be true. :)
Also, I'm curious what you mean by 'hermeneutics', since you seem very keen on it when it's Bayesian.
Hmm. I'm not sure I can articulate what I mean.
I think what I'm trying to get at is the difference between using evidence as the basis for an inference about the process that caused it--which I would classify broadly as science, in my own head--with the act of viewing evidence--say, a text--with goal of interpreting it, to find its 'true meaning
( ... )
Yeah, so this makes sense. So I guess what I've been trying to get at, is that I think psychology ought to have a significant hermeneutic element as well as a predictive or explanatory element. Things must be both explained and explicated, so to speak. Thoughts and acts can be interpreted like texts (actually, texts can be interpreted like thoughts and acts). And rigorous empirical hermeneutics is pretty much a non-starter (I don't think you can really do Bayesian hermeneutics with 'hypotheses about meaning' because you need to interpret those meanings into place first). You associate science with the explanatory aspect - that, I suppose, is a defesible view. But I don't have a problem with psychology not being fully 'scientific' in that sense.
is that I think psychology ought to have a significant hermeneutic element as well as a predictive or explanatory element. Things must be both explained and explicated, so to speak.
What do you see as the purpose of this approach? What is the goal of this interpretation, and how do we judge whether or not such an interpretation is a good one?
For me, the most compelling examples of hermeneutics in, say, studying literature are, for example, those that claim to discover hidden or coded themes in the work being studied. But for that to be a meaningful discovery to me, there needs to be the implication from that to the claim that it was the intention of the author. While this is a controversial point whenever I talk to literary theory people, I can't figure out the point of coming up with a "meaning" of a text divorced from its relationship to its author. If it's not grounded in something like that, how can we say that there is a truth of the matter as to its meaning
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What is the goal of this interpretation, and how do we judge whether or not such an interpretation is a good one? The goal would be to understand people's thoughts, words, and actions in a certain way. If someone says something to me, it won't help me much to only know what other facts that utterance is often correlated with, what results it has, what chains of physical events may have caused it. I have to, in essence, try to reconstruct in my mind what's going on in their mind - i.e. to understand the meaning of their words (or acts). The empirical facts may help me to form this understanding, but the understanding itself goes beyond them.
I can't figure out the point of coming up with a "meaning" of a text divorced from its relationship to its author. If it's not grounded in something like that, how can we say that there is a truth of the matter as to its meaning? I would strongly agree. Meanings only have truth-values in terms of authorial intention. That intention, of course, is psychological.
If someone says something to me, it won't help me much to only know ... what chains of physical events may have caused it. I have to, in essence, try to reconstruct in my mind what's going on in their mind - i.e. to understand the meaning of their words (or acts).
So, I wouldn't say the purpose of psychology is to provide knowledge of a causal chain of physical events, necessarily. I would, however, say, that in "reconstruct[ing] in my mind what's going on in their mind," I am essentially coming up with a story about a causal chain of mental events (which may or may not be reducible to the physical--the metaphysical question here can remain open). That's what it means, to me, to know what is going on in something: it's to understand the parts and their (mostly causal--I can't think of other interesting ones) relationships.
But if the purpose of psychology is to come up with that causal story, then I think it's appropriate to approach it scientifically and not hermeneutically
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I am essentially coming up with a story about a causal chain of mental events...we use formal language to describe our hypotheses...Then suppose we empirically confirm one of them so that we can depend on a particular model. At that point, we basically have our completed psychology. And where do these formal terms (such as causation, mathematical formulae, etc.) come from? From the mind thought about or the mind thinking? It seems clear to me that it's from the mind thinking - that this framework is something imposed upon experience roughly a la kant. If this was the only way to understand the mind (I'm not denying that it is one, internally consistent, way to do so) then we'd basically be as far removed from a proper understanding of what the mental actually is as we are from a proper understanding of what the physical actually is
( ... )
I've been meaning to get back to this for a long time...
But I think hermeneutics (in the sense I've been using it) has the potential to give us an understanding of the mind better than our understanding of matter. In this sense, 'understanding' doesn't mean, as you say, 'the parts and their mostly causal relationships', it means bringing our minds to actually mimic what's going on in their minds.
This is an interesting thought. My primary reaction, though, is that this isn't what psychology--even Freudian psychology--is up to.
The problem is, as I've said before, that a lot of mental states are unconscious, so having them in our minds doesn't really bring us any closer to understanding them. I'm not a Freudian, so the details on this may be sloppy, but suppose I want to understand what a repressed, subconscious Oedipal complex is. If I have the repressed, subconscious, Oedipal complex, I shouldn't be aware of it, by definition. So I haven't really learned anything about it
( ... )
I've been meaning to get back to this for a long time Nurse, bring me the defibrillators! I don't care what it takes, I'm not letting this one die!
My primary reaction, though, is that this isn't what psychology--even Freudian psychology--is up to. I completely understand that, and I don't think it's an unreasonable way to use the term. But then I'd just say that psychologists (or someone) should be up to this, and that many (especially psychoanalysts) are up to it, even if they won't admit it - isn't that roughly what you've been arguing that? That they're not doing proper psychology-as-you-define-it?
suppose I want to understand what a repressed, subconscious Oedipal complex is. If I have the repressed, subconscious, Oedipal complex, I shouldn't be aware of it, by definition. So I haven't really learned anything about it.Well, the idea goes that a repressed, subconscious Oedipus complex is pretty similar to conscious Oedipus complex - the feelings of desire, jealousy, hostility, guilt, fear, etc. can all be understood with the
( ... )
But then I'd just say that psychologists (or someone) should be up to this, and that many (especially psychoanalysts) are up to it, even if they won't admit it - isn't that roughly what you've been arguing that?
Oy. Probably. It's gotten to the point that I don't remember what I'm arguing.
But I think what I've been trying to say is that the psychoanalysts at fault are doing the right thing (trying to come up with explanations of people's behavior and then use them to effect positive change in a reliable way) but doing it in a way that doesn't provide reliable or justified explanations.
I think the kind of conscious mental replay on the part of the psychoanalyst is something relatively new that you've introduced. I'm still not sure what role its supposed to play. E.g,
Well, the idea goes that a repressed, subconscious Oedipus complex is pretty similar to conscious Oedipus complex - the feelings of desire, jealousy, hostility, guilt, fear, etc. can all be understood with the help of their conscious analogues.Would you,
( ... )
Well, you're starting a course in consciousness, I'm starting a three-year degree in psychology (and philosophy). So maybe we should adjourn this meeting for now and come back when we've absorbed more soul-energy? I think I principally disagree with you about qualia/consciousness/unconscious-consciousness etc., and about the function of psychology - I think there's more to it than explanatory models that allow us to cure people. But as I said, adjourn for now?
in terms of conscious experiencepaulhopeAugust 24 2006, 19:23:38 UTC
I think - we may be thinking of different things.
Like what? What sorts of things are you talking about?
These, though, aren't as interesting, from my point of view, and from the psychoanalytic point of view, as certain other functions.
In the category of "mental functions that are not necessarily definable exclusively in terms of conscious experience," I'd include perception, conceptualization, the vast majority of reasoning, memory, language use.... "Exclusively" would be the key term here. I haven't studied emotion much at all, but I think a functionalist account of them would probably put them into the same category.
So, either we are disagreeing about what should be included in this category, or we are disagreeing quite a bit about what psychological functions are interesting.
Re: in terms of conscious experiencelukiferAugust 24 2006, 22:11:06 UTC
"Exclusively" would be the key term here. Yes, that's true. But I think it betrays a mistake. I think in principle all mental functions should be definable or at least describable in both conscious terms, neurological terms, and (possibly, if we had Super!Knowledge of detailed circumstances) behavioural terms. So there is no class of things definable 'exclusively' in terms of any of them. The things I was talking about were things, rather circularly, where declarative awareness is very hard to get, and precise neurological and behavioural information is comparatively easy to get. Like...how does the mind process shapes. When can we discriminate between different colours. Etc. What I'm distancing them from is things like why people get depressed, what makes people satisfied with their lives, what are the origins of neurosis. When will someone risk their own lives for a cause. Etc. Also, things like 'what does it feel like to discriminate colours?', 'what does it mean to be depressed'.
Re: in terms of conscious experiencepaulhopeAugust 25 2006, 14:11:31 UTC
I think in principle all mental functions should be definable or at least describable in both conscious terms, neurological terms, and (possibly, if we had Super!Knowledge of detailed circumstances) behavioural terms.
Why this set of kinds of terms? (As opposed to one that includes things like an algorithmic level of description, or a "computational"--not sure how to summarize this one, but David Marr was a big proponent of it--level of description?)
And do you mean that if something is to be a mental function, it must have all three of those kinds of properties ('conscious,' neural, and behavioral)? Because I think I would disagree.
Back on point though, your original claim was that:
Because we who theorise are full to the brim with conscious experience we can make theories that are phrased in terms drawn from or definable in terms of the terms of conscious experience. But rigourous empirical methods can only be applied to mathematical-statistical systems. So to use them in psychology, you need to do a conversion from the terms
( ... )
Well, I guess, but then I'm not too sure about any distinction between memory and knowledge. If I learn that south american monkeys have a different kind of nose from old world monkeys, and I remember that, is that memory or knowledge? Similarly, if I learn to ride a bike, is that procedural memory or procedural knowledge? I'm honestly asking, is there some clear distinction that's drawn? 'Cos it seems to me that 'memory' can be stretched to any information stored in the mind that's derived from past experience, which is almost all of it. And if knowledge counts, then belief would have to count, insofar as they differ in terms of how reality is. And I think beliefs and attitudes blur into one another ('I hate him' blurs into 'he is a bastard').
And Freud was a fraud.
You take that back!
if your hypothesis (that most memories have some of each), it would be much harder to explain these cases.Well fine, I guess - I'm not (yet) an empirical neurophysiologist, ( ... )
Reply
That may be true. :)
Also, I'm curious what you mean by 'hermeneutics', since you seem very keen on it when it's Bayesian.
Hmm. I'm not sure I can articulate what I mean.
I think what I'm trying to get at is the difference between using evidence as the basis for an inference about the process that caused it--which I would classify broadly as science, in my own head--with the act of viewing evidence--say, a text--with goal of interpreting it, to find its 'true meaning ( ... )
Reply
Reply
What do you see as the purpose of this approach? What is the goal of this interpretation, and how do we judge whether or not such an interpretation is a good one?
For me, the most compelling examples of hermeneutics in, say, studying literature are, for example, those that claim to discover hidden or coded themes in the work being studied. But for that to be a meaningful discovery to me, there needs to be the implication from that to the claim that it was the intention of the author. While this is a controversial point whenever I talk to literary theory people, I can't figure out the point of coming up with a "meaning" of a text divorced from its relationship to its author. If it's not grounded in something like that, how can we say that there is a truth of the matter as to its meaning ( ... )
Reply
The goal would be to understand people's thoughts, words, and actions in a certain way. If someone says something to me, it won't help me much to only know what other facts that utterance is often correlated with, what results it has, what chains of physical events may have caused it. I have to, in essence, try to reconstruct in my mind what's going on in their mind - i.e. to understand the meaning of their words (or acts). The empirical facts may help me to form this understanding, but the understanding itself goes beyond them.
I can't figure out the point of coming up with a "meaning" of a text divorced from its relationship to its author. If it's not grounded in something like that, how can we say that there is a truth of the matter as to its meaning?
I would strongly agree. Meanings only have truth-values in terms of authorial intention. That intention, of course, is psychological.
Why do you have to interpet those ( ... )
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So, I wouldn't say the purpose of psychology is to provide knowledge of a causal chain of physical events, necessarily. I would, however, say, that in "reconstruct[ing] in my mind what's going on in their mind," I am essentially coming up with a story about a causal chain of mental events (which may or may not be reducible to the physical--the metaphysical question here can remain open). That's what it means, to me, to know what is going on in something: it's to understand the parts and their (mostly causal--I can't think of other interesting ones) relationships.
But if the purpose of psychology is to come up with that causal story, then I think it's appropriate to approach it scientifically and not hermeneutically ( ... )
Reply
And where do these formal terms (such as causation, mathematical formulae, etc.) come from? From the mind thought about or the mind thinking? It seems clear to me that it's from the mind thinking - that this framework is something imposed upon experience roughly a la kant. If this was the only way to understand the mind (I'm not denying that it is one, internally consistent, way to do so) then we'd basically be as far removed from a proper understanding of what the mental actually is as we are from a proper understanding of what the physical actually is ( ... )
Reply
But I think hermeneutics (in the sense I've been using it) has the potential to give us an understanding of the mind better than our understanding of matter. In this sense, 'understanding' doesn't mean, as you say, 'the parts and their mostly causal relationships', it means bringing our minds to actually mimic what's going on in their minds.
This is an interesting thought. My primary reaction, though, is that this isn't what psychology--even Freudian psychology--is up to.
The problem is, as I've said before, that a lot of mental states are unconscious, so having them in our minds doesn't really bring us any closer to understanding them. I'm not a Freudian, so the details on this may be sloppy, but suppose I want to understand what a repressed, subconscious Oedipal complex is. If I have the repressed, subconscious, Oedipal complex, I shouldn't be aware of it, by definition. So I haven't really learned anything about it ( ... )
Reply
Nurse, bring me the defibrillators! I don't care what it takes, I'm not letting this one die!
My primary reaction, though, is that this isn't what psychology--even Freudian psychology--is up to.
I completely understand that, and I don't think it's an unreasonable way to use the term. But then I'd just say that psychologists (or someone) should be up to this, and that many (especially psychoanalysts) are up to it, even if they won't admit it - isn't that roughly what you've been arguing that? That they're not doing proper psychology-as-you-define-it?
suppose I want to understand what a repressed, subconscious Oedipal complex is. If I have the repressed, subconscious, Oedipal complex, I shouldn't be aware of it, by definition. So I haven't really learned anything about it.Well, the idea goes that a repressed, subconscious Oedipus complex is pretty similar to conscious Oedipus complex - the feelings of desire, jealousy, hostility, guilt, fear, etc. can all be understood with the ( ... )
Reply
Oy. Probably. It's gotten to the point that I don't remember what I'm arguing.
But I think what I've been trying to say is that the psychoanalysts at fault are doing the right thing (trying to come up with explanations of people's behavior and then use them to effect positive change in a reliable way) but doing it in a way that doesn't provide reliable or justified explanations.
I think the kind of conscious mental replay on the part of the psychoanalyst is something relatively new that you've introduced. I'm still not sure what role its supposed to play. E.g,
Well, the idea goes that a repressed, subconscious Oedipus complex is pretty similar to conscious Oedipus complex - the feelings of desire, jealousy, hostility, guilt, fear, etc. can all be understood with the help of their conscious analogues.Would you, ( ... )
Reply
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Like what? What sorts of things are you talking about?
These, though, aren't as interesting, from my point of view, and from the psychoanalytic point of view, as certain other functions.
In the category of "mental functions that are not necessarily definable exclusively in terms of conscious experience," I'd include perception, conceptualization, the vast majority of reasoning, memory, language use.... "Exclusively" would be the key term here. I haven't studied emotion much at all, but I think a functionalist account of them would probably put them into the same category.
So, either we are disagreeing about what should be included in this category, or we are disagreeing quite a bit about what psychological functions are interesting.
Reply
Yes, that's true. But I think it betrays a mistake. I think in principle all mental functions should be definable or at least describable in both conscious terms, neurological terms, and (possibly, if we had Super!Knowledge of detailed circumstances) behavioural terms. So there is no class of things definable 'exclusively' in terms of any of them. The things I was talking about were things, rather circularly, where declarative awareness is very hard to get, and precise neurological and behavioural information is comparatively easy to get. Like...how does the mind process shapes. When can we discriminate between different colours. Etc. What I'm distancing them from is things like why people get depressed, what makes people satisfied with their lives, what are the origins of neurosis. When will someone risk their own lives for a cause. Etc. Also, things like 'what does it feel like to discriminate colours?', 'what does it mean to be depressed'.
Reply
Why this set of kinds of terms? (As opposed to one that includes things like an algorithmic level of description, or a "computational"--not sure how to summarize this one, but David Marr was a big proponent of it--level of description?)
And do you mean that if something is to be a mental function, it must have all three of those kinds of properties ('conscious,' neural, and behavioral)? Because I think I would disagree.
Back on point though, your original claim was that:
Because we who theorise are full to the brim with conscious experience we can make theories that are phrased in terms drawn from or definable in terms of the terms of conscious experience. But rigourous empirical methods can only be applied to mathematical-statistical systems. So to use them in psychology, you need to do a conversion from the terms ( ... )
Reply
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