The past five days or so have been one of those rare times in my life when my social life expands to the exclusion of all my concrete projects. It's been real good.( Read more... )
If someone says something to me, it won't help me much to only know ... what chains of physical events may have caused it. I have to, in essence, try to reconstruct in my mind what's going on in their mind - i.e. to understand the meaning of their words (or acts).
So, I wouldn't say the purpose of psychology is to provide knowledge of a causal chain of physical events, necessarily. I would, however, say, that in "reconstruct[ing] in my mind what's going on in their mind," I am essentially coming up with a story about a causal chain of mental events (which may or may not be reducible to the physical--the metaphysical question here can remain open). That's what it means, to me, to know what is going on in something: it's to understand the parts and their (mostly causal--I can't think of other interesting ones) relationships.
But if the purpose of psychology is to come up with that causal story, then I think it's appropriate to approach it scientifically and not hermeneutically.
I've read it a couple times, and I don't understand the logic of your last paragraph. Suppose we use formal language to describe our hypotheses, as you claim we do in natural science. Then suppose we empirically confirm one of them so that we can depend on a particular model. At that point, we basically have our completed psychology. If there is such a thing as happiness, then we should be able to find it in the model, as with schizophrenia.
The method of taking folk psychological terms (e.g. happiness) and then interpreting them so as to create models may help motivate interesting research, but ultimately that seems sloppy to me. It's possible that our everyday notions of happiness are confusions of several different phenomena. If that's the case, why should we hold onto the crude idea, 'happiness', in our psychological theory? Better to get an accurate and elegant model--with mental states labeled only by numbers, if it must be--and then come up with language to describe that.
I am essentially coming up with a story about a causal chain of mental events...we use formal language to describe our hypotheses...Then suppose we empirically confirm one of them so that we can depend on a particular model. At that point, we basically have our completed psychology. And where do these formal terms (such as causation, mathematical formulae, etc.) come from? From the mind thought about or the mind thinking? It seems clear to me that it's from the mind thinking - that this framework is something imposed upon experience roughly a la kant. If this was the only way to understand the mind (I'm not denying that it is one, internally consistent, way to do so) then we'd basically be as far removed from a proper understanding of what the mental actually is as we are from a proper understanding of what the physical actually is.
But I think hermeneutics (in the sense I've been using it) has the potential to give us an understanding of the mind better than our understanding of matter. In this sense, 'understanding' doesn't mean, as you say, 'the parts and their mostly causal relationships', it means bringing our minds to actually mimic what's going on in their minds.
It's possible that our everyday notions of happiness are confusions of several different phenomena. If that's of different physical phenomena, then they're still the same mental phenomenon; if that's of different mental phenomena, then phenomenological analysis should be able to distinguish them, and there's no need to 'hold onto the crude idea'. But 'finding' happiness in a purely formal, mathematical theory seems to me to rather be a matter of 'losing' an idea of what happiness actually is.
I've been meaning to get back to this for a long time...
But I think hermeneutics (in the sense I've been using it) has the potential to give us an understanding of the mind better than our understanding of matter. In this sense, 'understanding' doesn't mean, as you say, 'the parts and their mostly causal relationships', it means bringing our minds to actually mimic what's going on in their minds.
This is an interesting thought. My primary reaction, though, is that this isn't what psychology--even Freudian psychology--is up to.
The problem is, as I've said before, that a lot of mental states are unconscious, so having them in our minds doesn't really bring us any closer to understanding them. I'm not a Freudian, so the details on this may be sloppy, but suppose I want to understand what a repressed, subconscious Oedipal complex is. If I have the repressed, subconscious, Oedipal complex, I shouldn't be aware of it, by definition. So I haven't really learned anything about it.
The same goes for unconscious mental events that are, you know, real. Like most concept formation, a lot of vision, etc.
if that's of different mental phenomena, then phenomenological analysis should be able to distinguish them, and there's no need to 'hold onto the crude idea'.
Unless there are (i) mental phenomena that have no phenomenological component, or (ii) limits on our phenomenological analysis due to methodological issues. I think the latter is a serious concern.
I've been meaning to get back to this for a long time Nurse, bring me the defibrillators! I don't care what it takes, I'm not letting this one die!
My primary reaction, though, is that this isn't what psychology--even Freudian psychology--is up to. I completely understand that, and I don't think it's an unreasonable way to use the term. But then I'd just say that psychologists (or someone) should be up to this, and that many (especially psychoanalysts) are up to it, even if they won't admit it - isn't that roughly what you've been arguing that? That they're not doing proper psychology-as-you-define-it?
suppose I want to understand what a repressed, subconscious Oedipal complex is. If I have the repressed, subconscious, Oedipal complex, I shouldn't be aware of it, by definition. So I haven't really learned anything about it. Well, the idea goes that a repressed, subconscious Oedipus complex is pretty similar to conscious Oedipus complex - the feelings of desire, jealousy, hostility, guilt, fear, etc. can all be understood with the help of their conscious analogues.
Also, I think there tends to be an issue with 'conscious-unconscious'. Phenomenal consciousness and access-consciousness aren't the same thing (David Chalmers is quite good at explaining this), so to speak of an 'unconscious hostility' doesn't necessarily mean a not-phenomenally-conscious hostility, but a phenomenally-conscious hostility that we can't have access to higher-order states about - that we cannot 'be conscious of'.
But then I'd just say that psychologists (or someone) should be up to this, and that many (especially psychoanalysts) are up to it, even if they won't admit it - isn't that roughly what you've been arguing that?
Oy. Probably. It's gotten to the point that I don't remember what I'm arguing.
But I think what I've been trying to say is that the psychoanalysts at fault are doing the right thing (trying to come up with explanations of people's behavior and then use them to effect positive change in a reliable way) but doing it in a way that doesn't provide reliable or justified explanations.
I think the kind of conscious mental replay on the part of the psychoanalyst is something relatively new that you've introduced. I'm still not sure what role its supposed to play. E.g,
Well, the idea goes that a repressed, subconscious Oedipus complex is pretty similar to conscious Oedipus complex - the feelings of desire, jealousy, hostility, guilt, fear, etc. can all be understood with the help of their conscious analogues.
Would you, personally, defend this idea? I don't see how it would work. I think two things need to be defended: (1) "A subconscious mental state of type X is pretty similar to a conscious mental state of type X" -- similar in what respects? I might accept this as tautologically true depending on how things are defined, but I want to know what I'm buying into. (2) "the feelings of .... can all be understood with the help of their conscious analogues." Why? For me, this doesn't follow from the interpretations of (1) I agree with most.
Phenomenal consciousness and access-consciousness aren't the same thing (David Chalmers is quite good at explaining this), so to speak of an 'unconscious hostility' doesn't necessarily mean a not-phenomenally-conscious hostility, but a phenomenally-conscious hostility that we can't have access to higher-order states about - that we cannot 'be conscious of'.
I'm aware of this distinction. My reaction to it (I think I posted in philosophy about it a while ago) was that it doesn't seem right to me to say that there are P-conscious mental states whose qualia are somehow fixed and that we come to be A-conscious of by virtue of some attentional spotlight. That seems to violate a lot of strong intuitions about qualia for me, and instead play upon intuitions (which I think are misplaced) about the permanency of physical objects. ("If the tree falls and there's nobody there to hear it, will it make a sound?" "Yes. Of course." I don't currently think this works with qualia.)
As an aside, my opinions on this topic are likely to develop rapidly in the next couple months because I happen to be taking a course right now of consciousness. So consider anything I say about the matter now a little unstable.
For now though, I need to go back to sleep. I was woken up this morning by somebody who I think was a phishing telemarketer. Grraah.
Well, you're starting a course in consciousness, I'm starting a three-year degree in psychology (and philosophy). So maybe we should adjourn this meeting for now and come back when we've absorbed more soul-energy? I think I principally disagree with you about qualia/consciousness/unconscious-consciousness etc., and about the function of psychology - I think there's more to it than explanatory models that allow us to cure people. But as I said, adjourn for now?
So, I wouldn't say the purpose of psychology is to provide knowledge of a causal chain of physical events, necessarily. I would, however, say, that in "reconstruct[ing] in my mind what's going on in their mind," I am essentially coming up with a story about a causal chain of mental events (which may or may not be reducible to the physical--the metaphysical question here can remain open). That's what it means, to me, to know what is going on in something: it's to understand the parts and their (mostly causal--I can't think of other interesting ones) relationships.
But if the purpose of psychology is to come up with that causal story, then I think it's appropriate to approach it scientifically and not hermeneutically.
I've read it a couple times, and I don't understand the logic of your last paragraph. Suppose we use formal language to describe our hypotheses, as you claim we do in natural science. Then suppose we empirically confirm one of them so that we can depend on a particular model. At that point, we basically have our completed psychology. If there is such a thing as happiness, then we should be able to find it in the model, as with schizophrenia.
The method of taking folk psychological terms (e.g. happiness) and then interpreting them so as to create models may help motivate interesting research, but ultimately that seems sloppy to me. It's possible that our everyday notions of happiness are confusions of several different phenomena. If that's the case, why should we hold onto the crude idea, 'happiness', in our psychological theory? Better to get an accurate and elegant model--with mental states labeled only by numbers, if it must be--and then come up with language to describe that.
Reply
And where do these formal terms (such as causation, mathematical formulae, etc.) come from? From the mind thought about or the mind thinking? It seems clear to me that it's from the mind thinking - that this framework is something imposed upon experience roughly a la kant. If this was the only way to understand the mind (I'm not denying that it is one, internally consistent, way to do so) then we'd basically be as far removed from a proper understanding of what the mental actually is as we are from a proper understanding of what the physical actually is.
But I think hermeneutics (in the sense I've been using it) has the potential to give us an understanding of the mind better than our understanding of matter. In this sense, 'understanding' doesn't mean, as you say, 'the parts and their mostly causal relationships', it means bringing our minds to actually mimic what's going on in their minds.
It's possible that our everyday notions of happiness are confusions of several different phenomena.
If that's of different physical phenomena, then they're still the same mental phenomenon; if that's of different mental phenomena, then phenomenological analysis should be able to distinguish them, and there's no need to 'hold onto the crude idea'. But 'finding' happiness in a purely formal, mathematical theory seems to me to rather be a matter of 'losing' an idea of what happiness actually is.
Reply
But I think hermeneutics (in the sense I've been using it) has the potential to give us an understanding of the mind better than our understanding of matter. In this sense, 'understanding' doesn't mean, as you say, 'the parts and their mostly causal relationships', it means bringing our minds to actually mimic what's going on in their minds.
This is an interesting thought. My primary reaction, though, is that this isn't what psychology--even Freudian psychology--is up to.
The problem is, as I've said before, that a lot of mental states are unconscious, so having them in our minds doesn't really bring us any closer to understanding them. I'm not a Freudian, so the details on this may be sloppy, but suppose I want to understand what a repressed, subconscious Oedipal complex is. If I have the repressed, subconscious, Oedipal complex, I shouldn't be aware of it, by definition. So I haven't really learned anything about it.
The same goes for unconscious mental events that are, you know, real. Like most concept formation, a lot of vision, etc.
if that's of different mental phenomena, then phenomenological analysis should be able to distinguish them, and there's no need to 'hold onto the crude idea'.
Unless there are (i) mental phenomena that have no phenomenological component, or (ii) limits on our phenomenological analysis due to methodological issues. I think the latter is a serious concern.
Reply
Nurse, bring me the defibrillators! I don't care what it takes, I'm not letting this one die!
My primary reaction, though, is that this isn't what psychology--even Freudian psychology--is up to.
I completely understand that, and I don't think it's an unreasonable way to use the term. But then I'd just say that psychologists (or someone) should be up to this, and that many (especially psychoanalysts) are up to it, even if they won't admit it - isn't that roughly what you've been arguing that? That they're not doing proper psychology-as-you-define-it?
suppose I want to understand what a repressed, subconscious Oedipal complex is. If I have the repressed, subconscious, Oedipal complex, I shouldn't be aware of it, by definition. So I haven't really learned anything about it.
Well, the idea goes that a repressed, subconscious Oedipus complex is pretty similar to conscious Oedipus complex - the feelings of desire, jealousy, hostility, guilt, fear, etc. can all be understood with the help of their conscious analogues.
Also, I think there tends to be an issue with 'conscious-unconscious'. Phenomenal consciousness and access-consciousness aren't the same thing (David Chalmers is quite good at explaining this), so to speak of an 'unconscious hostility' doesn't necessarily mean a not-phenomenally-conscious hostility, but a phenomenally-conscious hostility that we can't have access to higher-order states about - that we cannot 'be conscious of'.
Reply
Oy. Probably. It's gotten to the point that I don't remember what I'm arguing.
But I think what I've been trying to say is that the psychoanalysts at fault are doing the right thing (trying to come up with explanations of people's behavior and then use them to effect positive change in a reliable way) but doing it in a way that doesn't provide reliable or justified explanations.
I think the kind of conscious mental replay on the part of the psychoanalyst is something relatively new that you've introduced. I'm still not sure what role its supposed to play. E.g,
Well, the idea goes that a repressed, subconscious Oedipus complex is pretty similar to conscious Oedipus complex - the feelings of desire, jealousy, hostility, guilt, fear, etc. can all be understood with the help of their conscious analogues.
Would you, personally, defend this idea? I don't see how it would work. I think two things need to be defended:
(1) "A subconscious mental state of type X is pretty similar to a conscious mental state of type X" -- similar in what respects? I might accept this as tautologically true depending on how things are defined, but I want to know what I'm buying into.
(2) "the feelings of .... can all be understood with the help of their conscious analogues." Why? For me, this doesn't follow from the interpretations of (1) I agree with most.
Phenomenal consciousness and access-consciousness aren't the same thing (David Chalmers is quite good at explaining this), so to speak of an 'unconscious hostility' doesn't necessarily mean a not-phenomenally-conscious hostility, but a phenomenally-conscious hostility that we can't have access to higher-order states about - that we cannot 'be conscious of'.
I'm aware of this distinction. My reaction to it (I think I posted in philosophy about it a while ago) was that it doesn't seem right to me to say that there are P-conscious mental states whose qualia are somehow fixed and that we come to be A-conscious of by virtue of some attentional spotlight. That seems to violate a lot of strong intuitions about qualia for me, and instead play upon intuitions (which I think are misplaced) about the permanency of physical objects. ("If the tree falls and there's nobody there to hear it, will it make a sound?" "Yes. Of course." I don't currently think this works with qualia.)
As an aside, my opinions on this topic are likely to develop rapidly in the next couple months because I happen to be taking a course right now of consciousness. So consider anything I say about the matter now a little unstable.
For now though, I need to go back to sleep. I was woken up this morning by somebody who I think was a phishing telemarketer. Grraah.
Happy birthday, by the way.
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