§73-75 We must eschew all prolegomenae to thought and but bravely set out thinking.

§76 There can be no foundation for the project of thought but what thought discovers in the conclusions of its projects.

§77-78 Truth can be neither immediately known nor unknowable, but is known in its mediation.

§79 Our negation of the untrue produces a ( Read more... )

Hegel concludes now by restating what has already really been grasped: that this process of self-education is itself the science of experience, and no scientific task remains regarding experience but to undergo that education. The contents of this science will be the determinate moments that consciousness adopts for itself through this process, ( Read more... )

What can be present to consciousness are only those objects proper to its given shape. Thus Hegel supposes he may have been misunderstood (c.f. §85-86) to be saying that consciousness finds its object inadequate through the manner of an empirical disproof. ( Read more... )

Because the criterion attends on our activity (c.f. §84) our inquiry into it must follow the same path as our inquiry into the science it belongs too: that path of self-education already described (c.f. §77-78) whereby we attend to the activity of consciousness engaging in that inquiry. ( Read more... )

If, as argued in §81, science is not furnished with a criterion by which to measure its success, how can this success be sought? Evidently such a criterion in knowledge is the truth, or the nature of things as they are in themselves. ( Read more... )

My regrets for the tardiness in finishing up my notes on the introduction. I've altered the dates so the posts fit properly according to the order of the text ( Read more... )

Hegel argues that the path that proceeds through the reflection and negation discussed in §79 is not just a possible one, but one whose necessity arises from the nature of consciousness. ( Read more... )

How is the path of thought to progress in its self-education? Hegel introduces such means through the idea of a determinate nothingness. ( Read more... )

In his criticism of the epistemological orientation, Hegel is following a lead mapped out by Jacobi and according to which we have an immediate intuition of being. Yet he's not in fact going to adopt the Jacobian position. ( Read more... )

Hegel means to distance himself here from an objection or misunderstanding that would arise against his proposal. ( Read more... )