Логистика. Шесть.
J.F. Lazenby. Logistics in Classical Greek Warfare // War in History. Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 3-18
Нормы выдачи провианта, организация обоза и так далее. И при этом:
Foraging is frequently mentioned and was clearly common, particularly, of course, in hostile territory. Invasions were often timed for ’when the corn was ripe’, and when, for example, the Peloponnesians invaded Attica ’before the corn was fully ripe’, they had to retreat after only 15 days, partly because ’having invaded early and the corn being still green, most of them did not have enough food’.
...
Thus, the 400 wagons full of barley and wine which King Cyrus was said to have gathered before the battle, and which were plundered by the enemy before the Greeks could get at them, would only have lasted them just over a week, even if none of the food and drink had gone to the camp followers.
...
But having said that, it is worth remembering that Xenophon and his comrades, far from being forced to surrender through lack of supplies, were able, in the end, to escape, and that although the Greeks at Plataia had to withdraw to a new position in order to restore the supply situation, they actually fought and won their battle before they had managed to do so. In general, logistics rarely, if ever, seem to have played a decisive role in ancient warfare.
...
But when he and his comrades found themselves in the middle of the Persian Empire, deprived of their commanders, his own advice was to bum their wagons, so that their line of march would not be dictated by the ox teams, burn their tents as well, because they caused problems of transport and were no use for fighting or getting provisions, and get rid of most of the other baggage, except what they had for fighting, eating or drinking. ’When men are defeated’, he concluded, ’all they have goes to others, but if we win, we must consider our enemies our baggage carriers’. In other words, win the war and the logistics will take care of themselves.
John Haldon. Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204. 1999.
Тоже - организация обоза, дневной рацион... И часто забываемое нашей "сектой логистов" - лошадка, на которой везут запас, сама же его и ест. И соотношение между "носимым/возимым грузом" и "дневным потреблением" откровенно аховое.
For an army of 10,000, where 6,000 are infantry carrying as much of their own rations as possible, a little more flexibility is possible; but it is clear that, for an army to attempt to carry all its supplies with it - and I have excluded water in this example - for more than a few days was virtually impossible, if only because there were limits on the number of pack-animals available. The law of diminishing returns applies quite mechanically here, as the figure for a 10-day march indicates: the longer the march (and given a constant number of transport animals from start to finish), the greater the portion of supplies remaining each day consumed by the pack-animals themselves, until none is left to distribute elsewhere: by the tenth day in this example, an impossible 84,000+ animals would have been required from the beginning of the march to supply all the needs of the army for the period in question. The “line of logistical impossibility” would be drawn after the fifth day, and even assuming there were enough animals for each horseman to lead one pack-animal, that would mark the maximum duration of a march under these conditions.
Но считать "сколько лошадей нужно сыну боярскому, чтобы увезти полный запас продовольствия для себя и коней на 6 месяцев" - это пошло и подрывает устои.
P.S. И ведь даже не сказать, что работ по теме так уж мало. Marching across Anatolia: Medieval Logistics and Modeling the Mantzikert Campaign, A Greek Army on the March. Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's Anabasis и многие и многие другие...