Вербрюгген и Франс.
Насколько понимаю - "уши" более-менее "современных" исследований по тактике латинской панцирной конницы растут из этой вот статьи
J.F. Verbruggen. La tactique militaire des armées de chevaliers // Revue du Nord 29 (1947)
Далее - Verbruggen J.F. The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages from the Eighth Century to 1340. Second, revised and enlarged, edition, in English translation 1997.
Первое издание вышло в 1954-м - De Krijgskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen, IXe tot begin XIVe eeuw.
Collective Training: Tournaments
During the struggle between the sons of Louis the Pious there were group exercises and military games among the Franks following the celebrated Oaths of Strasbourg of 14 February 842. These cavalry games were often held by the troops of Louis the German and Charles the Bald, probably at Worms: causa exercitii, for the training of their own followers. In the presence of spectators ranged on both sides of a place which had been prepared for the spectacle, equal numbers of Saxons, Gascons, Austrasians and Bretons rode at each other at full tilt, as though they were going to join battle. But a moment before they met, one of the parties made a turn and pretended to escape the attacking enemy by flight, while the horsemen protected themselves with their shields. Then it was the turn of the fugitives to attack the pursuers. Finally both young princes sprang on to their horses and with great exuberance took part in the game, encouraged by loud cheers from the crowd. Lance in hand, they charged first one group and then another of those who were fleeing.
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Tournai by the burgrave Evrardus, who had a number of gallant knights under him. Henry III, count of Louvain, invited one of his vassals, who was in the opposing camp, to enter the lists against him personally. Jocelyn of Vorst accepted his lord's challenge only after repeated pressure. Finally he couched his lance, spurred his horse savagely, and charged the count with the intent of unhorsing him, but the thrust struck the count in the heart, and he died instantly. The counts of Flanders used tournaments to distract their knights from the private wars which were disturbing the peace in the county, and at the same time to give them a chance to practice. After he had restored peace and order in his county, Baldwin VII went abroad to get practice in the knightly profession of arms. His successor Charles the Good pursued the same policy, and went with 200 knights to tournaments in France, in Normandy and even outside France, to enhance his own fame as well as the might and honour of his land, and being a pious man, he atoned for the sins incurred through these ventures with rich gifts to the Church.
Even after the First Crusade the clergy were just as disturbed about these dangerous games as they had been over private wars, for they thought that both meant needless squandering of strength, and bloodshed, and that knights could test their prowess better against the Moslems in the Holy Land. The Council of Clermont in 1130 forbade tournaments because they entailed loss of human lives: anyone who perished in such a game was not to receive Christian burial. But the knights thought otherwise. For them the tournament was a training-school, a pastime, a source of income and a suitable opportunity for meeting men of their own class, and their best feats could be admired by noble ladies, which was not possible on the battlefield. They let themselves be daunted neither by the criticism of the clergy nor by the prohibitions of the Church.
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Tournaments did not differ greatly from real combat on the battlefield; indeed some sources call the clash of knights in full charge a tornatio or tornoiement. The knights fought with their normal equipment, and there is no mention of the use of otherweapons, nor that the point of the lance or the cutting-edge of the sword were dulled. This was anyway not necessary between 1150 and 1250, when the defensive equipment of the knights was strong enough to prevent fatal accidents. Naturally there was a risk of being unhorsed and seriously hurt thereby but the danger was not much greater in the real battles of that time when few men were killed. The main difference between tournaments and real battles lay in the fact that the engagement took place on terrain specially fixed by announcement or agreement. Knights came from far and wide with friends from their own country, or in a group under the command of their lord. Each of these troops took up position on their own 'ground', a piece of land marked out, from which the groups advanced to face each other in the tournament. This area was also a refuge for those who were exhausted and who had to withdraw from the lists. Again this was different from a real battle. Another difference was the custom of laying down arms as soon as one side gave up the battle. But if the enemy did not entirely give up while some of them were fleeing, the pursuit was carried on. An armistice could be brought about by common consent, and lasted until the resumption of the fighting, which was usually on the following day. At the end of the tournament a prize was awarded to the knight who had most distinguished himself by bravery or skill in unhorsing his opponents and taking them prisoner.
The actual engagement in a tournament took place on a flat piece of ground, not marked off. Each side left its own base and rode at the enemy: the knights fought in units, and their numbers varied according to the extent to which the nobility of the region were taking part. Usually knights from the counties of Flanders and Hainault turned out together against the French in France. It was considered a scandal when, during a tournament between Gournay and Ressons, the newly knighted Baldwin of Hainault, later count Baldwin V, who had a grudge against count Philip of Alsace of Flanders, fought on the side of the French knights against the Flemings, instead of following the custom which demanded that the men of Hainault, Flanders and Vermandois fight together against the French. In their own regions, however, Flemings fought against Hainaulters, or the latter against Brabanters. Just as in real wars, tournaments served to foster local pride and increased moral solidarity in military units.
The knights were organised in conrois or units of varying strength, according to the power of the lord under whose banner they were fighting, or according to the extent of the participation of the nobility of a certain area. These units were drawn up in very close formation, the horsemen side by side, horse beside horse, and they had to advance and charge in an orderly manner. Such units were so obviously superior to those not drawn up in an orderly way that they were able to turn an unfavourable balance of strength to their own advantage. In a tournament in which the knightly units of prince Henry, son of Henry II of England, fought against the French, the French knights had such confidence in their numerical superiority that out of pride they forgot about unity, and charged, pell-mell, only to suffer a crushing defeat. In the view of contemporaries, one of the greatest stupidities that could be committed was the separate individual charge made by knights who abandoned the protective ranks of the conroi in order to rush ahead into battle, for in so doing they destroyed the cohesion of the unit. If on the other hand they attacked in close order, there was no risk of the enemy breaking through.
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Philip of Alsace, who was praised in the Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal as being one of the best knights of his time, and as the most courteous count of Flanders, employed sly tactics in tournaments, which shows that he really believed anything was allowable in the face of the enemy. From this it appears that there was a certain continuity in the policy of the counts concerning tournaments, and that the princes' example in knightly exercises directly influenced the art of war. Philip was accustomed to using powerful contingents, some of which comprised very well-equipped foot-soldiers. During the tournament he evidently kept these units skilfully behind the scenes as though he had no intention of their taking part in the game, and patiently waited for an opportune moment while groups of heavy cavalrymen rushed at each other. Then, when the contestants were worn out by the struggle and the units had lost their original cohesion, he gave the signal to charge and fell upon the enemy's flank. This meant victory for him and magnificent booty for his knights. As prince Henry's tutor, he taught him these tactics, first making him pay dearly for the knowledge in an actual tournament. The Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal mentions the dense conrois (seréement) in which the advance was made without disorder (disrei), in which the knights were arranged in close battle order (serré et bataillé se tindrent) and could fight in serried ranks (errèrent sagement et rangié e seréement) so that no one could get through them (onques nuls n'en trespassa outre) contrasting them to the units that advanced in disorder (a grant disrei), and in which knights recklessly broke rank in order to fight in front of the unit (poindre as premiers de la rote), which for that reason were severely censured (fols est qui trop tost se desrote). All this is clear evidence of real tactical units. Philip of Alsace waited until the contestants were no longer fighting in steady ranks (desrengié), nor formed a fixed unit (destassé). He attacked them on the flank (lor moveit a la traverse) and made the foolish knights who had left their units his special prey. When Prince Henry's troops were in disorder (desrei) and his men exhausted, the count fell on them. Yet in this text two scholars see only the possibility that Henry's knights were tired when they were attacked by fresh Flemings.
John France. The Battle of Bouvines 27 July 1214 // The Medieval Way of War. Studies in Medieval Military history in honor of Bernard S. Bachrach. 2013
Subsequently, horse-armour became more common in Europe. However, elaborate equipment such as this was expensive, and the increased weight demanded stronger and costlier warhorses, so that a gap opened up between the noble wealthy on one hand and the less well-equipped sergeants on the other. In 1187 Count Baldwin V of Hainaut assisted Philip of France against Henry II of England with a force of “110 chosen knights and 80 mounted sergeants with chain mail”. But he noted as remarkable that:
… all his men, with the exception of the most virtuous knight Baldwin (namely
of Strépy), had horses equipped with iron armour. Among the sergeants, many
were armed as knights and had horses covered in iron.*
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There was no general cavalry charge. This would have been very risky because knights normally fought in small assemblages, conrois, which were probably based on kin and locality, and on a wider scale in the retinues of their lords. As a result, the accounts of the battle somewhat resemble those of a tournament, and this is most dramatic in that of the Anonymous of Béthune. But tournaments were the form of knightly training and the distinction between them and war was often fine. In August 1170 Baldwin V of Hainaut went to a tourney at Trazegnies, but fearing Godfrey of Lorraine, took 3,000 foot with him. The affair became a battle. In 1175 Baldwin took 200 knights and 1,200 foot to a tourney between Soissons and Braisne. He was ambushed but fought off the enemy, killing many. So, the picture we have of relatively small groups charging into battle and then emerging to rest and return is like a tournament because a tournament was like battle. And it accords well with the best contemporary analysis of the needs of battle which is given in the Rule of the Temple. This document suggests that in general knights expected to be in and out of battle in just the way described by the Anonymous of Béthune and Guillaume le Breton. This is not to say that mass charges were impossible, but they would have been very risky.
* Chronicle of Hainaut by Gilbert of Mons
P.S. Pierre Gaite. Exercises in Arms: the Physical and Mental Combat Training of Men-at-Arms in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries // Journal of Medieval Military History: Volume XVI. 2018
Methods of Collective Physical Training.
Although discerning practices for collective physical training in surviving sources is yet more difficult, it is worth briefly considering this area. We can be reasonably confident that medieval military minds recognized the value of bodies of troops working as a collective, as evidenced by the appreciation of Vegetian comments that men from different places and backgrounds “could not learn to act together without rigorous training carried out in common.” Nonetheless, actual examples of medieval armies adopting this approach before the late fifteenth century are difficult to identify. This is particularly true of men-at-arms, as Rogers indicates when he states that it is unlikely that landowning warriors were “put to any sort of formal drill” when attending their lord, though he does note it is likely they engaged in martial activities purely for entertainment.
The most obvious opportunity for collective physical training is participation in tournaments, as explored above. It has been established that the effective actions of grouped warriors were essential for success in battle, and although early tournaments frequently involved displays of reckless individual courage, the rewards and prestige to be gained by acting as a cohesive team must surely have provided knights with an incentive to use these events for practicing group maneuvers and tactics. This would seem all the more likely at least from the early fourteenth century, because lords were likely to lead the same men in tournaments as well as on military campaigns; Juliet Barker gives the example of Lord Berkeley’s household men travelling with him to tournaments at Hertford, Coventry, Exeter, and Bristol, all in 1328. However, Muhlberger notes that the tournament was already in decline during the fourteenth century, with changes in battle tactics making the skills of knightly mounted combat in groups slightly less relevant than before. Aside from this, it may be that mixed knights and infantrymen were put to practice together by their commanders while on campaign, but examples of this are difficult to locate.
P.P.S. Хрестоматийный пример дичи, которую могли учинить франки на поле боя - битва при Адрианополе в 1205-м. Годом ранее эти господа взяли Константинополь...
Тогда пришла весть, что Иоаннис, король Блакии, выступил против них, чтобы помочь городу; они со своей стороны приняли меры, и было решено, что Жоффруа, маршал, и Манассье де Лиль будут оборонять лагерь, а император Бодуэн и все другие выступят из него, коли Иоаннис завяжет сражение. Так пребывали они до среды пасхальных праздников. И Иоаннис находился теперь столь близко, что расположился всего в пяти лье от них. И он выслал своих коменов к их лагерю; и в лагере поднялся тревожный крик, и они выехали из него в беспорядке. И они преследовали коменов доброе лье, совсем потеряв рассудок. А когда они захотели вернуться назад, комены начали безостановочно пускать в них стрелы и ранили многих из их коней.
Итак, они вернулись оттуда в лагерь, и баронов позвали в расположение императора Бодуэна; и они держали совет и сказали, что впали в великое безумие, пустившись преследовать таких воинов, которые были столь легко вооружены. Итог совета был таков, что если Иоаннис снова подойдет к ним, то они выйдут и встанут строем перед своим лагерем, и будут ожидать его там, и не тронутся оттуда; и они приказали кликнуть клич по всему лагерю, чтобы никто не вздумал выказывать храбрость в нарушение этого приказа, сколь бы ни были велики крики или шум, которые он услышал бы. И было решено, что Жоффруа, маршал, и Манассье де Лиль будут охранять лагерь со стороны города.
Так провели они эту ночь пасхальных праздников до утра четверга. И они выслушали обедню и съели свой завтрак. А комены прискакали к самым их палаткам и подняли крик, и они схватились за оружие, и все их боевые отряды вышли строем из лагеря в том порядке, как это было решено ранее.
Граф Луи вышел первым со своим боевым отрядом; и он начал преследовать коменов; и он послал к императору Бодуэну, чтобы тот последовал за ним. Увы! Как худо соблюдали они то, что было решено накануне вечером: ведь они преследовали таким образом коменов почти два лье, и они настигли их; и они их гнали какое-то время перед собой; а комены в свой черед кинулись на них и начали улюлюкать и стрелять. ... Были там такие, кто доблестно сражался, а были такие, кто бежал с поля боя. Наконец - ведь Бог допускает неудачи - наши были разбиты. Там, на поле битвы остались император Бодуэн, который ни за что не хотел бежать, и граф Луи: император Бодуэн был взят живым, а граф Луи был убит.
Что, опять же, не помешало франкам в дальнейшем побить болгар в 1208-м у Филиппополя и никейцев при Риндаке в 1211-м.