Linguistics webcomics--just what I was waiting for!

[glenniebun]

Dinosaur Comics examines the finer points of linguisticsThe (serious) problem implied is a large one; you obviously can't completely formalize living languages because they're continually changing based on the whims of individual speakers at the end of the day. "Language is in a constant state of change," my first linguistics professor would intone

Comments

[conrad_zaar]

I really need to go to bed, but I can't pass this up. I'll try to keep it brief, and as coherent as possible.

I agree that "you ought to use whatever linguistic effects/rhetorical ploys/speaking style you need to convey whatever it is you want to in whatever context you're in," and I agree with it because I see language in entirely pragmatic terms. As far as I'm concerned, the question is always, "how can I use the tools available to me (linguistic or otherwise) to do what I need to do?" (I say "what I need to do" rather than "what I need to convey," because there are any number of things you can do with language other than conveying information: soothing, wooing, distracting, entertaining, etc.)

But (perhaps due to my weary state) I don't understand how there is a moral question. What is the moral obligation? To fellow language-users? And the epistemological question seems to me to collapse into a sociological question: how do meanings become standard, authoritative, accepted, or "official"? This question could produce an account of who dominates literary discourse, how educational curricula are produced, how dictionaries are composed, etc. - all sorts of fruitful areas for investigation. To ask an epistemological question instead (some form of "how do we know for sure what a word really means?") seems to me a fruitless pursuit. What kind of interesting answer could that question possibly produce? (This is not a rhetorical question; I truly can't think of anything right now.)

And isn't relativism something of bogeyman here? Is language really in any danger of devolving into a mess?

[glenniebun]

(I say "what I need to do" rather than "what I need to convey," because there are any number of things you can do with language other than conveying information: soothing, wooing, distracting, entertaining, etc.)

When I said "convey" that included conveying emotions and such; we're basically saying the same thing.

But (perhaps due to my weary state) I don't understand how there is a moral question. What is the moral obligation? To fellow language-users?

On a basic level every decision is a moral one, since when faced with options the question becomes "Which one should I use?" Most everyday moral decisions aren't made consciously--that is, a person makes a decision and the principle that led him there goes unexamined--but I like examining that sort of process (for myself, personally, so that I can be confident that my subconscious processes are also pretty good ones), so I try to make as many things explicit as I can. In my thesis, since I was concentrating on moral theory in grammar, I was threading my way between the prescriptivist position (such-and-such rules are Right and Good and Proper because they're the Queen's English, because they came from Latin and all of you are corrupting our poor language, because these great authors use them, etc.) and the descriptivist one (that's bullshit; there's no moral component to langauge; just say whatever and I'll sit over here noting trends). I think it's plainly wrong to reject a moral component to grammar outright, yet the prescriptivist position is also preposterous--hence the context-based hypothetical imperative.

And the epistemological question seems to me to collapse into a sociological question: how do meanings become standard, authoritative, accepted, or "official"? This question could produce an account of who dominates literary discourse, how educational curricula are produced, how dictionaries are composed, etc. - all sorts of fruitful areas for investigation.

What you call a sociological question is what I was referring to as an epistemological one, because it depends on the epistemological processes of the people involved. In terms of individual linguistic choices, the hypothetical imperative makes the central issue one of consciously identifying what one wishes to do with his language as contingent on the context he's working in, which requires several epistemological questions to be answered--knowing what one wants to do, deciding what qualities of an audience are required to do it effectively, etc. Again, most of these processes go on very quickly and without much attention paid to them in day-to-day conversation.

To ask an epistemological question instead (some form of "how do we know for sure what a word really means?") seems to me a fruitless pursuit. What kind of interesting answer could that question possibly produce?

None that I know of, unfortunately. Such is the nature of a thing so wrapped up in human behavior.

And isn't relativism something of bogeyman here? Is language really in any danger of devolving into a mess?

Linguistically, no. Like I said in the original post, there'll always be some sort of fundamental order; otherwise the language would devolve into an incomprehensible mess, and people would stop speaking it. That's sort of an invisible-hand process--the language becomes what people need it to be, regardless of the little distinctions I like to fuss over sometimes. So while total epistemological relativism would be a bit far-fetched, there've already been people advocating moral relativism in linguistics for a long time, which I think is also inappropriate.

[conrad_zaar]

When I said "convey" that included conveying emotions and such; we're basically saying the same thing.

We might be, but I'm not sure. I'm not talking necessarily about conveying anything, but achieving desired effects. Sometimes, for instance, we deliberately use language so as not to convey anything, but to obfuscate, confuse, or conceal. It's a tangential point though, and perhaps a trivial one as well. I ought to make a proper entry about it some time.

On a basic level every decision is a moral one, since when faced with options the question becomes "Which one should I use?"

If that's how you're defining "moral" then your earlier statement makes a lot more sense to me. But isn't this a remarkably broad (and therefore empty) definition of "moral"? Are you really saying that I'm making a moral decision when I have a pink popsicle rather than a purple one, or when I decide that I'd rather use a Robertson screwdriver than a Phillips? I don't have a background in philosophy, so if you tell me that this is how the word is being used these days, I'll take your word for it. But I'm kind of surprised.

What you call a sociological question is what I was referring to as an epistemological one, because it depends on the epistemological processes of the people involved.

But the question still seems to me a sociological or psychological one. Epistemology as I understand it is regulative or normative: it tries to answer questions like "How can we be sure if our beliefs are justified?" or "What ways of investigating the world will produce true knowledge?" By this understanding, epistemology is about finding the correct path to true knowledge. If that is the case, then the project you envision does not ask epistemological questions, but instead asks how and under what circumstances people tend to go about asking and answering epistemological questions. Or do I just have an outdated/impoverished/wrong notion of epistemology?

So while total epistemological relativism would be a bit far-fetched, there've already been people advocating moral relativism in linguistics for a long time, which I think is also inappropriate.

So would "moral relativism" in this sense be the position that there is no good reason to choose one word or grammatical structure over another?

[glenniebun]

I'm not talking necessarily about conveying anything, but achieving desired effects. Sometimes, for instance, we deliberately use language so as not to convey anything, but to obfuscate, confuse, or conceal.

I see your point, and agree with it actually. Perhaps my language wasn't clear enough earlier.

But isn't this a remarkably broad (and therefore empty) definition of "moral"? Are you really saying that I'm making a moral decision when I have a pink popsicle rather than a purple one, or when I decide that I'd rather use a Robertson screwdriver than a Phillips?

I'm saying that moral principles of whatever sort figure into almost every decision we make, and usually go unstated. (Also, a lot of people's unstated principles are pragmatic--more often than not you use the Robertson screwdriver because you have a Robertson screw and have already decided it'd be a good thing to screw it in, right?) As for your popsicles, I suppose I could go into special and unlikely contexts, or even the morality of following personal preferences in context, but I think I'd rather exempt personal-preference stuff for contexts in which the alternatives truly don't matter.

I don't have a background in philosophy, so if you tell me that this is how the word is being used these days, I'll take your word for it.

Oh, I don't claim this is how professional philosophers think of it; this is just the most sensible way I've seen of thinking about the subject. (I must acknowledge some intellectual debt to Ayn Rand and others, though the main essay I've been thinking of in relation to this was about how philosophy in general permeates all subjects at a fundamental level.) I'm still in contact with an ethicist from my alma mater from time to time; perhaps I'll ask him about it next time I email him.

Epistemology as I understand it is regulative or normative: it tries to answer questions like "How can we be sure if our beliefs are justified?" or "What ways of investigating the world will produce true knowledge?" By this understanding, epistemology is about finding the correct path to true knowledge.

It goes a bit deeper than that, I think, namely "What constitutes justification?" and other basic questions. Notice that even that ventures into semantic territory, which gets a bit complicated when the issue is how we ought to arrive at semantic definitions. As I understand it, epistemology is most broadly the study of knowledge as such, meaning its definition, content and processes of discovery. Using that definition, my meaning was that crafting one's speech to do something with an audience requires a process of discovery of 1) what one actually wants to do, 2) the context of knowledge of the audience, such as it's relevant, and probably some more things I'm not thinking of at the moment. At any rate, I can see why you'd call those sociological processes, but I still think they're more plainly epistemological inasmuch as they consist of a process of discovery. Even by the definition you give, "finding the correct path to true knowledge," I'd say that relevant factors are true knowledge that one has to find the correct path to.

So would "moral relativism" in this sense be the position that there is no good reason to choose one word or grammatical structure over another?

I suppose even a moral relativist could admit pragmatically that one could go through a process of discovery and determine what speaking style or what-have-you is likeliest to have an intended effect (an epistemological relativist--at least, a fully consistent one--would have to deny that that discovery is possible, because knowledge is impossible). My objection is that the normative language I suggest is appropriate because of the moral theory we've been discussing...and I think it's more intellectually honest besides.

[conrad_zaar]

I can accept that all decisions are moral, insofar as every decision ultimately depends on one's conception of what is good or desirable. But my choosing Robertson over Phillips is not in itself moral; it's just a pragmatic question of which tool is better suited to getting the job done. Whether the job itself is actually a good thing is a separate matter.

For instance, if there existed a complex and comprehensive theory of screwdrivers, I might draw on this theory to select and effectively use a screwdriver for a particular task. That task might be building a playground for underpriveleged children, or building a trebuchet to attack my neighbour's house. The theory of screwdrivers could advise me how to select and use the screwdriver, but this theory could not tell me anything about the morality of my chosen job. Similarly, a theory of grammar might tell me what words and grammatical structures will most likely work well for certain linguistic tasks, but it cannot tell me whether those tasks are themselves good. It seems to me that the grammatical decision is never a moral one, even if a moral decision provides the occasion for it.

So although I can understand having grammatical imperatives, even strict ones, I can't see these imperatives as anything but pragmatic, with no moral content of their own. (And all this still leaves untouched the added problem that life has a way of overflowing any rules and boundaries we set for it. I might disregard the normal rules of grammar and write an avant-garde poem; or I could ignore the standard Theory of Screwdrivers and use my Phillips to stab someone in the neck.)

[glenniebun]

Whether the job itself is actually a good thing is a separate matter.

It is a distinct issue, but it's one you must deal with explicitly or not before you get to the point where you're choosing screwdrivers. Also, the substance of my objection is that "Which screwdriver does what I want to do?" and "Which one should I use?" are essentially the same question; the second merely makes the normative issue--pragmatism as a moral principle in whatever context--clearer than the first. In the same way, the questions "What manner of speaking has the effect I want?" and "How should I speak?" are essentially the same with the second highlighting the normative issue, assuming moral pragmatism.

(And all this still leaves untouched the added problem that life has a way of overflowing any rules and boundaries we set for it. I might disregard the normal rules of grammar and write an avant-garde poem; or I could ignore the standard Theory of Screwdrivers and use my Phillips to stab someone in the neck.)

If you have occasion to want to write an avant-garde poem, fine; they go by a rather different rule book. Along the same lines, if someone's attacking you that Phillips could be of great help. (Unfortunately, I don't think your Theory of Screwdrivers would be of much help in deciding which sort of screwdriver is best to ward off an attacker. Grab any one!)