The Algerian Civil War
The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998
Luis Martinez, C. Hurst & Co., Ltd., 2000.
What Luis Martinez does in this book:
“Rejecting culturalist explanations as too simplistic, the author concentrates on actors who act deliberately to maximise their advantage.” (p. ix)
“Unlike others who have treated the subject, he is the first to bring together a unified theory of warlike behaviour in the context of both institutional-historical and rational choice paradigms substantiated by an impressive array of solid empirical data gathered directly from the field.” (p. ix)
Chapter 1: Introduction, pp. 1-19
“This book is an analysis of the origins and development of the civil war…. The arguments used to explain it have been based on factors present since independence (poverty, corruption, authoritarianism etc.).” (p. 1)
“This book demonstrates that the political crisis arising from the interruption of the elections in January 1992 produced a dynamic of violence whose roots are to be sought in a war-oriented imaginaire in which violence is a form of accumulation of wealth and prestige. Briefly, the civil war destroyed political machinery that ensured social control, and thus opened new ways for social progress through violence.” (p. 1)
Debunks theory that “Islamists are a fruit of the failure of the Socialist development model followed by the Houari Boumedienne regime (1965-78).” (p. 2)
Martinez explains why the social crisis theory doesn’t work (p. 2). His challenge questions to the theory: “But does the explanation based on the failure of economic and social development stand up to historical analysis? In short, did the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid, marked by the emergence of Islamist movements on the political scene, really see an increase in inequality?” (p. 3)
In fact, Martinez challenges, supposed economic and social growth under Boumedienne (prior to the Chadli government) was actually marked by striking inequality. Growth happened only in certain sector of society, benefiting mainly those who are already rich and powerful.
“Corruption, unemployment and poverty were present in the Algeria of the 1960s and 1970s. They were not a feature of Chadli Bendjedid’s presidency alone. The theory of a sudden halt to a development phase, after the fall in oil prices in 1986, to explain the emergence of Islamist contestation is not confirmed.” (p. 4)
Civil war as an economic and political resource, not breakdown, but in some way a strategy, a weapon (for mainly the army) to use (pp. 4-5).
Debunk #2: that Algeria has no roots, is incapable to have a political sphere of activity-“The collapse of the ‘FLN-state’, it is therefore suggested, is explained by the inability of the FLN to create ideal sorts of conditions for a modern state - to overcome what President Houari Boumedienne called in one of his speeches ‘the archaic idea of the beylicate in people’s minds….” (p. 5)
Martinez employs the distinction between state formation and state-building (historical process vs. creation of state/control apparatus) to show that in the Algerian civil war, actors competed for the control of state, i.e., state-building. Thus it has nothing to do with the state formation basis of the “ahistoric” theory. Just like blaming the war on poverty is an insufficient claim, using state formation (nature of state) as a scapegoat produces an incomplete conclusion.
“Cultural explanations of the collapse of the state leave out the part played by violence and conflict in state ‘formation’ and hence in the behaviour of actors involved. So this work seeks, on the basis of analysis of the warring parties’ strategies, to take account of the functioning mechanisms of the civil war.” (p. 7)
~ Analysing the gaps between strategies, reality, and the imaginaire.
To sum it up:
“The central hypothesis of this work is that a war-oriented imaginaire is common to the warring parties in Algeria and contributes towards making violence a method of accumulation of wealth and prestige.” (p. 7)
The Islamic imaginaire as a enflaming cause leading to the civil war?
“However, the idea that an Islamic imaginaire explains the motives and references of the Islamist movements comes up against the historically defined character of ‘Muslim societies’…” (p. 9)
“It is rather through analysis of a war-oriented imaginaire or world view that the present situation in Algeria seems comprehensible to us. That imaginaire is made up of historical figures which, through the use of violence, have enhanced their symbolic and material resources.” (p. 9)
~ War, as some sort of ideology-in-action, constantly in motion and its ideologies repeatedly used by those engaged in conflict, is the ideal way to perpetuate the imaginaire, already a sort of ideological goal to aim for. It is symbolic and materialistic (physical too?) as well as (something that refers back to the) historic.
“From this definition of the imaginaire, our hypothesis is that the ‘Emirs’ - the leaders of the armed Islamic groups - prefer to define themselves, more or less consciously, in relation to certain historical models that have achieved distinction, at different periods, by social advancement through war.” (p. 10)
Violence as means of accumulation wealth and prestige not exclusive:
“In speaking of a war-oriented imaginaire we suggested rather a code in which the use of violence is respected as a means of social advancement. Just as the need for political activity is not something universally shared… belief in violence as a means of accumulation of wealth, prestige and power is not a common trait of all Algerians.” (pp. 10-11)
Author’s view:
“The conviction shared by the warring parties, of violence being a means of accumulation, is in our view a powerful factor for perpetuation of war, as the history of war and violence on contemporary Algeria is well able to illustrate.” (p. 11)
Is war the catalyst for reform, for advancement, for liberation, for systemic sociopolitical changes, and as Martinez puts it, “the crucible of equality” that leads to some sort of better future with more equal opportunities? (War as equalizer?)
“The war-oriented imaginaire is strengthened by success stories of individuals starting from humble backgrounds. So, we suggest, the ‘Emirs’ (leaders of armed groups) of the Islamist guerrillas follow in a line of continuity from those historic figures. The emergence of the ‘Emirs’ in the civil war of the 1990s, far from constituting a breach with the past or even a revolution in Algeria, forms part of the image of war as the special way of getting access to wealth and prestige.” (p. 13)
“The issue here is not emphasising the permanence of ‘traditional’ structures, but rather showing how ‘tradition’ (the experience of the marquis) has been subjected to permanent reinvention by Caïds, ‘Colonels’ and then ‘Emirs’.” (p. 14)
~ Martinez lists an example: the marquis’ experience produced the identity of the Moudjahids, resulting in a societal change that preferred the uneducated (but powerful fighters) in high positions of power. It can (maybe?) be seen as equalizing gone the other way.
Civil war as an economic and political choice?
“The choice of war, made both by some senior military officers and by Islamist militants, is in response to a purpose in mind and fits into a particular context.” (p. 15)
~ For example, in January 1992 civil war was made as a “political response to an unfavourable situation” (p. 16). Specific purpose in mind also led to other changes, such as the expansion of the food industry to supply food for the military (the general “war economy”).
“In many respects the Algerian civil war presents a paradox: an intense degree of violence has been accompanied by job creation (especially in the profession of arms), by considerable investment in the oil and gas sector, and by lively activity in the commercial sector, based on the creation of import-export companies.” (p. 16)
“The outbreak of the civil war can thus be seen as a socio-economic operation aimed at encouraging accumulation of wealth.” (p. 17)
Conclusion:
“Our conclusion is that the civil war cannot be explained only by a single factor: its mainsprings are numerous and the explanation needs to be sought in a combination of factors in which the actors’ strategies and their imaginaire have a central place.” (p. 17)
~ In a way, isn’t Martinez stating the obvious? I mean, the trend in area studies now is that events and wars cannot be analyzed only from one point of view. That the variable Martinez employs here is the imaginaire factor doesn’t make his opinion any less commonplace. *shrugs*
On the outcome of war: is return to civil peace possible? (p. 17)
Current situation (up to 1998, book’s initial publication):
“…one of the theories put forth in this book - that violence is seen as a virtue in Algerians’ political world view. For by refusing to make the FIS a partner in power in 1991 despite its success in the elections, by declaring in December 1997 that ‘the file on the dissolved party has been definitively closed’, and then giving a privileged role to the AIS, the Presidency showed that the way to power is not through the ballot box but through armed resistance.” (p. 19)
Chapter 11: Conclusion, pp. 245-252
“We hope we have shown that war is, to the protagonists, a virtuous way of accumulating wealth and prestige and that, in that sense, the consolidation of violence is the result of the opportunities for social advance which it creates.” (p. 245)
~ To examine: Did Martinez successfully prove his thesis? Within the book, did he manage to show that war is accumulation? And outside of book, did his method of examination gloss over anything that might prove or disprove his points? Could he have employed other methodologies but seems to have blind spots for them? Etc.
Claim: military and Islamist guerrillas “are driven by a common war-oriented imaginaire.” (p. 245)
Conclusion: neither side can win.
Both the Islamist groups (FIS and other military-Islamist groups) and the military have survived and continue to be influential in Algerian politics. The Islamists by having support of the people as shown in the November 1995 election of the Hamas-MSI party (despite losing overall popularity during the war), and the military by sustaining itself economically through liberalizing oil and gas and working with the IMF in the Structural Adjustment Plan.
Difference from the independence war:
“…in contrast to 1954-62, therefore, possible losers have no place of asylum waiting for them. That is why it is an illusion to imagine that if one of the protagonists gains supremacy, peace can return.” (p. 246)
“So one effect of the situation in which neither side can win is the development of insecurity, which in turn is part of the dynamics of the war. And endless continuation of the war is accompanied at the social level by numerous effects which foreshadow new redrawing of the political landscape.” (p. 246)
~ Development of insecurity, oh joy… [/sarcasm]
In light of this, how (if needed/plausible/in the best interest of country) should development and/or other intervention organizations respond? Or not respond?
Violence with political/economic purposes has become “generalised” violence.
Social change of the civil war:
“The development of the profession of arms… attract[ed] a section of the youth, especially those confronted with joblessness and poverty, but the motives for enlisting… also include a desire for revenge and the general feeling of insecurity. In addition the demand for fighters by the military organisations, both state and Islamist ones, presents an opportunity to get a job and enjoy, thanks to the prestige of the ‘klach’ (Kalashnikov), a certain respect.” (p. 247)
“If at that lower end the civil war represents an opportunity for social advancement, at the upper end of the social scale it has been a time of reallocation of privileges and increase in wealth… the elites for their part have installed an ‘economy of plunder’ through economic liberation.” (p. 247)
~ So while the people at the bottom rung of the social ladder had opportunities to rise to power and to have social advancement, it was ultimately the rich who made a lucrative fortune out of the war economy, for the already-rich to make even more profit.
“The profits from the war explain why the protagonists reject a political settlement.” (p. 248)
~ Is this the same as the IMF aide to Algeria in 1995? That because of the additional aide money, the regime stopped all further negotiations and thus indirectly prolonged the war? Or is this profit referring to something else? If it’s about something else, then is it legitimately what halted political settlement or is it merely a substitute view for what role the IMF actually played in lengthening the war?
“Each of these types of fighter [Islamist fighters, security/militia fighters, etc.] has a respected position in this war, and we have sought to show that the choice of one or the other has resulted more from the local context than from political motivation. These types of ‘warrior’, however varied, are inspired by a common war-oriented imaginaire, in which violence has the virtues of an instrument for advancement. In that sense that civil war has been accompanied by a reconstitution of social hierarchies, it takes the place of a means of redistributing wealth.” (p. 248)
The role of Emirs: shows the continuation (reconstruction) from earlier social figures, rather than support the view that the civil war collapsed the state. (p. 249)
Ultimately, if the civil war “generates wealth and prestige for the warring parties,” then what’s the hurry to end the conflict, whether it resulted in human losses? Martinez shows that the Algerian civil war wasn’t a total dystopia. If it were, the conflict probably would have been won by one side a long time ago (p. 249).
“Obviously the Islamist guerillas, by declaring the jihad and setting down to a long struggle, are no longer following a logic of participation in the political system.” (p. 249)
~ Founded?
Guerillas - war strategies changed throughout the years.
“The fact must be faced that few factors are working towards ending the civil war. The social changes in progress are in the direction of expansion of the profession of arms, bringing with it increased privatisation of violence.” (p. 250)
It seems that to end the civil war, one needs to let go of the war-oriented imaginaire and adopt a democratic imaginaire, however that happens. The concept of imaginaire is central to Martinez’s theory. Is it his original thought? Or does it have grounding elsewhere?
War-oriented imaginaire as central:
“Our study has tried to show that the failure of Algeria’s ‘democratic transition’ can be explained by belief in the virtues of violence as a means for keeping the ranks of the elites filled.” (p. 251)
~ So, not yet a democracy-oriented imaginaire.
To be continued...
Luis Martinez, C. Hurst & Co., Ltd., 2000.
What Luis Martinez does in this book:
“Rejecting culturalist explanations as too simplistic, the author concentrates on actors who act deliberately to maximise their advantage.” (p. ix)
“Unlike others who have treated the subject, he is the first to bring together a unified theory of warlike behaviour in the context of both institutional-historical and rational choice paradigms substantiated by an impressive array of solid empirical data gathered directly from the field.” (p. ix)
Chapter 1: Introduction, pp. 1-19
“This book is an analysis of the origins and development of the civil war…. The arguments used to explain it have been based on factors present since independence (poverty, corruption, authoritarianism etc.).” (p. 1)
“This book demonstrates that the political crisis arising from the interruption of the elections in January 1992 produced a dynamic of violence whose roots are to be sought in a war-oriented imaginaire in which violence is a form of accumulation of wealth and prestige. Briefly, the civil war destroyed political machinery that ensured social control, and thus opened new ways for social progress through violence.” (p. 1)
Debunks theory that “Islamists are a fruit of the failure of the Socialist development model followed by the Houari Boumedienne regime (1965-78).” (p. 2)
Martinez explains why the social crisis theory doesn’t work (p. 2). His challenge questions to the theory: “But does the explanation based on the failure of economic and social development stand up to historical analysis? In short, did the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid, marked by the emergence of Islamist movements on the political scene, really see an increase in inequality?” (p. 3)
In fact, Martinez challenges, supposed economic and social growth under Boumedienne (prior to the Chadli government) was actually marked by striking inequality. Growth happened only in certain sector of society, benefiting mainly those who are already rich and powerful.
“Corruption, unemployment and poverty were present in the Algeria of the 1960s and 1970s. They were not a feature of Chadli Bendjedid’s presidency alone. The theory of a sudden halt to a development phase, after the fall in oil prices in 1986, to explain the emergence of Islamist contestation is not confirmed.” (p. 4)
Civil war as an economic and political resource, not breakdown, but in some way a strategy, a weapon (for mainly the army) to use (pp. 4-5).
Debunk #2: that Algeria has no roots, is incapable to have a political sphere of activity-“The collapse of the ‘FLN-state’, it is therefore suggested, is explained by the inability of the FLN to create ideal sorts of conditions for a modern state - to overcome what President Houari Boumedienne called in one of his speeches ‘the archaic idea of the beylicate in people’s minds….” (p. 5)
Martinez employs the distinction between state formation and state-building (historical process vs. creation of state/control apparatus) to show that in the Algerian civil war, actors competed for the control of state, i.e., state-building. Thus it has nothing to do with the state formation basis of the “ahistoric” theory. Just like blaming the war on poverty is an insufficient claim, using state formation (nature of state) as a scapegoat produces an incomplete conclusion.
“Cultural explanations of the collapse of the state leave out the part played by violence and conflict in state ‘formation’ and hence in the behaviour of actors involved. So this work seeks, on the basis of analysis of the warring parties’ strategies, to take account of the functioning mechanisms of the civil war.” (p. 7)
~ Analysing the gaps between strategies, reality, and the imaginaire.
To sum it up:
“The central hypothesis of this work is that a war-oriented imaginaire is common to the warring parties in Algeria and contributes towards making violence a method of accumulation of wealth and prestige.” (p. 7)
The Islamic imaginaire as a enflaming cause leading to the civil war?
“However, the idea that an Islamic imaginaire explains the motives and references of the Islamist movements comes up against the historically defined character of ‘Muslim societies’…” (p. 9)
“It is rather through analysis of a war-oriented imaginaire or world view that the present situation in Algeria seems comprehensible to us. That imaginaire is made up of historical figures which, through the use of violence, have enhanced their symbolic and material resources.” (p. 9)
~ War, as some sort of ideology-in-action, constantly in motion and its ideologies repeatedly used by those engaged in conflict, is the ideal way to perpetuate the imaginaire, already a sort of ideological goal to aim for. It is symbolic and materialistic (physical too?) as well as (something that refers back to the) historic.
“From this definition of the imaginaire, our hypothesis is that the ‘Emirs’ - the leaders of the armed Islamic groups - prefer to define themselves, more or less consciously, in relation to certain historical models that have achieved distinction, at different periods, by social advancement through war.” (p. 10)
Violence as means of accumulation wealth and prestige not exclusive:
“In speaking of a war-oriented imaginaire we suggested rather a code in which the use of violence is respected as a means of social advancement. Just as the need for political activity is not something universally shared… belief in violence as a means of accumulation of wealth, prestige and power is not a common trait of all Algerians.” (pp. 10-11)
Author’s view:
“The conviction shared by the warring parties, of violence being a means of accumulation, is in our view a powerful factor for perpetuation of war, as the history of war and violence on contemporary Algeria is well able to illustrate.” (p. 11)
Is war the catalyst for reform, for advancement, for liberation, for systemic sociopolitical changes, and as Martinez puts it, “the crucible of equality” that leads to some sort of better future with more equal opportunities? (War as equalizer?)
“The war-oriented imaginaire is strengthened by success stories of individuals starting from humble backgrounds. So, we suggest, the ‘Emirs’ (leaders of armed groups) of the Islamist guerrillas follow in a line of continuity from those historic figures. The emergence of the ‘Emirs’ in the civil war of the 1990s, far from constituting a breach with the past or even a revolution in Algeria, forms part of the image of war as the special way of getting access to wealth and prestige.” (p. 13)
“The issue here is not emphasising the permanence of ‘traditional’ structures, but rather showing how ‘tradition’ (the experience of the marquis) has been subjected to permanent reinvention by Caïds, ‘Colonels’ and then ‘Emirs’.” (p. 14)
~ Martinez lists an example: the marquis’ experience produced the identity of the Moudjahids, resulting in a societal change that preferred the uneducated (but powerful fighters) in high positions of power. It can (maybe?) be seen as equalizing gone the other way.
Civil war as an economic and political choice?
“The choice of war, made both by some senior military officers and by Islamist militants, is in response to a purpose in mind and fits into a particular context.” (p. 15)
~ For example, in January 1992 civil war was made as a “political response to an unfavourable situation” (p. 16). Specific purpose in mind also led to other changes, such as the expansion of the food industry to supply food for the military (the general “war economy”).
“In many respects the Algerian civil war presents a paradox: an intense degree of violence has been accompanied by job creation (especially in the profession of arms), by considerable investment in the oil and gas sector, and by lively activity in the commercial sector, based on the creation of import-export companies.” (p. 16)
“The outbreak of the civil war can thus be seen as a socio-economic operation aimed at encouraging accumulation of wealth.” (p. 17)
Conclusion:
“Our conclusion is that the civil war cannot be explained only by a single factor: its mainsprings are numerous and the explanation needs to be sought in a combination of factors in which the actors’ strategies and their imaginaire have a central place.” (p. 17)
~ In a way, isn’t Martinez stating the obvious? I mean, the trend in area studies now is that events and wars cannot be analyzed only from one point of view. That the variable Martinez employs here is the imaginaire factor doesn’t make his opinion any less commonplace. *shrugs*
On the outcome of war: is return to civil peace possible? (p. 17)
Current situation (up to 1998, book’s initial publication):
“…one of the theories put forth in this book - that violence is seen as a virtue in Algerians’ political world view. For by refusing to make the FIS a partner in power in 1991 despite its success in the elections, by declaring in December 1997 that ‘the file on the dissolved party has been definitively closed’, and then giving a privileged role to the AIS, the Presidency showed that the way to power is not through the ballot box but through armed resistance.” (p. 19)
Chapter 11: Conclusion, pp. 245-252
“We hope we have shown that war is, to the protagonists, a virtuous way of accumulating wealth and prestige and that, in that sense, the consolidation of violence is the result of the opportunities for social advance which it creates.” (p. 245)
~ To examine: Did Martinez successfully prove his thesis? Within the book, did he manage to show that war is accumulation? And outside of book, did his method of examination gloss over anything that might prove or disprove his points? Could he have employed other methodologies but seems to have blind spots for them? Etc.
Claim: military and Islamist guerrillas “are driven by a common war-oriented imaginaire.” (p. 245)
Conclusion: neither side can win.
Both the Islamist groups (FIS and other military-Islamist groups) and the military have survived and continue to be influential in Algerian politics. The Islamists by having support of the people as shown in the November 1995 election of the Hamas-MSI party (despite losing overall popularity during the war), and the military by sustaining itself economically through liberalizing oil and gas and working with the IMF in the Structural Adjustment Plan.
Difference from the independence war:
“…in contrast to 1954-62, therefore, possible losers have no place of asylum waiting for them. That is why it is an illusion to imagine that if one of the protagonists gains supremacy, peace can return.” (p. 246)
“So one effect of the situation in which neither side can win is the development of insecurity, which in turn is part of the dynamics of the war. And endless continuation of the war is accompanied at the social level by numerous effects which foreshadow new redrawing of the political landscape.” (p. 246)
~ Development of insecurity, oh joy… [/sarcasm]
In light of this, how (if needed/plausible/in the best interest of country) should development and/or other intervention organizations respond? Or not respond?
Violence with political/economic purposes has become “generalised” violence.
Social change of the civil war:
“The development of the profession of arms… attract[ed] a section of the youth, especially those confronted with joblessness and poverty, but the motives for enlisting… also include a desire for revenge and the general feeling of insecurity. In addition the demand for fighters by the military organisations, both state and Islamist ones, presents an opportunity to get a job and enjoy, thanks to the prestige of the ‘klach’ (Kalashnikov), a certain respect.” (p. 247)
“If at that lower end the civil war represents an opportunity for social advancement, at the upper end of the social scale it has been a time of reallocation of privileges and increase in wealth… the elites for their part have installed an ‘economy of plunder’ through economic liberation.” (p. 247)
~ So while the people at the bottom rung of the social ladder had opportunities to rise to power and to have social advancement, it was ultimately the rich who made a lucrative fortune out of the war economy, for the already-rich to make even more profit.
“The profits from the war explain why the protagonists reject a political settlement.” (p. 248)
~ Is this the same as the IMF aide to Algeria in 1995? That because of the additional aide money, the regime stopped all further negotiations and thus indirectly prolonged the war? Or is this profit referring to something else? If it’s about something else, then is it legitimately what halted political settlement or is it merely a substitute view for what role the IMF actually played in lengthening the war?
“Each of these types of fighter [Islamist fighters, security/militia fighters, etc.] has a respected position in this war, and we have sought to show that the choice of one or the other has resulted more from the local context than from political motivation. These types of ‘warrior’, however varied, are inspired by a common war-oriented imaginaire, in which violence has the virtues of an instrument for advancement. In that sense that civil war has been accompanied by a reconstitution of social hierarchies, it takes the place of a means of redistributing wealth.” (p. 248)
The role of Emirs: shows the continuation (reconstruction) from earlier social figures, rather than support the view that the civil war collapsed the state. (p. 249)
Ultimately, if the civil war “generates wealth and prestige for the warring parties,” then what’s the hurry to end the conflict, whether it resulted in human losses? Martinez shows that the Algerian civil war wasn’t a total dystopia. If it were, the conflict probably would have been won by one side a long time ago (p. 249).
“Obviously the Islamist guerillas, by declaring the jihad and setting down to a long struggle, are no longer following a logic of participation in the political system.” (p. 249)
~ Founded?
Guerillas - war strategies changed throughout the years.
“The fact must be faced that few factors are working towards ending the civil war. The social changes in progress are in the direction of expansion of the profession of arms, bringing with it increased privatisation of violence.” (p. 250)
It seems that to end the civil war, one needs to let go of the war-oriented imaginaire and adopt a democratic imaginaire, however that happens. The concept of imaginaire is central to Martinez’s theory. Is it his original thought? Or does it have grounding elsewhere?
War-oriented imaginaire as central:
“Our study has tried to show that the failure of Algeria’s ‘democratic transition’ can be explained by belief in the virtues of violence as a means for keeping the ranks of the elites filled.” (p. 251)
~ So, not yet a democracy-oriented imaginaire.
To be continued...