Чому почалася війна і як Росія її готувала
Друзі форварднули текст про те, що відбуваєтсья у Грузії і що цьому передувало. Дуже зрозуміло і коротко все описується. Прошу:
Account of events from inside Georgia:
++++++
You probably already heard about heavy fightings going on in Georgia,
where the country tries to stop invaded Russian troops and bombing of
Georgian towns and cities.
I would like to provide you with additional information for better
understanding of what is going on, because western media commonly
provides biased information copied from Russian media resources.
1. Russian preparations. There were repeated attempts to explore the
situation in both Georgian conflict regions during the last four
years.
Usually these were bombings of Georgian villages or police stations
near the conflict regions by "separatists" but obviously directed by
Russian forces based in the regions since 1992. After some European
countries blocked providing of MAP to Georgia and Ukraine, Russia
openly declared that Georgia and Ukraine will "commit problems".
During the Russian military trainings in
the northern Caucasus last July, the leaflets were spread among
Russian soldiers with description of a negative image of Georgian
soldier, the main
potential enemy.
2. Situation in the conflict region of South Ossetia. Reading existent
information sources, one can gain an impression that Georgia tried to
invade
the breakout region for recovering the central power (although legal,
but somewhat questionable attempt), and Russians were just answering
this with military power. I then must briefly explain the situation
prior to the war. The conflict region is a small area at the southern
slopes of the Great
Caucasus, with the total population of 70,000, approximately 50% of
that are ethnic Ossetians and another 50% - ethnic Georgians, the
groups very close culturally and historically. The capital town
Tskhinvali has a population of ca. 20,000. By the end of the conflict
of 1991, Georgia retained its control over approximately half of the
region, mostly parts were Georgian or mixed villages dominate
(including the area just around Tskhinvali) but also an important part
of Ossetian villages, and these parts were fully integrated
in the rest of the country without any time gap. Similar situation
exists in Abkhazia, where albeit lesser (ca. 15%) mountain part is
controlled by the
central government.
3. The situation prior to the war. Wide-scaled provocations have
started since beginning of July, where positions of "separatists" (in
fact Russian
paramilitary troops) started bombing of large Georgian villages around
Tskhinvali. This provoked backfire from Georgian military based near
the
villages. At 6th of August the paramilitaries backed by Russian
"peacekeepers" started to attack the Georgian villages, with a clear
aim to
withdraw Georgians and spread Russian power over the areas currently
controlled by the country. Saakashvili, Georgian president, tried to
ceasfire afternoon 06 August, but this was followed by activation of
the attack on the Georgia-controlled part of the region.
Simultaneously, Russian tanks started to invade the region from north,
via Roki tunnel passing through the Greater Caucasus Mountains.
Georgian government had just no way but starting the offensive on the
paramilitary fire positions and, eventually, Tskhinvali town.
4. Russians, after several hours, invaded large military groups with
heavy weapons, and started to bomb Georgian infrastructure. Thus
Georgian troops had already to face regular Russian military forces.
5. Since 8th August, Russian military plains started to bomb Georgian
infrastructure throughout the entire country and civil objects. The
Georgian
towns and objects bombed: - Gori (ca. 40,000 population), both
military objects and living appartments bombed, bombings multiple and
especially heavy as of 9th August, 55 civil dead for two days;
- Poti town (ca. 30,000), Georgian only large port; multiple civil casualties;
- Marneuli town/airport (ca. 70,000);
- Senaki (ca. 10,000) (railway station/civil buildings)
-Oni (ca 10,000)
-Tbilisi (Vaziani military base and surrounding area)
- Kutaisi (second largest city of Georgia, ca. 300,000), the
airport/surrounding appartments;
- Parts of Abkhazia controlled by the central government, high
mountain villages;
- currently the information comes that the Russians plant to bomb
Tbilisi international airport.
Georgian troops, according to the official reports, shot down 10
Russian plains since last two days, including strategic bombarder
TU-22 and smaller
military plains SU-25 and SU-27. The pilots were shown on TV and
currently questioned.
Russians move to the Georgian coast large military vessels.
Paramilitary groups in Abkhazia tried to take control over Upper
Abkhazia but failed.
Tskhinvali is a subject of heavy battles between regular troops of
Georgia and 58 army of Russia. Georgia yet cannot control
strategically important
Roki tunnel, although effectively controls largest part of the
conflict epicenter. We here have little doubts that if Russians take
over, they won't
stop and will occupy Georgia and pose the puppy government in the
country moreover, split it in several parts as a potentially dangerous
for "Russian geopolitical interests".
It is critically important that the international community intervenes
in that or another way. Starting from diplomatic efforts and finishing
with providing anti-aircraft weapons to Georgian Army.
--
Gela Vasadze
Account of events from inside Georgia:
++++++
You probably already heard about heavy fightings going on in Georgia,
where the country tries to stop invaded Russian troops and bombing of
Georgian towns and cities.
I would like to provide you with additional information for better
understanding of what is going on, because western media commonly
provides biased information copied from Russian media resources.
1. Russian preparations. There were repeated attempts to explore the
situation in both Georgian conflict regions during the last four
years.
Usually these were bombings of Georgian villages or police stations
near the conflict regions by "separatists" but obviously directed by
Russian forces based in the regions since 1992. After some European
countries blocked providing of MAP to Georgia and Ukraine, Russia
openly declared that Georgia and Ukraine will "commit problems".
During the Russian military trainings in
the northern Caucasus last July, the leaflets were spread among
Russian soldiers with description of a negative image of Georgian
soldier, the main
potential enemy.
2. Situation in the conflict region of South Ossetia. Reading existent
information sources, one can gain an impression that Georgia tried to
invade
the breakout region for recovering the central power (although legal,
but somewhat questionable attempt), and Russians were just answering
this with military power. I then must briefly explain the situation
prior to the war. The conflict region is a small area at the southern
slopes of the Great
Caucasus, with the total population of 70,000, approximately 50% of
that are ethnic Ossetians and another 50% - ethnic Georgians, the
groups very close culturally and historically. The capital town
Tskhinvali has a population of ca. 20,000. By the end of the conflict
of 1991, Georgia retained its control over approximately half of the
region, mostly parts were Georgian or mixed villages dominate
(including the area just around Tskhinvali) but also an important part
of Ossetian villages, and these parts were fully integrated
in the rest of the country without any time gap. Similar situation
exists in Abkhazia, where albeit lesser (ca. 15%) mountain part is
controlled by the
central government.
3. The situation prior to the war. Wide-scaled provocations have
started since beginning of July, where positions of "separatists" (in
fact Russian
paramilitary troops) started bombing of large Georgian villages around
Tskhinvali. This provoked backfire from Georgian military based near
the
villages. At 6th of August the paramilitaries backed by Russian
"peacekeepers" started to attack the Georgian villages, with a clear
aim to
withdraw Georgians and spread Russian power over the areas currently
controlled by the country. Saakashvili, Georgian president, tried to
ceasfire afternoon 06 August, but this was followed by activation of
the attack on the Georgia-controlled part of the region.
Simultaneously, Russian tanks started to invade the region from north,
via Roki tunnel passing through the Greater Caucasus Mountains.
Georgian government had just no way but starting the offensive on the
paramilitary fire positions and, eventually, Tskhinvali town.
4. Russians, after several hours, invaded large military groups with
heavy weapons, and started to bomb Georgian infrastructure. Thus
Georgian troops had already to face regular Russian military forces.
5. Since 8th August, Russian military plains started to bomb Georgian
infrastructure throughout the entire country and civil objects. The
Georgian
towns and objects bombed: - Gori (ca. 40,000 population), both
military objects and living appartments bombed, bombings multiple and
especially heavy as of 9th August, 55 civil dead for two days;
- Poti town (ca. 30,000), Georgian only large port; multiple civil casualties;
- Marneuli town/airport (ca. 70,000);
- Senaki (ca. 10,000) (railway station/civil buildings)
-Oni (ca 10,000)
-Tbilisi (Vaziani military base and surrounding area)
- Kutaisi (second largest city of Georgia, ca. 300,000), the
airport/surrounding appartments;
- Parts of Abkhazia controlled by the central government, high
mountain villages;
- currently the information comes that the Russians plant to bomb
Tbilisi international airport.
Georgian troops, according to the official reports, shot down 10
Russian plains since last two days, including strategic bombarder
TU-22 and smaller
military plains SU-25 and SU-27. The pilots were shown on TV and
currently questioned.
Russians move to the Georgian coast large military vessels.
Paramilitary groups in Abkhazia tried to take control over Upper
Abkhazia but failed.
Tskhinvali is a subject of heavy battles between regular troops of
Georgia and 58 army of Russia. Georgia yet cannot control
strategically important
Roki tunnel, although effectively controls largest part of the
conflict epicenter. We here have little doubts that if Russians take
over, they won't
stop and will occupy Georgia and pose the puppy government in the
country moreover, split it in several parts as a potentially dangerous
for "Russian geopolitical interests".
It is critically important that the international community intervenes
in that or another way. Starting from diplomatic efforts and finishing
with providing anti-aircraft weapons to Georgian Army.
--
Gela Vasadze