... Esmā‘il’s army was composed of a total of seventeen oymāqs ...
Riza Yildirim. The rise of the Safavids as a political dynasty: the revolution of Shāh Esmā‘il, the founder of the Safavid state // The Safavid World. 2022
The absolute Qezelbāsh domination in the Safavid army remained unchanged until Shah ‘Abbas I’s reforms toward the end of the sixteenth century. Masashi Haneda’s study on the military of the early Safavid state concludes that although there were certain religious figures and statesmen of Persian origin, the Iranian element in the early Safavid army was negligible. In addition to numerous accounts in contemporary sources, a complete list of Shah Esmā‘il’s army recorded in the Shāhnāma-ye Āl-e ‘Osman demonstrates the exclusively Qezelbāsh-Turkoman character of the Safavid army. The Shāhnāma says that when Shāh Esmā‘il rose up, a great number of people from several regions gathered around him. Then, the Shah assigned leaders to each tribal group (oymāq), put the others under their command, and in this fashion, built an army. According to the Shāhnāma, Esmā‘il’s army was composed of a total of seventeen oymāqs, each providing qurchis (royal guards) and ordinary soldiers. The complete list is given in Table 3.1.
An analysis of the Safavid state structure demonstrates that Shāh Esmā‘il and his Qezelbāsh adherents followed the Turko-Mongol tradition of politics. More specifically, they inherited the Aqqoyunlu statecraft. As John Woods has noted, at the collapse of the Aqqoyunlu empire, a great majority of the leading cadre of the Bayondur tribes were massacred by the Qezelbāsh. Those who managed to escape this holocaust were forced to accept a subordinate status in the newly formed tribal grouping known as the Turkoman oymāq. In the meantime, the Safavids readily took over the administrative infrastructure and staff of the Aqqoyunlu state. In the two-tiered structure of the Turko-Mongol statecraft, the bureaucratic edifice (vezārat, Tajiks) remained intact during the abrupt transition, while the politico-military elite (emārat, Turks) was replaced by the Qezelbāsh aristocracy. According to Woods, ‘The only real Safavid break with the Aqqoyunlu past is to be seen in the new religiopolitical ideology, or ideologies, adopted by Shāh Esmā‘il’.
Mehmed b. Mehmed el-Fenârî. Şâhnâme-i Âl-i Osman (alias Şemâilnâme-i Âl-i Osman), manuscript, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, III, Ahmed Kitaplığı, 3592: fols. 87a-7b.
This book is devoted to explaining the virtues of the Ottoman Sultans until Murad III (1574-95). The author writes his name in fol. 9a as Mehmed b. Mehmed el-Fenārī eş-şehir bī Ta’līkī-zāde. He says he was assigned as court historian (şehnâmeci) by Murad III. Thus his work must have been completed in the period between 1574 and 1595.
Для эпохи Тахмаспа (1530-й) есть вот такое - Periode De La Domination Qızılbāš (1524-1533) // Masashi Haneda. Le châh et les qizilbāš: le systeme militaire safavide. 1987. Числа там даны несколько большие.
Собрать все перечисленные контингенты в одном месте было затруднительно, если вообще возможно. С другой стороны - этим списком военные ресурсы не исчерпывались. К войне могли привлекаться вспомогательные войска из групп, которые к кызылбашам не относились.
Для сравнения можно посмотреть на иррегулярную конницу Ирана при поздних Каджарах.
Reza Ra'iss Tousi. The Persian Army, 1880-1907 // Middle Eastern Studies, 24:2. 1988
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Picot. Report on the Organization of the Persian Army. 1900
Demorgny G. Les reforms administratives en Perse. Les tribus du Fars // Revue du monde musulman, tome XXII, Mars 1913
P.S.
- A Chronicle of the Early Safawis being the Ahsani 't-Tawarikh of Hasan j-Rumlu. Ed. by C. N. Seddon.
- Eskandar Beg Monshi. History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great, translation by Roger M. Savory.
- Masashi Haneda. Le Châh et les Qizilbāš: le systeme militaire safavide. 1983
- Giorgio Rota. Safavids Against Turkmen in the Early Seventeenth Century: Warfare Against the Nomads on the Caspian Steppe // Iran, 2017
- Rudolph Matthee. Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran // Safavid Persia. History and Politics of an Islamic Society. 1996
- Семенов А. А. Шейбани-хан и завоевание им империи Тимуридов // Труды Академии наук Таджикской ССР. Т. XII, вып. 1, 1954
- Семенов А. А. Первые Шейбаниды и борьба за Мавераннахр // Труды Академии наук Таджикской ССР. Т. XII, вып. 1, 1954
- Султанов Т. И. Кочевые племена Приаралья в 15-17 вв. Вопросы этнической и социальной истории. 1982.
- Beatrice Forbes Manz. Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran. 2007
- John E. Woods. The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire. 1976
- Riza Yildirim. Turkomans between Two Empires: The Origins of the Qizilbash Identity in Anatolia (1447-1514). PhD diss., Bilkent University, February 2008
- Charles Melville. History: from the Saljuqs to the Aq Qoyunlu (ca. 1000-1500 C.E.) // Iranian Studies, 31:3-4. 1998
- Yıldız Sara Nur. Post-Mongol Pastoral Policies in Eastern Anatolia during the Late Middle Ages. // At the Crossroads of Empires: 14th - 15th Century Eastern Anatolia. Proceedings of the International Symposium held in Istanbul, 4th-6th May 2007. 2012.
- Savory R.M. The Struggle for Supremacy in Persia after the Death of Tīmūr // Der Islam XL. 1964
- Savory R.M. The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia // Der Islam 41. 1965.
- Ali Anooshahr. The Rise of the Safavids According to their Old Veterans: Amini Haravi’s Futuhat-e Shahi // Iranian Studies, 2015. Vol. 48, No. 2
P.P.S. Hugh Kennedy. The late Abbasid pattern, 945-1050 // The new Cambridge history of Islam. Vol. I. 2011
In economic terms, the changing relationships between the nomads and the settled population can be seen in the laments of numerous sources about the decline of settled agriculture and the occupation of farmland by the Bedouin. ... There can be no doubt that the century 950-1050 saw a vast increase in the area used for nomad pasture and the collapse of the agricultural economy in districts that had once been the granaries of the Abbasid caliphate. ... An attempt by one member of the ruling family, al Muqallad ibn Muhammad, to establish himself in the city and recruit Turkish ghilman in fact, to make the Uqaylid in to a settled dynasty like the Hamdanids or Buyids met with failure in the face of opposition from his fellow tribesmen. In 391/1001 leadership of the tribewas assumed by Qirwash ibn al Muqallad, who was to reign until 441/1049. During this half century his main priorities were to preserve his political independence and ensure access to sufficient summer and winter pastures for his tribesmen. He lived in his camp and seldom visited Mosul or any of the other towns that paid him tribute.
H. Kennedy. The Uqaylids of Mosul: The origins and structure of a nomad dynasty // Actas del XII Congreso de la UEAI (Madrid, 1986)
R. Stephen Humphreys. Syria // The new Cambridge history of Islam. Vol. I. 2011
In contrast to his counterparts in Iraq and Egypt, Muqawiya did not have to deal with a large influx of Arabian tribesmen from disparate lineages. Such newcomers needed to be settled and supervised, and they were easily filled with jealousy and resentment focused on the division of the spoils of the conquests. In contrast, the numerous tribes under his authority continued to live more or less in their traditional areas, and hence seldom fell into conflict with one another. He assiduously cultivated his connections with the old Syrian tribes, especially Kalb, the largest lineage in the Qudaa group and the one that dominated the countryside around his capital, Damascus. These tribes in fact supplied the manpower for Muqawiya’s armies. Since they resided in the steppe and desert they required little bureaucratic oversight, but could rather be recruited and paid as needed. We know very little about military administration in Muqawiya’s Syria, but most likely it was done through subsidies to the tribal leaders rather than by centrally controlled stipends assigned to individual soldiers.
Hugh Kennedy. Syrian Elites from Byzantium to Islam: Survival or Extinction? // Money, Power and Politics in early Islamic Syria. 2010
Jurgen Paul. Mongol Aristocrats and Beyliks in Anatolia: A Study of Astarabadi’s Bazm va Razm // Eurasian Studies, IX/1-2 (2011)
Ramzi Rouighi. The Making of a Mediterranean Emirate. Ifriqiya and Its Andalusis, 1200-1400. 2011
D.G. Tor. The Political Revival of the Abbasid Caliphate: Al-Muqtafi and the Seljuqs // Journal of the American Oriental Society 137.2 (2017)
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the events of al-Muqtafī’s reign. First, one of the more noteworthy aspects of his military campaigns for caliphal independence - which seems not to have been remarked upon previously - is that the caliph achieved his military successes almost entirely without the aid of Turkish mamluks; the sources state explicitly that all of his slave soldiery (as opposed to his free soldiery, which included Turkmens as well as every other Muslim ethnic group) was recruited from Byzantium and Armenia - and these mamluks apparently maintained their position quite well against the various Seljuq and atabeg armies, which consisted largely of Turks, both Turkmens and mamluks:
When the imam was made caliph, it was upon the condition that he would not purchase any Turkish mamluk; and throughout the entire length of his caliphate he purchased only Armenian or Byzantine [ones], and he did not have any [slave] Turks, with the sole exception of Turshak, whom he had owned before [his elevation to] the imamate.
Ironically, this passage, which has been held up as proof of Turkish mamluk superiority, proves the contrary, since al-Muqtafī’s virtually Turkish-mamluk-free armies repeatedly beat the Turkish (supposedly mamluk-filled) ones in open combat. Even after freeing himself from Seljuq domination, when he enjoyed complete freedom of action, al-Muqtafī continued to avoid purchasing Turkish mamluks, according to this passage.
Eskandar Beg Monshi. History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great. Vol. II.
Among the Uzbegs, very few, except the most valiant, seek the command of armies. For the majority, the supreme act of bravery is to make an individual charge against the enemy with drawn sword, to achieve a few feats of individual valor, and to ride back from the battlefield. ... he now suddenly decided to make an individual charge against the enemy in the traditional Uzbeg manner. He rushed out with drawn sword, and charged the enemy around the palisades and trenches, wounding several of them.
Для сравнения - из Рашид ад-Дина.
- Так как у Чингиз-хана войско было небольшое, а принадлежащее Он-хану - многочисленно, то он учинил с эмирами совет: „Как нам поступить?". ... Когда Чингиз-хан обсуждал [создавшееся положение], Кэхтэй-нойон поглаживал по лошадиной гриве плетью, находясь в раздумье и сомнении, и не смог [дать] определенного ответа. Куилдар-сэчэн, который был побратимом [андэ] Чингиз-хана, сказал: „Хан, анда мой! Я поскачу, воткну в землю свой бунчук на том холме, что находится в тылу врага и название которого Куйтэн, и выкажу свое мужество. У меня несколько сыновей, если я умру, Чингиз-хан сумеет их вскормить и воспитать!". Другой эмир Баджигар-хан, также происходивший из мангутов, сказал Чингиз-хану: „Какая нужда во всем этом? Поскачем на них, уповая на бога, и [пусть будет], что суждено всевышней истиной". Короче говоря, Куилдар-[сэчэн] поскакал, как он сказал, и всевышний творец помог ему проскочить [невредимым] мимо врагов и водрузить свой бунчук на том холме Куйтэн. Чингиз-хан же совместно с другими эмирами атаковал [врага].
- Случилось, что конь светлой масти с перевернутым под брюхо седлом убежал из войска Чингиз-хана и забежал в середину войска найманов. Когда те увидели, что конь истощен, Таян-хан учинил с эмирами совещание что де, кони монголов тощи, подразнив [монголов], мы начнем понемногу отступать для того, чтобы они пустились нас преследовать, [вследствие этого] их кони еще более ослабеют, а наши окажутся резвыми [барак], затем мы остановимся и дадим сражение. Упомянутый Субэчу-Кори, который был одним из старших эмиров Таян-хана, в ответ на эти слова сказал: „Твой отец, Инанч-хан, ни одному человеку не показал своей спины и крупа своего коня, ты же сразу струсил! Когда так, следует привести Гурбасу-хатун", - т. е. жену, которую тот любил. Этот эмир, сказав эти слова, в гневе и негодовании удалился. По этой причине Таян-хану поневоле пришлось встать на войну.