SPACE AND TIME ARE TRANSCENDENTALLY IDEAL
The two alternatives to the Kantian view are Leibnizian and Newtonian positions, and these can stand in for all broadly relational and non-relational ontologies of space respectively. Now it's quite clear that the Leibnizian view is defeated by the a priority arguments. This is shown here and here, but we are still left with the question of whether or not the Newtonian position (broadly construed) is ruled out by these arguments. Prima facie it seems as though space could be an a priori and intuitive representation but also be a real condition of things as they are in themselves. In that case our representation of space is an epistemic condition, but there is also "real" space, "out there," and it is an ontological condition.
How does a nonrelationalist about space explain that our representation of space is also an epistemic condition? There are two possible explanations: 1. We have an innate idea of space, and between this idea of space and space itself there exists a "preestablished harmony"; and 2. Our idea of space is derived from our experience of these "real things" and represents a property or condition of them.
Putting aside its dogmatic metaphysical appeal to the goodness of God, the first argument is inadequate because it cannot account for the necessity that is to be explained in the representation of space. Space could never be a necessary presupposition of experience if it had merely subjective necessity and were implanted in us arbitrarily.
The problem with the second alternative is that it claims that something that is supposed to function as a condition of the possibility of experience can have its source in that experience. This is contradictory, because it entails that experience is possible apart from something that is stipulated to be a condition of its possibility.
So how can the representation of space (or time) play the foundational role in human experience that is claimed for it by the apriority arguments and the intuition arguments? Clearly, the representation can function this way if space (the content of the representation) is a form of human sensibility; and having ruled out the Leibnizian and Newtonian ontologies, it is difficult to see on what other basis this can be understood. Therefore, space and time are transcendentally ideal. They apply only to things as appearances and not to things in themselves.
How does a nonrelationalist about space explain that our representation of space is also an epistemic condition? There are two possible explanations: 1. We have an innate idea of space, and between this idea of space and space itself there exists a "preestablished harmony"; and 2. Our idea of space is derived from our experience of these "real things" and represents a property or condition of them.
Putting aside its dogmatic metaphysical appeal to the goodness of God, the first argument is inadequate because it cannot account for the necessity that is to be explained in the representation of space. Space could never be a necessary presupposition of experience if it had merely subjective necessity and were implanted in us arbitrarily.
The problem with the second alternative is that it claims that something that is supposed to function as a condition of the possibility of experience can have its source in that experience. This is contradictory, because it entails that experience is possible apart from something that is stipulated to be a condition of its possibility.
So how can the representation of space (or time) play the foundational role in human experience that is claimed for it by the apriority arguments and the intuition arguments? Clearly, the representation can function this way if space (the content of the representation) is a form of human sensibility; and having ruled out the Leibnizian and Newtonian ontologies, it is difficult to see on what other basis this can be understood. Therefore, space and time are transcendentally ideal. They apply only to things as appearances and not to things in themselves.