Interesting. That Gastronomic Realism paper reads more like a realist reductio than a relativist one. I thought the realists' challenge has always been "But if your view is correct, then your moral opinions have no greater weight than your taste in food."
He concludes that even if gastronomic realism is true, the sensible thing to do is to eat the foods you enjoy, rather than the foods which are objectively better but which you dislike. So does he advocate behaving in a way which benefits you rather than a way which is (your best guess at what is) morally right? Again, I thought that was a realist straw man which no relativist actually admitted to.
I thought the realists' challenge has always been "But if your view is correct, then your moral opinions have no greater weight than your taste in food."
Well yes, and Loeb's response is that, if the realist view is correct, then it seems you can use the arguments for it to defend the view that there are objectively better foods, i.e. that arguments for realism prove too much (although he backs off calling it a true reductio at the end: perhaps there really are gastronomic absolutes). Note that by "better" he doesn't necessarily mean better for instrumental reasons (like being healthier, say): some foods just are better, in the same way that some things are just wrong.
So does he advocate behaving in a way which benefits you rather than a way which is (your best guess at what is) morally right?No (but he doesn't say that doing so is irrational either, just like preferring pizza to caviar is not irrational). I think he means that there's a decision to be made here: "Even if there are facts about what has gastronomic value, that is,
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And I agree with Loeb - knowing God's moral opinion doesn't make it no longer an opinion :->
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He concludes that even if gastronomic realism is true, the sensible thing to do is to eat the foods you enjoy, rather than the foods which are objectively better but which you dislike. So does he advocate behaving in a way which benefits you rather than a way which is (your best guess at what is) morally right? Again, I thought that was a realist straw man which no relativist actually admitted to.
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Well yes, and Loeb's response is that, if the realist view is correct, then it seems you can use the arguments for it to defend the view that there are objectively better foods, i.e. that arguments for realism prove too much (although he backs off calling it a true reductio at the end: perhaps there really are gastronomic absolutes). Note that by "better" he doesn't necessarily mean better for instrumental reasons (like being healthier, say): some foods just are better, in the same way that some things are just wrong.
So does he advocate behaving in a way which benefits you rather than a way which is (your best guess at what is) morally right?No (but he doesn't say that doing so is irrational either, just like preferring pizza to caviar is not irrational). I think he means that there's a decision to be made here: "Even if there are facts about what has gastronomic value, that is, ( ... )
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If some foods are just better, why are they just better?
' he doesn't necessarily mean better for instrumental reasons (like being healthier, say)'
So for what reasons is one thing better than another thing?
And is one person just better than another, in the same way that lasagne is just better than pork scratchings?
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