Heidegger's views on comportment, equipmental totality, everydayness, ready-to-handedness etc., would be very relevant to the contents of this post almost as much as Lukacs. Nonetheless, I think there are some significant problems in the way you frame your response to Lukacs' critique.
But there is no conscious application of a discursive concept here--how could it be?
I'm assuming this is a reference to our past discussion on Kant, at least obliquely. In some ways I'm glad we hit that impasse in our discussion on Kant, becuase it really made clear that I was articulating something rather untenable and, perhaps, even overextending Kantian epistemology to things that posed some real problems of content and particularity. At any rate, here are some of my responses in particular:
Our recognition of these objects as being of a certain kind is not a theoretical recognition at all; it is a practical one. Right. Although, it wouldn't be merely a re-cognition -- it would also be an experimenting, doing, playing, practicing and making of
( ... )
Heidegger's views on comportment, equipmental totality, everydayness, ready-to-handedness etc., would be very relevant to the contents of this post almost as much as Lukacs.
I'm conscious of working on a phenomenology-Lukacs bridge here, but unfortunately don't have any Heidegger mentally on hand. I'm pulling a lot of influence out of Merleau-Ponty, which is why I can't seem to stop saying the word "body."
I'm assuming this is a reference to our past discussion on Kant, at least obliquely. In some ways I'm glad we hit that impasse in our discussion on Kant, becuase it really made clear that I was articulating something rather untenable and, perhaps, even overextending Kantian epistemology to things that posed some real problems of content and particularity.I too am really glad we had that conversation about Kant, since you illuminated his position very well and made it possible for me to understand a lot of the criticisms of Kantian epistemology that I've been getting from MP and Lukacs. Thanks for it. My only gripe is that it
( ... )
Right. Although, it wouldn't be merely a re-cognition -- it would also be an experimenting, doing, playing, practicing and making of things with such tools.
Hmmm. "Re-cognition"--hyphenated as you write it--looks more cognitive than I intended it. But I do think it's possible to perceive an object--without necessarily doing, playing, etc.--in such a way that it anticipates doing, playing, whatever. It presents itself with the potential of being played with in such and such a way.
Second, because with proficiency, objects with practical form can become extensions of the body--like the cane of a blind man or, now, the keyboard of this computer which now falls within the horizon of my experienced body, bordering on this text, which is external to me. And so the gradual acquisition of procedural knowledge of the appropriate kinds would allow us to traverse the functional structure of the world; as we near an object through practice, its functional form becomes a practical form, and its practical form becomes subsumed into our bodies.But here's the part where you precisely engage in the contemplative stance. You put the the cart before the horse, so to speak. Your reasoning gives precedence to the "functional form" as if there were one essential functional form to the world or certain objects -- objects even like a keyboard, which you describe as seemingly having a definitive function for typing, when it very well could be used for hammering something, or, say, throwing it at someone. The relevant possibilities
( ... )
But here's the part where you precisely engage in the contemplative stance.
Great--I'm really interested in criticism of this kind! But I think I have some rebuttals. Let me take it point by point.
Your reasoning gives precedence to the "functional form" as if there were one essential functional form to the world or certain objects -- objects even like a keyboard, which you describe as seemingly having a definitive function for typing, when it very well could be used for hammering something, or, say, throwing it at someone.I didn't mean to imply that objects have a single functional form. Of course, an object can have many forms. But what I'm trying to say is that when we talk about an object's functional form, we are trying to articulate a way that we perceive an object. So while I can perceive this object before me as something that can hammer in nails, I am now perceiving it as a keyboard because it is presents itself to me as something to type upon
( ... )
I didn't mean to imply that objects have a single functional form. Of course, an object can have many forms. But what I'm trying to say is that when we talk about an object's functional form, we are trying to articulate a way that we perceive an object. So while I can perceive this object before me as something that can hammer in nails, I am now perceiving it as a keyboard because it is presents itself to me as something to type upon. So I want to say that this object is a keyboard in virtue of its form, but not in a way that is exclusive to other things that it might be.I'm having a little trouble parsing this, because it almost seems as if the the "keyboard in virtue of its form" is its practical form as much as the function it takes on for you. Since you add that it the form is something that is not exclusive, it almost sounds as if the practical form that goes with a certain performative activity and the functional form for you are virtually indistinguishable. In which case, I don't think I have any disagreements with you. But
( ... )
functionalismpaulhopeOctober 13 2007, 17:06:34 UTC
Don't let me escape the last paragraph of your second comment, but these questions of clarification are easier to answer and I have a bit of time now. Since I'm having trouble understanding your substantive criticism in that paragraph, maybe this will help get us on the same page.
What exactly do you mean by functionalism here? It's not wholly evident to me if you're using functionalism in the way you're talking about it in this post -- i.e. wedded to practical formality and habituation -- or if you're using it in the computationalist sense of formally logical operations.What I am consciously trying to do here is show that (at least one flavor of) functionalism as it's talked about in analytic philosophy is much less "contemplative" than many might assume
( ... )
I sure am sorry about it. Smith tell in this how the same subject "thing" not established or not established precisely. Then we must speak about whole phenomena "act or process of the interpretation" when stimulus is only the initial conditions ... :)
Comments 12
But there is no conscious application of a discursive concept here--how could it be?
I'm assuming this is a reference to our past discussion on Kant, at least obliquely. In some ways I'm glad we hit that impasse in our discussion on Kant, becuase it really made clear that I was articulating something rather untenable and, perhaps, even overextending Kantian epistemology to things that posed some real problems of content and particularity. At any rate, here are some of my responses in particular:
Our recognition of these objects as being of a certain kind is not a theoretical recognition at all; it is a practical one. Right. Although, it wouldn't be merely a re-cognition -- it would also be an experimenting, doing, playing, practicing and making of ( ... )
Reply
I'm conscious of working on a phenomenology-Lukacs bridge here, but unfortunately don't have any Heidegger mentally on hand. I'm pulling a lot of influence out of Merleau-Ponty, which is why I can't seem to stop saying the word "body."
I'm assuming this is a reference to our past discussion on Kant, at least obliquely. In some ways I'm glad we hit that impasse in our discussion on Kant, becuase it really made clear that I was articulating something rather untenable and, perhaps, even overextending Kantian epistemology to things that posed some real problems of content and particularity.I too am really glad we had that conversation about Kant, since you illuminated his position very well and made it possible for me to understand a lot of the criticisms of Kantian epistemology that I've been getting from MP and Lukacs. Thanks for it. My only gripe is that it ( ... )
Reply
Hmmm. "Re-cognition"--hyphenated as you write it--looks more cognitive than I intended it. But I do think it's possible to perceive an object--without necessarily doing, playing, etc.--in such a way that it anticipates doing, playing, whatever. It presents itself with the potential of being played with in such and such a way.
Reply
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Great--I'm really interested in criticism of this kind! But I think I have some rebuttals. Let me take it point by point.
Your reasoning gives precedence to the "functional form" as if there were one essential functional form to the world or certain objects -- objects even like a keyboard, which you describe as seemingly having a definitive function for typing, when it very well could be used for hammering something, or, say, throwing it at someone.I didn't mean to imply that objects have a single functional form. Of course, an object can have many forms. But what I'm trying to say is that when we talk about an object's functional form, we are trying to articulate a way that we perceive an object. So while I can perceive this object before me as something that can hammer in nails, I am now perceiving it as a keyboard because it is presents itself to me as something to type upon ( ... )
Reply
Reply
What exactly do you mean by functionalism here? It's not wholly evident to me if you're using functionalism in the way you're talking about it in this post -- i.e. wedded to practical formality and habituation -- or if you're using it in the computationalist sense of formally logical operations.What I am consciously trying to do here is show that (at least one flavor of) functionalism as it's talked about in analytic philosophy is much less "contemplative" than many might assume ( ... )
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I am sorry for my English. :))
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