Anyway, onto philosophy ...unnamed525September 6 2007, 23:11:12 UTC
I would say that pragmatism is the ground of science; it is, ultimately, what justifies the scientific endeavor. Science exists to allow us to understand and therefore predict reality; this allows us to manipulate reality to conform to our desires. We first want to manipulate reality, therefore we must learn to predict it, which requires that we must understand it, so there are two levels between the primal urge (to manipulate reality) and the "scientific" desire (to understand reality in order to better manipulate it); this cognitive distance might explain why most people don't "get" science. They're not thinking deep enough.
Re: Anyway, onto philosophy ...paulhopeSeptember 7 2007, 04:40:31 UTC
At this point in my intellectual life I have a lot of trouble distinguishing the sort of material sciences which let us predict and control reality from a more general schema of inquiry (in the pragmatist sense) whereby we come to some resolution which guides our action. So I would want to shy away from a characterization of science that holds its telos as "manipulat[ing] reality to conform to our desires," even with the caveat that understanding reality is instrumental to this goal
( ... )
Hmm. Thanks for the response. And thanks for calling me out on not actually knowing how phenomenologists see science. That was what I was going to look into more before I realized that I didn't have anyone to impress so I might as well shoot first and take crap for it.
But I think I'm trying to say something other than that causal stuff is secondary or derivative though. I think I'm trying to say, rather, that causal language is the language that we have to communicate certain complex ways that the world is to us, and specifically the way it is to us as something we can interact with. So it is a description, not an explanation.
All this reminds me that I still want to read your paper on the priority of perception for MP, because I've had issues throughout reading PoP with his use of priority to establish privileged spheres of experience etc.
MP derides causal thought not because he thinks it's completely impotent, but because it offers an explanation as a description. But in this sense, it sounds like the question of the difference between description and explanation is a repackaging of the question of causality. Consider: among scientific characterizations of physical behavior, (e.g. universal gravitation, Maxwell's laws, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, &c.) which do you count as descriptive, and which as explanatory?
So... as far as I understand it, here's the story on causation that a lot of people think is really solid: Hume shows that you can't infer causal relations from sensations. Kant "solves" the problem by placing the ascription of causal relations into a kind of categorical attitude. It becomes part of a domain of "objective," discursive knowledge.
Well, I guess I'll play Appy here and ask you what you mean by this description of the Kantian move. Kant explicitly denies the validity of objective knowledge (knowledge of the noumenal). Causality is made into a kind of subjective precondition for perception. Perhaps there's something to the "discursive" that's important here, but it seems to me that any continental thinker who took Kant even halfway seriously would have to accept the undeniable subjective reality of causality, and thus to move in precisely the direction you want to go.
I'm a bit out of my league here, but here's my best shot. I trust you to call me out on anything that is stupid.
Kant explicitly denies the validity of objective knowledge (knowledge of the noumenal)
So, by objective knowledge I didn't mean to talk about knowledge of the noumenal. I meant rather to refer to the kind of knowledge that awwh_snap was talking about here, which is knowledge that comes from the judgment that certain discursive concepts apply to the phenomena
( ... )
I was under the impression that you accepted moderator rights in Faux to expound on the historical creation/fragmentation of the various LJ philosophical communities. I don't think I've ever heard you described as an apologist, much less a troll. IMO, the banning speaks more about their character and motives than it does yours.
Now, if I can get back to digesting the remainder of what you had written and give it some more thought before I respond.
I was under the impression that you accepted moderator rights in Faux to expound on the historical creation/fragmentation of the various LJ philosophical communities.
Yep.
I don't think I've ever heard you described as an apologist
In the interest of full disclosure, at the point in history (about two years ago) where faux_ was a place where people who were dissatisfied with Appy and Mendy's moderating style and were otherwise silenced could go and complain about them, I was a vocal fan.
much less a troll
this part was a total fabrication on their part.
IMO, the banning speaks more about their character and motives than it does yours.
IMO as well. Thanks for the support; I appreciate it.
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Privately, not playing along.
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But I think I'm trying to say something other than that causal stuff is secondary or derivative though. I think I'm trying to say, rather, that causal language is the language that we have to communicate certain complex ways that the world is to us, and specifically the way it is to us as something we can interact with. So it is a description, not an explanation.
All this reminds me that I still want to read your paper on the priority of perception for MP, because I've had issues throughout reading PoP with his use of priority to establish privileged spheres of experience etc.
Reply
But in this sense, it sounds like the question of the difference between description and explanation is a repackaging of the question of causality. Consider: among scientific characterizations of physical behavior, (e.g. universal gravitation, Maxwell's laws, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, &c.) which do you count as descriptive, and which as explanatory?
Reply
(The comment has been removed)
Well, I guess I'll play Appy here and ask you what you mean by this description of the Kantian move. Kant explicitly denies the validity of objective knowledge (knowledge of the noumenal). Causality is made into a kind of subjective precondition for perception. Perhaps there's something to the "discursive" that's important here, but it seems to me that any continental thinker who took Kant even halfway seriously would have to accept the undeniable subjective reality of causality, and thus to move in precisely the direction you want to go.
Reply
Kant explicitly denies the validity of objective knowledge (knowledge of the noumenal)
So, by objective knowledge I didn't mean to talk about knowledge of the noumenal. I meant rather to refer to the kind of knowledge that awwh_snap was talking about here, which is knowledge that comes from the judgment that certain discursive concepts apply to the phenomena ( ... )
Reply
Now, if I can get back to digesting the remainder of what you had written and give it some more thought before I respond.
Reply
Yep.
I don't think I've ever heard you described as an apologist
In the interest of full disclosure, at the point in history (about two years ago) where faux_ was a place where people who were dissatisfied with Appy and Mendy's moderating style and were otherwise silenced could go and complain about them, I was a vocal fan.
much less a troll
this part was a total fabrication on their part.
IMO, the banning speaks more about their character and motives than it does yours.
IMO as well. Thanks for the support; I appreciate it.
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