More stories from the back-yard
Some recent steps by Juan Santos, the president of Colombia, which he has made toward China are causing concerns in the US and are putting pressure on the Congress to finally pass the free trade agreement (FTA) with Colombia. Maybe this is exactly what Santos is aiming for when he's playing that game, after all. But his moves which got a lot of recent publicity should be put in the actual context of his larger attempts to diversify Colombia's foreign policy options. So this shouldn't be under-estimated. It's yet another block from the back-yard fence which the US generally takes for granted but has to keep maintaining, should it avoid finding itself in a uncomfortable situation where they'd have to step in again ( hello, Costa Rica?)
So let's sprinkle some context into this. In September last year, just a couple of weeks after he was sworn in, Santos accepted $1 million of aid from China meant to help him get logistical military equipment from Mr Hu. The Chinese also invited some senior military officers from Colombia to take part in various training courses in China. And though this deal sounds pretty insignificant, especially when put next to the $7+ billion which Colombia has received from the US under the almost unmentionable "plan Colombia", the setting of this China agreement is much more important than the sheer size measured in money. Santos knows very well what effects such a deal could have on in Washington, having in mind China's attempts to jump onto the scene of arms trade in Latin America. So maybe that's why he's been testing the waters for now.
And here's another, more recent occasion illustrating Santos' strategy to use the "China menace" rhetoric that has gripped Washington. He commented on what he dubbed "a real proposal" by China to build a so-called "dry canal" that would connect various ports on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. The project is worth $7.6 billion, and if done, it would put the monopoly of the US-built Panama canal on transit trade at risk. Well, at least on paper. The 200 km long link would turn Colombia into the most important transportation hub in the region and an alternative that China and others could comfortably use.
When seeing Santos' efforts to put this dry-canal proposal into the spotlight, and adding the inroads that China is making in terms of military aid, Colombia's intention seems to be to try to boost the support from Washington for the ratification of the FTA, whose implementation has been blocked ever since GWB put his autograph on it 5 years ago. And despite the apparent shift of Santos to a less Americacentric foreign policy model, let's not hurry to write him off as the next member of the Axis-Of-Evil(TM) along with Chavez and the Castros. In fact he's nowhere near ending his key alliance with the US, which helped Colombia to weaken the FARC guarrillas. He's rather aiming at diversifying Colombia's trade options and promoting faster economic growth at a time of global crisis. Or at least so appears to be the most logical explanation.
As soon as he got elected, Santos officially expressed a noticeable change in Colombia's foreign policies. His foreign minister told the Congress that the new focus would now be on the geographic diversification of the foreign policy agenda to promote Colombia's interests and open new opportunities for investors. That was her official statement.
This sounds like a pretty pragmatic policy. And the results weren't late to follow. First, Santos restored the relations with Venezuela. These relations had been damaged a lot under the previous president Uribe. Then he also managed to integrate the Colombian stock market with the Chilean and Peruvian one, which hints about closer economic ties and more coordinated cooperation, which includes a free trade deal with Mexico. These four countries now seem to be forming a trade block which will try to use the Asian markets, and China is readily willing to step in and respond to the opening niche. It's the multipolar global model that people keep talking about, now practically turning into reality.
In the meantime Colombia is trying to open up diplomatically as well, and join as many multilateral bodies as possible, to expand its reach. Last year Santos finally achieved Uribe's dream of getting a 2-year term on the UN security council (which they're about to preside over now). He's also been calling for his country to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, plus the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. Both of these alliances already include Mexico and Chile, and the latter also includes Peru. Santos has seen the benefits from that in other countries, and he's hurrying to bring Colombia on board early. That would allow his country to use some internationally recognized practices that would increase the direct foreign investment and open new markets for exports.
Besides, let's look on this realistically. The diversification of trade with Asia (mostly China) was a direct result of the US recession after the global financial crisis. The diplomatic rift with Venezuela was also a factor. For the last couple of years the damage from both these factors has severely crippled the two main export markets of Colombia, which combined made over 50% of the total exports. Consequently, the exports to China more than doubled since 2009, even if the exports to some other parts of Asia didn't rise by more than 30%. So, China has now become Colombia's second biggest export market (although most exports are still commodities). Add the tripled exports to Singapore, South Korea and Japan. And the trend is accelerating. Colombia is currently negotiating free trade agreements with all these countries.
On the other hand, Colombia's relative diplomatic inexperience, combined with this rapid embrace of China with no strings attached, has shown some unintended consequences. The most significant one in the diplomatic area. Colombia, along with 18 other countries, initially decided to abstain from attending the Nobel peace prize ceremony for the Chinese rights activist Liu Xiaobo. But looking a bit closer on the list, most of those countries either have authoritarian regimes or are in very close relations with China. The global media attention to this decision caused the Colombian foreign minister to stutter some sort of explanation that Colombia has just one ambassador for all Scandinavian countries, but still the government would send a lower ranking official for the ceremony. Pretty unconvincing indeed.
So you see, Colombia is shifting its foreign policies, and strengthening its economic and diplomatic relations with Asia. Which is not exactly (or solely) a consequence of the US failure to ratify the FTA as some US analysts are claiming. And neither is it some attempt to alienate the US. That would be a stupid thing to do. It's rather an attempt to improve its economic and diplomatic position in this dynamic global situation. But of course Colombia is not entirely alien to the idea of exploiting the "Chinese menace" meme in the US, in their attempts to push for a faster ratification of the FTA.
So let's sprinkle some context into this. In September last year, just a couple of weeks after he was sworn in, Santos accepted $1 million of aid from China meant to help him get logistical military equipment from Mr Hu. The Chinese also invited some senior military officers from Colombia to take part in various training courses in China. And though this deal sounds pretty insignificant, especially when put next to the $7+ billion which Colombia has received from the US under the almost unmentionable "plan Colombia", the setting of this China agreement is much more important than the sheer size measured in money. Santos knows very well what effects such a deal could have on in Washington, having in mind China's attempts to jump onto the scene of arms trade in Latin America. So maybe that's why he's been testing the waters for now.
And here's another, more recent occasion illustrating Santos' strategy to use the "China menace" rhetoric that has gripped Washington. He commented on what he dubbed "a real proposal" by China to build a so-called "dry canal" that would connect various ports on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. The project is worth $7.6 billion, and if done, it would put the monopoly of the US-built Panama canal on transit trade at risk. Well, at least on paper. The 200 km long link would turn Colombia into the most important transportation hub in the region and an alternative that China and others could comfortably use.
When seeing Santos' efforts to put this dry-canal proposal into the spotlight, and adding the inroads that China is making in terms of military aid, Colombia's intention seems to be to try to boost the support from Washington for the ratification of the FTA, whose implementation has been blocked ever since GWB put his autograph on it 5 years ago. And despite the apparent shift of Santos to a less Americacentric foreign policy model, let's not hurry to write him off as the next member of the Axis-Of-Evil(TM) along with Chavez and the Castros. In fact he's nowhere near ending his key alliance with the US, which helped Colombia to weaken the FARC guarrillas. He's rather aiming at diversifying Colombia's trade options and promoting faster economic growth at a time of global crisis. Or at least so appears to be the most logical explanation.
As soon as he got elected, Santos officially expressed a noticeable change in Colombia's foreign policies. His foreign minister told the Congress that the new focus would now be on the geographic diversification of the foreign policy agenda to promote Colombia's interests and open new opportunities for investors. That was her official statement.
This sounds like a pretty pragmatic policy. And the results weren't late to follow. First, Santos restored the relations with Venezuela. These relations had been damaged a lot under the previous president Uribe. Then he also managed to integrate the Colombian stock market with the Chilean and Peruvian one, which hints about closer economic ties and more coordinated cooperation, which includes a free trade deal with Mexico. These four countries now seem to be forming a trade block which will try to use the Asian markets, and China is readily willing to step in and respond to the opening niche. It's the multipolar global model that people keep talking about, now practically turning into reality.
In the meantime Colombia is trying to open up diplomatically as well, and join as many multilateral bodies as possible, to expand its reach. Last year Santos finally achieved Uribe's dream of getting a 2-year term on the UN security council (which they're about to preside over now). He's also been calling for his country to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, plus the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. Both of these alliances already include Mexico and Chile, and the latter also includes Peru. Santos has seen the benefits from that in other countries, and he's hurrying to bring Colombia on board early. That would allow his country to use some internationally recognized practices that would increase the direct foreign investment and open new markets for exports.
Besides, let's look on this realistically. The diversification of trade with Asia (mostly China) was a direct result of the US recession after the global financial crisis. The diplomatic rift with Venezuela was also a factor. For the last couple of years the damage from both these factors has severely crippled the two main export markets of Colombia, which combined made over 50% of the total exports. Consequently, the exports to China more than doubled since 2009, even if the exports to some other parts of Asia didn't rise by more than 30%. So, China has now become Colombia's second biggest export market (although most exports are still commodities). Add the tripled exports to Singapore, South Korea and Japan. And the trend is accelerating. Colombia is currently negotiating free trade agreements with all these countries.
On the other hand, Colombia's relative diplomatic inexperience, combined with this rapid embrace of China with no strings attached, has shown some unintended consequences. The most significant one in the diplomatic area. Colombia, along with 18 other countries, initially decided to abstain from attending the Nobel peace prize ceremony for the Chinese rights activist Liu Xiaobo. But looking a bit closer on the list, most of those countries either have authoritarian regimes or are in very close relations with China. The global media attention to this decision caused the Colombian foreign minister to stutter some sort of explanation that Colombia has just one ambassador for all Scandinavian countries, but still the government would send a lower ranking official for the ceremony. Pretty unconvincing indeed.
So you see, Colombia is shifting its foreign policies, and strengthening its economic and diplomatic relations with Asia. Which is not exactly (or solely) a consequence of the US failure to ratify the FTA as some US analysts are claiming. And neither is it some attempt to alienate the US. That would be a stupid thing to do. It's rather an attempt to improve its economic and diplomatic position in this dynamic global situation. But of course Colombia is not entirely alien to the idea of exploiting the "Chinese menace" meme in the US, in their attempts to push for a faster ratification of the FTA.