Kuhn 8: Paradigms as exemplars
in much of the book the term "paradigm" is used in two different senses. On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellations of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science.
--Thomas S. Kuhn, "Postscript - 1969" in The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions Second Edition, Enlarged, p. 175.
OK. Start discussing, start posting comments on this, in light of what you read in "What Are Scientific Revolutions?" Except I've got a few points of my own to make, and I've got a specific question in bold, below, if you're wondering where to start.
Minor point: when Kuhn says "employed as models or examples" here, he's treating the words "models" and "examples" as near synonyms, despite his also using the word "model," both later on in this "Postscript" (p. 184) and in the piece "Second Thoughts On Paradigms," in a specific sense as a different element in the constellation - different from "example," that is. I talked about that other use over here, and if you didn't see what I wrote or you want to refresh your memory, you should go look. Not that the words "models" and "examples" are generally synonymous, but in the above passage they modify each other, so that when Kuhn talks about examples he's talking about those examples - which he's now calling "exemplars" - that are used as models (as opposed to examples used as illustrations or for clarification), and by model here he means "an example you try to follow" (rather than, e.g., a useful analogy or simile such as "electric resistance is like the flow of water in pipes," this sort of useful analogy being the other sort of "model" that I've mentioned in the previous two sentences). To confuse things further, in "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," in which he distinguishes between "models" and "exemplars," he uses the verb "model" to say what it is that scientists do with exemplars, and generally throughout his essays when he uses the word "model" in its verb form he's doing exactly this, saying what it is that scientists do with exemplars - e.g., that they model their subsequent puzzle-solutions on paradigms i.e. exemplars, which are concrete puzzle solutions.
Next point: OK, and what's a paradigm in its narrow use as "exemplar"? Well, actually, this is a definition right here. An exemplar is "a concrete puzzle-solution employed as a model or an example." But what about the rest of that sentence?
Crucial point: Kuhn says exemplars "can replace explicit rules." Now this could be confusing. It could be interpreted as saying, "A science can have a set of explicit rules, so a function of an exemplar is to come along and replace some of these rules; therefore, when scientists start employing an exemplar, it replaces their practice of following an explicit rule or rules that they'd formerly employed." But this is very much NOT what Kuhn means. Too bad my time machine is broken, or I'd go back and make him rewrite his sentence. What he actually means is that scientists use exemplars, whereas some philosophers had mistakenly argued that scientists used rules. So what Kuhn is saying is that in understanding what scientists do - how they learn to practice a particular science or subscience, and then how they actually engage in the science - we need to replace the idea that scientists learn and follow rules with the idea that they learn and employ paradigms - "paradigms" in the sense of "exemplars," i.e., concrete puzzle-solutions etc. (What I've just written is a bit simplistic, since Kuhn doesn't actually believe that there are no rules or definitions in science, but rather that some useful rules of thumb come along after you've learned to use the paradigms, and that paradigms are the basic means with which scientists make sense of their definitions.)
This is why Kuhn first began using the term "paradigm": to explain how scientists are taught and what they do, and to work out what it is that scientists within a discipline do share if they don't share rules on how to proceed.
So, Kuhn thinks it's crucial to distinguish between rules and paradigms.
A question for you: What is the difference between a rule and a paradigm (in the sense of "exemplar")? I don't think it's altogether obvious what is meant by "rule" or what the difference is between following a rule and being guided by a model, but I think Kuhn is right to try to make the distinction. And over the next several days I'll be posting some passages from Kuhn that may be useful in this regard. E.g., he says that if we could clearly answer the question "Similar with respect to what?" we wouldn't need the notion of paradigms, since the answer itself would be a rule. So a difference between an example and a rule could be, for instance, the difference between "Here's a swan, and other swans are similar to it" (an example) and "All swans are white" (a rule). And here we have to distinguish between a rule about swans and a mere fact about swans that so far seems to be true. In any event, Kuhn doesn't think you get enough of those rules/facts to let you dispense with paradigms.
I'm posting further elaborations and questions in the comments thread, and I may also post further passages from Kuhn there, if they become relevant to the discussion (assuming there is a discussion); if not, I'll give them their own separate posts in the hopes that they'll launch their own comment threads.
--Thomas S. Kuhn, "Postscript - 1969" in The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions Second Edition, Enlarged, p. 175.
OK. Start discussing, start posting comments on this, in light of what you read in "What Are Scientific Revolutions?" Except I've got a few points of my own to make, and I've got a specific question in bold, below, if you're wondering where to start.
Minor point: when Kuhn says "employed as models or examples" here, he's treating the words "models" and "examples" as near synonyms, despite his also using the word "model," both later on in this "Postscript" (p. 184) and in the piece "Second Thoughts On Paradigms," in a specific sense as a different element in the constellation - different from "example," that is. I talked about that other use over here, and if you didn't see what I wrote or you want to refresh your memory, you should go look. Not that the words "models" and "examples" are generally synonymous, but in the above passage they modify each other, so that when Kuhn talks about examples he's talking about those examples - which he's now calling "exemplars" - that are used as models (as opposed to examples used as illustrations or for clarification), and by model here he means "an example you try to follow" (rather than, e.g., a useful analogy or simile such as "electric resistance is like the flow of water in pipes," this sort of useful analogy being the other sort of "model" that I've mentioned in the previous two sentences). To confuse things further, in "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," in which he distinguishes between "models" and "exemplars," he uses the verb "model" to say what it is that scientists do with exemplars, and generally throughout his essays when he uses the word "model" in its verb form he's doing exactly this, saying what it is that scientists do with exemplars - e.g., that they model their subsequent puzzle-solutions on paradigms i.e. exemplars, which are concrete puzzle solutions.
Next point: OK, and what's a paradigm in its narrow use as "exemplar"? Well, actually, this is a definition right here. An exemplar is "a concrete puzzle-solution employed as a model or an example." But what about the rest of that sentence?
Crucial point: Kuhn says exemplars "can replace explicit rules." Now this could be confusing. It could be interpreted as saying, "A science can have a set of explicit rules, so a function of an exemplar is to come along and replace some of these rules; therefore, when scientists start employing an exemplar, it replaces their practice of following an explicit rule or rules that they'd formerly employed." But this is very much NOT what Kuhn means. Too bad my time machine is broken, or I'd go back and make him rewrite his sentence. What he actually means is that scientists use exemplars, whereas some philosophers had mistakenly argued that scientists used rules. So what Kuhn is saying is that in understanding what scientists do - how they learn to practice a particular science or subscience, and then how they actually engage in the science - we need to replace the idea that scientists learn and follow rules with the idea that they learn and employ paradigms - "paradigms" in the sense of "exemplars," i.e., concrete puzzle-solutions etc. (What I've just written is a bit simplistic, since Kuhn doesn't actually believe that there are no rules or definitions in science, but rather that some useful rules of thumb come along after you've learned to use the paradigms, and that paradigms are the basic means with which scientists make sense of their definitions.)
This is why Kuhn first began using the term "paradigm": to explain how scientists are taught and what they do, and to work out what it is that scientists within a discipline do share if they don't share rules on how to proceed.
So, Kuhn thinks it's crucial to distinguish between rules and paradigms.
A question for you: What is the difference between a rule and a paradigm (in the sense of "exemplar")? I don't think it's altogether obvious what is meant by "rule" or what the difference is between following a rule and being guided by a model, but I think Kuhn is right to try to make the distinction. And over the next several days I'll be posting some passages from Kuhn that may be useful in this regard. E.g., he says that if we could clearly answer the question "Similar with respect to what?" we wouldn't need the notion of paradigms, since the answer itself would be a rule. So a difference between an example and a rule could be, for instance, the difference between "Here's a swan, and other swans are similar to it" (an example) and "All swans are white" (a rule). And here we have to distinguish between a rule about swans and a mere fact about swans that so far seems to be true. In any event, Kuhn doesn't think you get enough of those rules/facts to let you dispense with paradigms.
I'm posting further elaborations and questions in the comments thread, and I may also post further passages from Kuhn there, if they become relevant to the discussion (assuming there is a discussion); if not, I'll give them their own separate posts in the hopes that they'll launch their own comment threads.