I totally and completely agree with you that the TSA is stupid. At best it would only stop terrorists by sheer chance, and would be unlikely to stop a clever terrorist at all. Its main effect is to unnecessarily make Americans hostile toward their own government, and it makes matters worse by diligently covering its own ass every time its employees do something idiotic, such as attempting to search colostomy bags or grope toddlers.
This is "security theater," and its prevalance is itself a sign that we don't really take the threat all that seriously. If we were more serious about this we would arm airplane crews, focus our surveillance on likely terrorists, and stop wasting all this time and money harrasing travelers at random.
And then we have other recent initiatives, such as the FBI pushing (yet again) for the power to force ISPs to build back doors into everybody's email accounts. It is (still) both an abysmal idea from a technical standpoint, and a mortal insult to the Fourth Amendment.Especially bad idea because if -- or
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Oh, btw -- yes, we obviously aren't being totally incompetent, because Al Qaeda hasn't been able to carry out a large terrorist attack on American soil since 9-11, and their small-scale attacks have had very limited effect. They don't seem to be able to get a lot of terrorists into America, armed and ready for action rather than Internet posting.
Their two main post-September 11th successes were the Beltway Snipers and the traitorous Major Hasan, and the first had only minor impact while the second was a one-off incident.
A sign that we don't take this very seriously yet is that Major Hasan isn't facing the death penalty for treason, despite the fact that his crime actually fits the rigid Constitutional criteria for such.
Interesting you should bring up those two incidents, because in both, a free and armed citizenry could play a large role at the point of contact.
As for the Beltway Snipers: true, you can't do much against a hidden man with a rifle, with your concealed handgun, after he's already shooting at you. But what if someone happened to walk around a corner and catch those guys in place, or setting up or breaking down?
As for Hasan: what does it say about our country when soldiers on a military base aren't allowed to bear arms?
Did you notice that the AQ papers called for public shootings in Europe where people are generally disarmed?
That's one example what I mean when I say that American security efforts need to look at a free people as a resource rather than as a liability. Right now they almost never do, not at any level, local or state or especially federal.
Sure. It's about how to really use force to make the world a better-for-us place.
On the one hand, a lot of it is about the willingness to act quickly and with clear objectives. The usual round of diplomatic escalation is no good in most modern situations. Unfortunately, the culture still thinks diplomacy is a kind of macro social work - that generatonal lack of experience of a nastier world makes people reluctant to send soldiers in early; war is nasty, but they don't see the nastiness that it will avert.
On the other, he thinks that we'll never return to the set piece battles of yesteryear, and even if we did, it would be decided by air power and missiles, not tanks. He says modern armies still act as if they're preparing for WWIII, and always act surprised when they need to do "war amongst the people" for which they are poorly trained and incorrectly equipped.
I mentioned it in this context because I'm curious about your take on his ideas.
On the one hand, a lot of it is about the willingness to act quickly and with clear objectives. The usual round of diplomatic escalation is no good in most modern situations. Unfortunately, the culture still thinks diplomacy is a kind of macro social work - that generatonal lack of experience of a nastier world makes people reluctant to send soldiers in early; war is nasty, but they don't see the nastiness that it will avert.
This is my main point. We shrink from small to medium-sized wars now; we shrink before even ludicrously-light casualties in the field; and we (amazingly) agonize not only over innocent but enemy losses (what's worse, we seem to have forgotten the whole concept of "enemy" where losses are concerned, conflating civilian and enemy deaths into one huge total and then abusing ourselves with the guilt of having inflicted them): but we do not seem to be taking seriously either our own likely losses in a surprise nuclear attack from a Terrorist States, and still less do we grasp the phase-shift that will occur in our
( ... )
On the other, he thinks that we'll never return to the set piece battles of yesteryear, and even if we did, it would be decided by air power and missiles, not tanks. He says modern armies still act as if they're preparing for WWIII, and always act surprised when they need to do "war amongst the people" for which they are poorly trained and incorrectly equipped.
Depends on the foe and the phase of the campaign. National armed forces exist to prevent the matter reaching the stage of national guerilla wars. One must first defeat the enemy's army in the field before one can even hope to fight a "war amongst the people," which certainly proved true against the Iraqis. Also, once a defender has been reduced to guerilla warfare, the defender almost never wins without considerable intervention against the attacker from other countries. How far would the Iraqi rebels have gotten had Iran and other Muslim Terrorist Staters not supported them? And note that the Iraqi rebels still lost, despite such intervention
( ... )
His paradigm was the Malay Conflict: Not making new enemies and winning over the supporters of the enemy while having a clear objective.Political muddle is the problem today. Hearts and minds works, but only if you do it right and have some sort of exit strategy that's realistic, and not PR.
My father fought in WWII. His father came to this country in 1923 and lived to be 105. They both shared stories with me about conditions in the 1930s. My grandfather argued, much like you do about conditions today, about the blindness of the people who supported Hitler and the stupidity of his enablers in European leadership. I agree that we are recycling those times. Like the many then, people today have failed to learn from history.
What I find so depressing about watching this is all the damage that is likely to be caused, and all the danger and difficulty that will be involved in stopping the Terrorists, and knowing that it could be stoppd so easily right now. Even now, a month's conventional bombing, at very little risk to American forces, could take out Iran's nuclear facilities, and a mere cessation of AID would be enough to topple North Korea's regime. Yet we fear to do both, because we fear consequences which would be trivial compared to the consequences of fighting a war against the Terrorist States later on, when they have nuclear missiles.
the thing about iran is that the iranians are not stupid. they realize that acting on israel hatred is tantamount to signing your death warrant. also, we shouldn't torture or murder prisoners (like what happened at abu gharib
the thing about iran is that the iranians are not stupid. they realize that acting on israel hatred is tantamount to signing your death warrant.
The Iranians are not "stupid," they are fanatical. They know that, normally, starting an atomic war with Israel would simply mean their deaths, but their religious leaders have convinced them that (1) after a million or so Iranians die, Allah will intervene and miraculously give Iran the victory not only over Israel but over all the world, and (2) those million Iranians who die will go straight to a martyrs' Paradise. Hence, provoking such an Israeli retaliation is rational given their assumptions.
also, we shouldn't torture or murder prisoners (like what happened at abu gharaib
So, you're saying we shouldn't do what Saddam Hussein did at Abu Ghraib, where he tortured hundreds of thousands and killed tens of thousands of prisoners? Or were you instead focusing laser-like on the very minor incidents where Americans did far less? Have you ever bothered to consider just why you can use "
( ... )
A fit of pique at Chinese lack of support for North Korea? North Korea might also launch a sneak attack against South Korea or Japan, or even the United States of America: they're crazy, they have nuclear capability, and soon they will have nuclear ICBM's. It's only a matter of time, really, before North Korea self-destructs against someone. This became likely when we failed to force the Norks to abide by the terms of the treaties they signed.
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This is "security theater," and its prevalance is itself a sign that we don't really take the threat all that seriously. If we were more serious about this we would arm airplane crews, focus our surveillance on likely terrorists, and stop wasting all this time and money harrasing travelers at random.
And then we have other recent initiatives, such as the FBI pushing (yet again) for the power to force ISPs to build back doors into everybody's email accounts. It is (still) both an abysmal idea from a technical standpoint, and a mortal insult to the Fourth Amendment.Especially bad idea because if -- or ( ... )
Reply
Their two main post-September 11th successes were the Beltway Snipers and the traitorous Major Hasan, and the first had only minor impact while the second was a one-off incident.
A sign that we don't take this very seriously yet is that Major Hasan isn't facing the death penalty for treason, despite the fact that his crime actually fits the rigid Constitutional criteria for such.
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As for the Beltway Snipers: true, you can't do much against a hidden man with a rifle, with your concealed handgun, after he's already shooting at you. But what if someone happened to walk around a corner and catch those guys in place, or setting up or breaking down?
As for Hasan: what does it say about our country when soldiers on a military base aren't allowed to bear arms?
Did you notice that the AQ papers called for public shootings in Europe where people are generally disarmed?
That's one example what I mean when I say that American security efforts need to look at a free people as a resource rather than as a liability. Right now they almost never do, not at any level, local or state or especially federal.
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On the one hand, a lot of it is about the willingness to act quickly and with clear objectives. The usual round of diplomatic escalation is no good in most modern situations. Unfortunately, the culture still thinks diplomacy is a kind of macro social work - that generatonal lack of experience of a nastier world makes people reluctant to send soldiers in early; war is nasty, but they don't see the nastiness that it will avert.
On the other, he thinks that we'll never return to the set piece battles of yesteryear, and even if we did, it would be decided by air power and missiles, not tanks. He says modern armies still act as if they're preparing for WWIII, and always act surprised when they need to do "war amongst the people" for which they are poorly trained and incorrectly equipped.
I mentioned it in this context because I'm curious about your take on his ideas.
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This is my main point. We shrink from small to medium-sized wars now; we shrink before even ludicrously-light casualties in the field; and we (amazingly) agonize not only over innocent but enemy losses (what's worse, we seem to have forgotten the whole concept of "enemy" where losses are concerned, conflating civilian and enemy deaths into one huge total and then abusing ourselves with the guilt of having inflicted them): but we do not seem to be taking seriously either our own likely losses in a surprise nuclear attack from a Terrorist States, and still less do we grasp the phase-shift that will occur in our ( ... )
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Depends on the foe and the phase of the campaign. National armed forces exist to prevent the matter reaching the stage of national guerilla wars. One must first defeat the enemy's army in the field before one can even hope to fight a "war amongst the people," which certainly proved true against the Iraqis. Also, once a defender has been reduced to guerilla warfare, the defender almost never wins without considerable intervention against the attacker from other countries. How far would the Iraqi rebels have gotten had Iran and other Muslim Terrorist Staters not supported them? And note that the Iraqi rebels still lost, despite such intervention ( ... )
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The Iranians are not "stupid," they are fanatical. They know that, normally, starting an atomic war with Israel would simply mean their deaths, but their religious leaders have convinced them that (1) after a million or so Iranians die, Allah will intervene and miraculously give Iran the victory not only over Israel but over all the world, and (2) those million Iranians who die will go straight to a martyrs' Paradise. Hence, provoking such an Israeli retaliation is rational given their assumptions.
also, we shouldn't torture or murder prisoners (like what happened at abu gharaib
So, you're saying we shouldn't do what Saddam Hussein did at Abu Ghraib, where he tortured hundreds of thousands and killed tens of thousands of prisoners? Or were you instead focusing laser-like on the very minor incidents where Americans did far less? Have you ever bothered to consider just why you can use " ( ... )
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