William James, Week 1: "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy"

[epictetus_rex]

Comments

First shot

[paulhope]

I may write more later, but my impression of the discussion of temperments was more by way of introduction. Saying "rationalist and empiricists are generally so because of their temperment" is a purely descriptive claim (and one that seems evidenced in these philosophy communities), similar to the claim that liberalism and conservatism in politics are matters of temperment.

But I'm not sure how that can have actual philosophical import. I don't think he's suggesting that for one of rationalist temperment, the rationalist's definition of truth is correct. I think he's just providing an kind of historical or cultural context: there are these two kinds of people, see, and they've been duking it out for a long time, and sometimes people get stuck in between, and this philosophy might appeal to them...etc.

The beef comes later, in my opinion.

[nanikore]

I don't see how it is "obvious" that James prefers the empirical mindset, since he did speak both against the staunchly empirical mindset as well as the staunchly rationalistic mindset. The way he portrayed "the growth of positivistic feeling" was not exactly one of content, and I wouldn't say he was lavishing praise upon either "camps". I wouldn't call impartiality, but I would call equal discontent. Otherwise, why bother going down a third path in the first place? What he is offering would be more an alternative rather than a straight compromise. He said in effect that to turn from one did meant in the past going to the other equally unsatisfactory alternative. He did not advocate impartiality in judgement of those alternatives, for it is a non-issue. What he did want to point out is the presence of another alternative in addition to those two

[nanikore]

do not put them on equal stature on the plane of truth

That should be "do not put them on equal stature in relation to each other on the plane of truth"