Comments | fpb: Some remarks about science, theory and the Catholic Church (assembled from other writings of mine)

fpb

Some remarks about science, theory and the Catholic Church (assembled from other writings of mine)

Nov 16, 2005 20:13

christianity, philosophy, catholic church, culture history, thomas kuhn, superstition, karl popper, albert einstein, thoughts, essay, theory of relativity, chesterton, anthropology, catholic doctrine, debate, creationism, induction, schism, catholicism, guido sommavilla, gk chesterton, science, atheism, pius xii

Comments 19

goreism November 16 2005, 21:30:44 UTC

Yeah, we know logical positivism was misguided. On the other hand, it's demolishment owes as much to analytic philosophers like Quine, Kuhn, and so on (indeed, it was already largely dead by the time of the publication of Two Dogmas) as it does to Popper. Rumors of the death of analytic philosophy as a whole, on the other hand, have been greatly exaggerated, methinks.

Incidentally, as I commented earlier to you, I'm generally of the (dominant) view that Kuhn has put Popperian falsificationism to rest. I'm surprised you didn't address him here, since his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is generally considered a seminal work in philosophy of science ( ... )

fpb November 16 2005, 21:47:24 UTC

"I am of the view that apples have put oranges to rest." My understanding of Kuhn's view is that it is wholly sociological, that is, that it does not give any logical reason why any theory should be better than any other. Popper takes sociological factors into account - in fact, the contemporary insistence on peer review is Popperian - but is based on principles of logic and reason. If we assume that "scientific revolutions" - whatever the Heck those may be, and I do not think there have ever been any - are motivated purely by climates of opinion, then there is no reason why the rise of Nazism in Germany should not be called a scientific revolution. After all, it involves a major paradigm shift.

goreism November 16 2005, 22:49:00 UTC

The general criterion is the relative puzzle-solving power of the competing paradigms. The new idea should account for most or all of the anomalies that led to the breakdown of the previous paradigm, while minimizing so-called "Kuhn-loss" (usually to be found in the new ideas having less explanatory power). Generally, the factors that lead to the adoption of the new theory come from within the scientific community, not without. I think most readers of Kuhn would agree that this is a fair assessment of Kuhn's position.

So Kuhn did admit that science progressively increases in its puzzle-solving ability. He does deny that the concept of science becoming progressively "nearer to the truth" is coherent (and there I disagree).

fpb November 17 2005, 11:23:30 UTC

It seems to me that there is one great big gap in this summary, namely the assumption that visible mistakes in a theory will lead to its "breakdown." I think this is expecting too much of human nature. Unless a social structure, indeed a profession, is present in society for the purpose of debating theories, with a professional bias in favour of challenge, the most untenable theories will be preserved; indeed, formidable amounts of intelligence will be used to shore them up.

Thread 15

I have a small irrelevant question ... ajat November 19 2005, 17:09:10 UTC

What's yr icon ?

Re: I have a small irrelevant question ... fpb November 24 2005, 20:56:19 UTC

Athena (goddess of practical reason and achievement, and also of reason at war - which is my interpretation of her). I think this particular one is called the Athena of Pireus; she was discovered in Pireus (the harbour of Athens) in 1959.

ajat November 25 2005, 02:31:37 UTC

Athena.

Right.

Have you read 'White Goddess' by Robert Graves ?

fpb November 26 2005, 19:36:28 UTC

I am a student of comparative mythology (published), and I regard it as almost entirely valueless. Sorry.