Tactics of War, Monday, 6 - 8 PM
Honor is standing at the front of the room, arms folded across her chest. She is once again clad in her dress uniform tunic, though she has, in compliance with school policy, left the sword at home. Nimitz is perched on her shoulder, claws dug in just below her shoulder blade, and just above the ribbons on the left side of her tunic. From the gleam in his eyes, it is apparent he is highly amused to be here.
Good evening, and welcome to another action-packed session of tactics of war...Well, okay, maybe action-packed isn't the word, but thank you for coming, all the same. I was very pleased you could make it to dinner on Monday, and I was also pleased with the discussions over the course of the evening. I'll let you know now that there will likely be one further dinner during the term, so be prepared.
On the table, you'll find the class syllabus. You are all capable of reading, so I'm not going to bore you by going into the details. Take a few moments to review it, and I'll take any questions. Once those are cleared up, we'll jump right into the lecture.
She pauses, rubbing the tip of her nose.
...and I'll apologize now for the lecture. I began researching, and I'm afraid it's a bit of a monster. I hope you'll at least find it interesting. So...any questions on the syllabus?
There is another pause as she waits for the class to review the document, and offer up any questions. Once those are settled, she plunges into the lecture.
Okay, today we're looking at the tactical use of intelligence. Intelligence, simply put, is information. Taken in context, however, it becomes something more. When we refer to intelligence in the security arena, we find that intelligence refers also to the activities and organizations used to collect that information. The simple data is then compiled, analyzed, and disseminated. In this process, it becomes a type of weapon.
There are three major collection methods: human intelligence (HUMINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), and what is referred to as "open source."
Moving toward the board, she scrawls the acronyms on the board as she speaks, hoping they are legible.
HUMINT is pretty much as it sounds - a human source - sometimes one of ours, sometimes one of theirs, willing and actively providing information. This type of intel is usually played very close to the vest, as human sources are hard to come by.
TECHINT, on the other hand, can be broken down even further, into several different categories:
IMINT - image intelligence - is also as it sounds, usually involving satellite imagery. Trained analysts can take these images - pictures or even thermal scans - and develop a great deal of information: placement of armaments, troops, possible research locations.
SIGINT - signals intelligence - usually refers to communications signals such as intercepted screens - er, phone calls or computer transmissions.
TELINT - telemetry intelligence - listens to the signals between a test vehicle -- say a missile -- and the receiving ground station. TELINT is usually collected when an adversary takes a new toy out for a trial run. This is one way we might learn about our adversaries’ weapons capability... in addition to any materials intelligence we might obtain in other ways.
ELINT - electronics intelligence - where we listen in on different electronic signals emanating from foreign military equipment.
MASINT - really another type of SIGINT - refers to measurements and signatures intelligence, or MASINT. MASINT might include seismic readings taken during a nuclear detonation.
And open source really is just like it sounds. It's collected from sources such as newspapers, television, and diplomatic connections within the community.
Moving back toward the front of the desk, she pauses long enough to scratch Nimitz's ears, then resumes her stance, leaning against the edge of the desk.
In open societies, there are often questions as to whether or not we should continue to collect intelligence during times of relative piece, or to collect intelligence even on our allies. As Machiavelli says in chapter 14 of The Prince, however: "A wise prince ought... never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if fortune changes it may find him prepared to resist her blows."
So why is intelligence important? And why should we collect it?
She moves to take a seat among the students. Nimitz, who, by this time has taken to sprawling across the desk, follows her with his eyes, eventually satisfied she's not going far. Honor crosses her legs, relaxing into the chair a bit, then sits back. She prompts the class to discuss. Once she feels the topic has been dissected to its sum parts, she moves on to the next point.
Well, as I said before, intelligence eventually becomes a sort of weapon. It can be used tactically to shape battle plans, or it can even be used to shape grand strategy. But the use of intelligence comes at a cost.
In World War II, with the assistance of Polish cryptologists, British Intelligence broke several complex German codes. Known commonly as "Enigma," the information obtained from these ciphers was known as "ULTRA." ULTRA was used to protect supply lines in the oceans, as well as troops on the ground. It is even said that ULTRA was responsible for warning Prime Minister Churchill regarding the German attempt to land on British soil (Operation Sea Lion).
Were any operations to be formed as a result of ULTRA, it was necessary for military planners to "cover their tracks." Many times, the British dispatched reconnaissance flights, to be sure they were seen by the Germans, and provide a simpler explanation for a coming attack. Rumor even circulated that Prime Minister Churchill, in his drive to protect ULTRA, allowed the town of Coventry to be bombarded by Luftwaffe forces. This rumor has been discredited over time, but it still carries with it the importance of protecting a source as important as ULTRA. It was, after all, German habit and sloppiness on the part of the Enigma transmitters that provided the British with the ability to read the code as easily as they did. (And here, easy is such a relative term...) Once the German Navy added an extra wheel to their machine, increasing the possible permutations and computations even further, it took months for the cryptanalysts to break it. Had the Germans been the least bit suspicious their codes had been broken, changing cipher wheels or procedures on a regular basis would have made the Allied analysts’ jobs close to impossible...and cost the war effort dearly.
It should also be noted, more as an aside than anything else, that the existence of ULTRA really didn't become public knowledge until the second --
Honor pauses, as though she were about to say something else, then continues:
-- until the mid-1970s, almost thirty years after the war ended.
There are limits, however, to the advantage that intelligence can afford us. First and foremost, intelligence products are produced by normal - or not-so-normal, as the case may be - human beings. As humans, they are capable of mistakes, and intelligence is no exception; incorrect conclusions can and will be drawn.
The second caveat is that intelligence cannot tell us everything we need to know. Even if the analysis is perfect, there are always gaps it can’t cover: Signals intercepts don’t give us the information we need to discern what the adversary is thinking; HUMINT may provide that information, but isn’t always available, nor is it always reliable; and MASINT is all well and good, but unless you know how and when your adversary would deploy those weapons, you can’t always come up with a constructive counterstrategy. In short, you sometimes simply have to go out there and do...and bring back your own intelligence.
Untangling her self, she rises and returns to her position at the front of the room.
And now... your homework. Much like Churchill and Coventry, it has been a subject of much debate whether or not President F. D. Roosevelt obtained prior knowledge of the Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor. I want you to put yourself in either Sir Winston's or President Roosevelt's shoes. What might you have done in the same situation? I would like one page, to be handwaved turned in next class. I'll award bonus points to the individuals who can point out the possible repercussions.
Readings for the next class include: Pages 287 to 317 from Sea Power, and Chapter 3 in The Price of Admiralty. Be prepared to discuss!
[Please wait for OCD threads! OCD threads up. Also, readings for next week will be posted once my PC has returned from the grave. ::wibble::
Info taken from Silent Warfare by Shulsky and Schmitt, Intelligence in War by Keegan, and Code Breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park by F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp.]
Good evening, and welcome to another action-packed session of tactics of war...Well, okay, maybe action-packed isn't the word, but thank you for coming, all the same. I was very pleased you could make it to dinner on Monday, and I was also pleased with the discussions over the course of the evening. I'll let you know now that there will likely be one further dinner during the term, so be prepared.
On the table, you'll find the class syllabus. You are all capable of reading, so I'm not going to bore you by going into the details. Take a few moments to review it, and I'll take any questions. Once those are cleared up, we'll jump right into the lecture.
She pauses, rubbing the tip of her nose.
...and I'll apologize now for the lecture. I began researching, and I'm afraid it's a bit of a monster. I hope you'll at least find it interesting. So...any questions on the syllabus?
There is another pause as she waits for the class to review the document, and offer up any questions. Once those are settled, she plunges into the lecture.
Okay, today we're looking at the tactical use of intelligence. Intelligence, simply put, is information. Taken in context, however, it becomes something more. When we refer to intelligence in the security arena, we find that intelligence refers also to the activities and organizations used to collect that information. The simple data is then compiled, analyzed, and disseminated. In this process, it becomes a type of weapon.
There are three major collection methods: human intelligence (HUMINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), and what is referred to as "open source."
Moving toward the board, she scrawls the acronyms on the board as she speaks, hoping they are legible.
HUMINT is pretty much as it sounds - a human source - sometimes one of ours, sometimes one of theirs, willing and actively providing information. This type of intel is usually played very close to the vest, as human sources are hard to come by.
TECHINT, on the other hand, can be broken down even further, into several different categories:
And open source really is just like it sounds. It's collected from sources such as newspapers, television, and diplomatic connections within the community.
Moving back toward the front of the desk, she pauses long enough to scratch Nimitz's ears, then resumes her stance, leaning against the edge of the desk.
In open societies, there are often questions as to whether or not we should continue to collect intelligence during times of relative piece, or to collect intelligence even on our allies. As Machiavelli says in chapter 14 of The Prince, however: "A wise prince ought... never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if fortune changes it may find him prepared to resist her blows."
So why is intelligence important? And why should we collect it?
She moves to take a seat among the students. Nimitz, who, by this time has taken to sprawling across the desk, follows her with his eyes, eventually satisfied she's not going far. Honor crosses her legs, relaxing into the chair a bit, then sits back. She prompts the class to discuss. Once she feels the topic has been dissected to its sum parts, she moves on to the next point.
Well, as I said before, intelligence eventually becomes a sort of weapon. It can be used tactically to shape battle plans, or it can even be used to shape grand strategy. But the use of intelligence comes at a cost.
In World War II, with the assistance of Polish cryptologists, British Intelligence broke several complex German codes. Known commonly as "Enigma," the information obtained from these ciphers was known as "ULTRA." ULTRA was used to protect supply lines in the oceans, as well as troops on the ground. It is even said that ULTRA was responsible for warning Prime Minister Churchill regarding the German attempt to land on British soil (Operation Sea Lion).
Were any operations to be formed as a result of ULTRA, it was necessary for military planners to "cover their tracks." Many times, the British dispatched reconnaissance flights, to be sure they were seen by the Germans, and provide a simpler explanation for a coming attack. Rumor even circulated that Prime Minister Churchill, in his drive to protect ULTRA, allowed the town of Coventry to be bombarded by Luftwaffe forces. This rumor has been discredited over time, but it still carries with it the importance of protecting a source as important as ULTRA. It was, after all, German habit and sloppiness on the part of the Enigma transmitters that provided the British with the ability to read the code as easily as they did. (And here, easy is such a relative term...) Once the German Navy added an extra wheel to their machine, increasing the possible permutations and computations even further, it took months for the cryptanalysts to break it. Had the Germans been the least bit suspicious their codes had been broken, changing cipher wheels or procedures on a regular basis would have made the Allied analysts’ jobs close to impossible...and cost the war effort dearly.
It should also be noted, more as an aside than anything else, that the existence of ULTRA really didn't become public knowledge until the second --
Honor pauses, as though she were about to say something else, then continues:
-- until the mid-1970s, almost thirty years after the war ended.
There are limits, however, to the advantage that intelligence can afford us. First and foremost, intelligence products are produced by normal - or not-so-normal, as the case may be - human beings. As humans, they are capable of mistakes, and intelligence is no exception; incorrect conclusions can and will be drawn.
The second caveat is that intelligence cannot tell us everything we need to know. Even if the analysis is perfect, there are always gaps it can’t cover: Signals intercepts don’t give us the information we need to discern what the adversary is thinking; HUMINT may provide that information, but isn’t always available, nor is it always reliable; and MASINT is all well and good, but unless you know how and when your adversary would deploy those weapons, you can’t always come up with a constructive counterstrategy. In short, you sometimes simply have to go out there and do...and bring back your own intelligence.
Untangling her self, she rises and returns to her position at the front of the room.
And now... your homework. Much like Churchill and Coventry, it has been a subject of much debate whether or not President F. D. Roosevelt obtained prior knowledge of the Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor. I want you to put yourself in either Sir Winston's or President Roosevelt's shoes. What might you have done in the same situation? I would like one page, to be handwaved turned in next class. I'll award bonus points to the individuals who can point out the possible repercussions.
Readings for the next class include: Pages 287 to 317 from Sea Power, and Chapter 3 in The Price of Admiralty. Be prepared to discuss!
[Please wait for OCD threads! OCD threads up. Also, readings for next week will be posted once my PC has returned from the grave. ::wibble::
Info taken from Silent Warfare by Shulsky and Schmitt, Intelligence in War by Keegan, and Code Breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park by F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp.]