War links
Damage analysis on the (pdf) battlecruiser IJS Kirishima, sunk by the USS Washington at close range off Guadacanal in 1942, whose underwater wreck has now been explored. Further details.
Study finds that Al Qaeda has killed eight times as many Muslims as non-Muslims. The study (pdf). Historian Michael Burleigh looks back on a decade of terrorism:
Intelligence experts reckon there are probably 120 core al-Qaeda operatives, their overriding concern being to get through each night still in one piece by day break.
Using drones to target Al-Qaeda and related insurgents in Pakistan. Yemeni forces strike at al-Qaeda militants. US special forces have been sent to Yemen to train local troops amid fears of the stability of the Yemeni state.
Paper on the effect of Pakistani possession of nuclear weapons in encouraging conventional conflict in South Asia.
About the misreading the Iranian regime and the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran:
if Iran achieves nuclear capability, transnational Islamic terrorism will be sheltered by a nuclear umbrella, a deterrence-military and diplomatic-that will shield them from any consequences of their terrorist outrages. Further, nuclear weapons-suitcase dirty bombs-will proliferate among non-state Islamic terrorists, and nuclear blackmail will become coin of the realm.
A former intelligence and nuclear affairs specialist for the French Government on the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran. Public opinion in Arab countries has shifted to seeing Iran as a great threat than Israel.
About the dangers that Obama’s realism might be read as weakness.
The destructive delusions of Hezbollah:
Hezbollah's new manifesto condemns the United States as the "root of all terror," and a "danger that threatens the whole world." The document also reiterates the call for the destruction of Israel, describing the need to "liberate Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa" as a "religious duty" for all Muslims. There is not a shred of evidence to suggest that these sentiments are intended for the printed page only. Indeed, recent visitors to Lebanon speak of a high, almost delusional state of morale among circles affiliated with Hezbollah. In the closed world around the movement, it is sincerely believed that the next war between Israel and Hezbollah will be part of a greater conflict in which Israel will be destroyed.
Discussing killing a bomb-armed terrorist in a crowded supermarket. About Israeli women with guns.
About the data-mess and entangling bureaucracy that Coalition forces face in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report (pdf). A case in point:
THE Taliban commander was back in the village. Our base roared to life as we prepared to capture him. Two Chinook helicopters spun their blades in anticipation in the dark. Fifty Afghan commandos brooded outside, pacing in the gravel. I was nearby, yelling into a phone: “Who else do we need approvals from? Another colonel? Why?”
A villager had come in that afternoon to tell us that a Taliban commander known for his deployment of suicide bombers was threatening the elders. The villager had come to my unit, a detachment of the United States Army stationed in eastern Afghanistan, for help.
Mindful of orders to protect the civilian population, we developed a plan with the Afghan commandos to arrest the Taliban commander that evening before he moved back into Pakistan. While the troops prepared, I spent hours on the phone trying to convince the 11 separate Afghan, American and international forces authorities who needed to sign off to agree on a plan.
Some couldn’t be found. Some liked the idea, others suggested revisions. The plan evolved. Hours passed. The cellphone in the corner rang. “Where are you?” the villager asked urgently. The Taliban commander was drinking tea, he said.
At 5 a.m. the Afghan commandos gave up on us and went home. The helicopters powered down. The sun rose. I was still on the phone trying to arrange approvals. Intelligence arrived indicating that the Taliban commander had moved on. The villagers were incredulous.
This incident is typical of what I saw during my six-month tour in Afghanistan this year. We were paralyzed by red tape, beaten by our own team. Our answer to Afghans seeking help was: “I can’t come today or tomorrow, but maybe next week. I have several bosses that I need to ask for permission.”
Seeing Afghanistan as a war that is itself, not through the prism of quite different conflicts:
Since the 2001 invasion, U.S. soldiers have come and gone from the Arghandab, but we’ve never had enough soldiers to sit still. More recently, the Canadians made jabs at Arghandab but did not get far. Some people believe the Canadians have been militarily defeated in their battlespace. No US officer has told me that the Canadians have been defeated, and none have denied it. There is no doubt that Canadian troops earned much respect, and that more that more than 130 paid the ultimate price.
On current course, Canada will have fully retreated by 2011. This is crucial: the enemy realizes that our greatest weakness is Coalition cohesion and they have defeated what was an important partner.
An ordinary ambush. About the work of a British bomb-disposal sergeant killed on his last day of his tour. Electrification effort that fails to come together.
Study finds that Al Qaeda has killed eight times as many Muslims as non-Muslims. The study (pdf). Historian Michael Burleigh looks back on a decade of terrorism:
Intelligence experts reckon there are probably 120 core al-Qaeda operatives, their overriding concern being to get through each night still in one piece by day break.
Using drones to target Al-Qaeda and related insurgents in Pakistan. Yemeni forces strike at al-Qaeda militants. US special forces have been sent to Yemen to train local troops amid fears of the stability of the Yemeni state.
Paper on the effect of Pakistani possession of nuclear weapons in encouraging conventional conflict in South Asia.
About the misreading the Iranian regime and the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran:
if Iran achieves nuclear capability, transnational Islamic terrorism will be sheltered by a nuclear umbrella, a deterrence-military and diplomatic-that will shield them from any consequences of their terrorist outrages. Further, nuclear weapons-suitcase dirty bombs-will proliferate among non-state Islamic terrorists, and nuclear blackmail will become coin of the realm.
A former intelligence and nuclear affairs specialist for the French Government on the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran. Public opinion in Arab countries has shifted to seeing Iran as a great threat than Israel.
About the dangers that Obama’s realism might be read as weakness.
The destructive delusions of Hezbollah:
Hezbollah's new manifesto condemns the United States as the "root of all terror," and a "danger that threatens the whole world." The document also reiterates the call for the destruction of Israel, describing the need to "liberate Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa" as a "religious duty" for all Muslims. There is not a shred of evidence to suggest that these sentiments are intended for the printed page only. Indeed, recent visitors to Lebanon speak of a high, almost delusional state of morale among circles affiliated with Hezbollah. In the closed world around the movement, it is sincerely believed that the next war between Israel and Hezbollah will be part of a greater conflict in which Israel will be destroyed.
Discussing killing a bomb-armed terrorist in a crowded supermarket. About Israeli women with guns.
About the data-mess and entangling bureaucracy that Coalition forces face in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report (pdf). A case in point:
THE Taliban commander was back in the village. Our base roared to life as we prepared to capture him. Two Chinook helicopters spun their blades in anticipation in the dark. Fifty Afghan commandos brooded outside, pacing in the gravel. I was nearby, yelling into a phone: “Who else do we need approvals from? Another colonel? Why?”
A villager had come in that afternoon to tell us that a Taliban commander known for his deployment of suicide bombers was threatening the elders. The villager had come to my unit, a detachment of the United States Army stationed in eastern Afghanistan, for help.
Mindful of orders to protect the civilian population, we developed a plan with the Afghan commandos to arrest the Taliban commander that evening before he moved back into Pakistan. While the troops prepared, I spent hours on the phone trying to convince the 11 separate Afghan, American and international forces authorities who needed to sign off to agree on a plan.
Some couldn’t be found. Some liked the idea, others suggested revisions. The plan evolved. Hours passed. The cellphone in the corner rang. “Where are you?” the villager asked urgently. The Taliban commander was drinking tea, he said.
At 5 a.m. the Afghan commandos gave up on us and went home. The helicopters powered down. The sun rose. I was still on the phone trying to arrange approvals. Intelligence arrived indicating that the Taliban commander had moved on. The villagers were incredulous.
This incident is typical of what I saw during my six-month tour in Afghanistan this year. We were paralyzed by red tape, beaten by our own team. Our answer to Afghans seeking help was: “I can’t come today or tomorrow, but maybe next week. I have several bosses that I need to ask for permission.”
Seeing Afghanistan as a war that is itself, not through the prism of quite different conflicts:
Since the 2001 invasion, U.S. soldiers have come and gone from the Arghandab, but we’ve never had enough soldiers to sit still. More recently, the Canadians made jabs at Arghandab but did not get far. Some people believe the Canadians have been militarily defeated in their battlespace. No US officer has told me that the Canadians have been defeated, and none have denied it. There is no doubt that Canadian troops earned much respect, and that more that more than 130 paid the ultimate price.
On current course, Canada will have fully retreated by 2011. This is crucial: the enemy realizes that our greatest weakness is Coalition cohesion and they have defeated what was an important partner.
An ordinary ambush. About the work of a British bomb-disposal sergeant killed on his last day of his tour. Electrification effort that fails to come together.