Rationalism's "leap of faith"

[triphicus]

Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), as Johannes Climacus, confronts Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1821) in Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

Common to both: Faith requires a kind of certainty that historical inquiry cannot provide.

Ø  Lessing’s rationalism: History is “the ugly broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however

Comments

[meus_ovatio]

The important question, is why is faith a matter of historical certainty of any sort?

[triphicus]

I think that is what Kierkegaard is trying to demonstrate with Climacus in this book. He is basically turning the tables on rationalism's demand that everything--even faith--be empirically verifiable, in showing that the claims about Jesus, or any historical figure for that matter, are by this point so beyond empirical validation that to make something like 'faith' contingent upon it would require a leap in either direction (not just forward, as Lessing erroneously assumed). And thus, because it is not empirically verifiable, even a person coming to the question with a supposedly "objective" viewpoint will ultimately wind up having to fall back on the preconceptions with which he/she approached the question in the first place. This because a lack of verifiability has both positive and negative ramifications.

[meus_ovatio]

Ah right, right.

[essius]

I take it that rationalism in the present sense, then, isn't opposed to strong forms of empiricism.

[fizzyland]

So I don't take a rationalist mindset yet reject(albeit in a somewhat passive way) the truth claims of the Gospels the same way I do UFO's, 9/11 truthers, etc.

So where do we go from here?

[triphicus]

He isn't taking issue with you, though. If you are admitting that you choose to reject Christianity's claims on no basis other than an assumption that they fall in line with those others (though that is still a "leap," but an honest one), then go on ahead. He is taking issue with the people who claim that they are rejecting them on some kind of stringent intellectual ground.

[fizzyland]

True, I'd never claim I'm rejecting those things on any kind of strict intellectual ground.

And I guess I'd say I'd lump the claims of religion & mythology into one pile and "Urban Legend" sort of things like chupacabras & such into another. I'm not sure what makes them that different from one another, save for ancient Vs. modern venues.

[essius]

Climacus' view applies not only, though principally, to the Incarnation, as it can also be applied to trying to prove the existence of God. But the point is not so much that we do not have enough historical evidence on the one hand or philosophical demonstrations on the other, but that existence in thought is not the same as existence in actuality. Christianity may exist as doctrine without existing as the subject's existence-communication. "Objective truth" does not entail "subjective truth." On this point a few quotations are instructive:

The inquiring, speculating, knowing subject accordingly asks about the truth but not about the subjective truth, the truth of appropriation. Accordingly, the inquiring subject is indeed interested but is not infinitely, personally, impassionedly interested in his relation to this truth concerning his own eternal happiness. Far be it from the objective subject to be so immodest, so vain. (Postscript, p. 21)

…the one who has objective Christianity and nothing else is eo ipso [precisely thereby] a

[triphicus]

The paradox is cursory to the point of my post, but thanks for weighing in. My interpretation of his treatment of Lessing remains just that, an interpretation. Nevertheless, in reading it this way it does serve to poke numerous holes in rationalism's so called "objectivity." In trying to be charitable towards Kierkegaard, I allow that he probably had this in mind as well. Otherwise, there really wouldn't, to my mind at least, be anything good or worthwhile about 'the leap.' Bah, fideism.

[essius]

As well, the paradox is cursory to the point of my comment. And Kierkegaard, if a fideist, is only one with respect to forms of reasoning-demonstrative or probabilistic-that remove the thinking subject. Something like Peirce's abduction, which retains the semiotic import of the interpreter, would be much more amenable to Kierkegaard's moderate fideism. Hell, Kierkegaard doesn't really have a problem with the use of demonstrations as long as the interest of the subject is kept underscored. Truth is subjectivity, and there is nothing unsubjective about a subject using demonstrative reasoning in a passionate way.

See Kierkegaard's posthumous work Johannes Climacus for more.

[direwolf23]

I'm a big fan of always opting in favor of a “studied agnosticism.” It seems to be the only truly honest path.

[triphicus]

You mean "unstudied" agnosticism?

[direwolf23]

No, I don't. What would motivate you to ask that?

[triphicus]

Because 'studied agnosticism' doesn't exist. It is only an illusion. That claim is one of the foundational principles upon which this argument rests. The claims of Christianity demand a decision, a leap, for or against them. Moreover, if the school of thought that promotes this so called agnosticism requires evidence that is deemed from the forefront as permanently lacking, then the decision itself was made from the forefront. Thus, there is nothing studied about it.

It seems clear to me there is a problem with the concept:

[enders_shadow]

Thus, for the sake of so-called objectivity, Lessing has also had to make a “leap.” Only his was a leap against faith, contrary to Climacus' leap towards it.

Can we get rid of objectivity now?

Re: It seems clear to me there is a problem with the concept:

[root_fu]

noe