Our knowledge of the growth of knowledge : Popper or Wittgenstein? by Peter Munz.

Aug 09, 2005 21:47

From Ingridients

I've been poking around in the philosophy of science recently, when I've had time, and I think it would be a good thing to write a bit of something about some of what I've been reading, just to get a bit of a sense of progress.
The usual long rambling sciencey book review from me )

philosophy of knowledge, review, popper, kuhn

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Comments 4

redbird August 9 2005, 12:04:01 UTC
I suspect, from what you say, that he's playing fast and loose with the definition of "false", as well as of "knowledge." For example, there's nothing false about being able to pronounce the /sh/ in "shibboleth" or knowing the words to a particular song: it doesn't contradict the physical world, nor--as you point out--does it reduce evolutionary fitness.

Because it's early in the morning, I'm reminded of the "true knowledge" from Ken MacLeod's The Cassini Division (and I think the other Fall Revolution books in that same future timeline), mostly from the naming rather than content.

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aquaeri August 10 2005, 01:52:58 UTC
Yes, I think you're right. He goes into, I think, very odd literalist corners to support the idea that cultural glue = false knowledge. I just can't see how to fit the ability to quote Monty Python all night into that model, or the ability to distinguish Beethoven from Mozart, or any of the other weird things humans do as cultural glue.

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Re: Our knowledge of the growth of knowledge : Popper or Wittgenstein? by Peter Munz. pir_anha August 9 2005, 15:50:30 UTC
my brain isn't in the right gear to say anything worthwhile, but that's an interesting train of thoughts. i think he might not be careful enough with his definition of "knowledge" -- and before talking more about it, i ought to define mine, *heh*, since i had an instinctive nay-reaction to "religion is a different kind of knowledge" (even though i don't think it's an anomalous blip).

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Re: Our knowledge of the growth of knowledge : Popper or Wittgenstein? by Peter Munz. aquaeri August 10 2005, 01:55:28 UTC
Well, "religion is a different kind of knowledge" is very much my take on it, not his (he doesn't want religion to be knowledge at all, I think).

I'm just struck by, having read some comparative religion recently, how many religions seem to me to understand the difference between physical reality and psychological/spiritual metaphors perfectly well. I actually see the whole literal creationist Christian fundamentalism as an anomaly.

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