(no subject)
With due respect to Rabbis Yisroel Friedman and A. Chefetz, learned as they may be (I've never heard of them personally, but they may well be very learned) I wish to take issue with some of the points made in their article about the use of a motorized scooter for the Sabbath (presumably for use by those incapable of walking). This scooter apparently works by grama (indirect action, in the article it is spelled gromo. they include their accent in their transliteration, and I include mine) and was designed by Machon Tzomet, an organization that attempts to design devices within halacha to fit percieved needs.
In the first section, "Opening a Closed Question" the author's quote the haskama (approbation) of R' Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky to a book written by R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach on electricity with regard to Shabbat. They then apply the quotation to essentially say that old questions are not worthy of reevaluation. Because of this, grama is a closed book for which no new devices may be used. This section ends by quoting the Chazon Ish. I am left perplexed and in wonder at the words of the Chazon Ish. Thankfully for me, Rav Auerbach also expressed wonder at the words of the Chazon Ish on electricity generally, so I am not alone. If, as the Chazon Ish is quoted as saying, an object seen publically in the streets on weekdays is prohibited on Shabbat, why do the publishers of siddurim (prayerbooks) put weekday and Shabbat prayers in the same book? Since the siddur is used on weekdays it is an uvda d'chol (a weekday object) and may not be used on Shabbat.
The authors attempt to argue that something which is never used in the grama mode on weekdays, and then used in the grama mode on Shabbat is not a change from normal practice. Is that not the definition of a change from normal practice? He is doing something different from his usual means of operating. That alone is not permission, but the fact tht it is used differently on weekdays makes the argument for permitting the device better, not worse.
The authors further say that even according to the manufacturers this device is permitted only conditionally for those who are elderly or infim or in emergencies. They object that a booklet detailing the circumstances under which it may be used is not included with the device. First, it is self-evident that a device for the infirm should only be used by them and no others, just as with prescription medication. Would anyone believe that such a scooter could be used by children as a race car? Second, I received an urn and a hotplate for use on Shabbat recently. Neither included a booklet detailing the laws of cooking on Shabbat, but all would agree that cooking on Shabbat may only be done under certain circumstances. The authors, quoting themselves in a letter say, "Moreover, can one possibly hand over to the general public a device whose use is only permitted under certain circumstances?" Does the Talmud set they received for their weddings include a note detailing which sections may be learned on Tisha B'av, lest they misuse the Talmud?
Here the question must be asked: Whose idea are these limitations? If something is forbidden, cripples are also not allowed to do melochoh on Shabbos. And if it is permissible, it is allowed for everyone. Do they mean to say that handicapped persons are allowed to "slightly transgress" a "relatively lenient" prohibition, while fit people are not? That sounds like a bad joke.
I'll mention the political incorrectness of the term "cripples" without comment, beyond saying that perhaps English is not their first language so they may not be aware. The idea that a person with a physical disability may have different halachot is not new. Rav Auerbach mentioned above felt that his mother, who was deaf could turn her hearing aid on and off on Shabbat (b/c the batteries in those days did not last long enough for the entire Shabbat). I doubt that he would have said the same regarding a person turning on and off his lights.
The authors then go on to rebuke those who seek leniency or seek to get around a problem created by observance of halacha. The Talmud is rife with examples of people endeavoring to solve just such a problem and seems to have no problem with this. For example, a male convert with a son (the convert converted after conception and is therefore halachically unrelated to the son) wished to give his property to this son. The amora with whom he had deposited his money attempted to delay, in hopes that the convert would die and his property become ownerless, allowing the amora to keep the money. The student of the beit midrash told this convert a trick to use, and he did. It does not appear that this was a bad thing for them to do. So why should moderns not seek a way to ease the burden on the disabled today? (If I were a bit looser with interpretation, I might say these are the widows and orphans of our day).
They say that a person should be sad over his exemption from mitzvot, which is not unreasonable. However, normally the exemption from mitzvot is due to another mitzva. A brother who does yibbum (obligatory marriage of a man to his brother's childless widow) is exempt from the prohibition of a brother's wife. But he should rejoice at the mitzva of yibbum. A doctor who must save lives on Shabbat should not mourn his sabbath desecration but rejoice in the saving of lives. A person who uses a halakhically approved device for his oneg Shabbat (sabbath joy) should rejoice in that mitzva and not mourn his loss that he must use something other Jews may not use.
Toward the end of the article, oneg Shabbos finally comes up. They play it as a slippery slope to other enjoyable activities, such as a grama tape deck. The analogy is poor for at least two other reasons. First, let's say I left a music player on from before Shabbos (with modern technologies, 25 hours worth of music is not so beyond imagination). Could I listen to it? Surely this would be advised against. (yes technically it is permitted but certainly violates the spirit of Shabbat). So it is because of that problem that one may not use a grama tape player. Second, one can draw a distinction between creating pleasure and preventing or removing pain. Rav Auerbach's permission for his mother's hearing aid would be unlikely to be applied for simple additional pleasure. It is quite likely that one would be permitted to administer morphine on Shabbat if needed, but not recreationally (even absent concerns of the prohibition on recreational drug use if such exists).
Furthermore, I will make kal v'chomer (argument from strong to weak) from animals (not to compare the infirm and elderly to animals). One may violate rabbinic prohibitions (carrying pillows & blankets in a non-Torah thoroughfare) to prevent pain to an animal on Shabbat. May one not violate rabbinic prohibitions to prevent pain to a human being? It is alluded to in the Shmirat Shabbat k'hilchata in 3-4 places (I have notes somewhere that say where) that R' Auerbach was only concerned for the opinion of the Chazon Ish to the level of a rabbinic prohibition. (The Chazon Ish prohibited use of elecricity on Shabbat and R' Auerbach wondered why as it appeared to him there was no reason to do so at all).
In "An issue that has sufaced in the past" they first requote at greater length the above quotation regarding the likelihood of misuse and neccesary warnings, to which I have already responded. Then they quote R' Aharon Kotler as suggesting that certain things are being done to make Torah Judaism more appealing to the masses, which will lead to Reform Judaism. I am certain R' Kotler was discussing something else. No one is deciding that the one thing keeping them from observing Shabbat & all the other mitzvot is the inability to use an electric scooter. Thus I think R' Kotler's quotation is being misapplied here.
The authors argue that building a device with grama means that the action is not a grama but a direct action. This is possible. Furthermore, if the device may only be used by those for whom Torah prohibitions are permitted, grama is unnecesary. The Nishmat Avraham (Dr Avraham S. Abraham) said in a lecture that he asked R' Auerbach if he should get himself a grama phone (not a grammaphone) because he gets so many medical calls on Shabbat that he answers his phone. R' Auerbach said that such calls require no grama phone and can be answered normally. Dr Abraham said however that he occassionally recieves other calls on Shabbat and he wishes to diminish this inadvertant Shabbat violation. R' Auerbach said it was entirely unneccesary. So while it is possible that no middle ground exists between those who may not use the grama devices and those who may use regular devices and don't need grama devices, the other arguments presented in this article seem to fall flat.
.
EDIT: I misunderstood uvda d'chol (correctly translated as: weekday activity). one may not engage in a particularly weekday-like activity on the Sabbath, either because it will lead one to forget it is Shabbat or because it is disrespectful to Shabbat. It is still somewhat unclear what its boundaries are. Uvda d'chol has no relationship to objects, and as a result I am somewhat unclear on how the authors understood uvda d'chol to apply here. For the person who is in an electric wheelchair, using it is no different of an activity than walking is to a healthy person. I cannot therefore understand the useage of uvda d'chol in this context despite my new understanding.
Uvda d'chol in general seems to only be applied to circumstances which are otherwise problematic, that by adding together several small issues, one can see why something should be avoided or prohibited. Rarely does one find that uvda d'chol is used by itself.
In the first section, "Opening a Closed Question" the author's quote the haskama (approbation) of R' Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky to a book written by R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach on electricity with regard to Shabbat. They then apply the quotation to essentially say that old questions are not worthy of reevaluation. Because of this, grama is a closed book for which no new devices may be used. This section ends by quoting the Chazon Ish. I am left perplexed and in wonder at the words of the Chazon Ish. Thankfully for me, Rav Auerbach also expressed wonder at the words of the Chazon Ish on electricity generally, so I am not alone. If, as the Chazon Ish is quoted as saying, an object seen publically in the streets on weekdays is prohibited on Shabbat, why do the publishers of siddurim (prayerbooks) put weekday and Shabbat prayers in the same book? Since the siddur is used on weekdays it is an uvda d'chol (a weekday object) and may not be used on Shabbat.
The authors attempt to argue that something which is never used in the grama mode on weekdays, and then used in the grama mode on Shabbat is not a change from normal practice. Is that not the definition of a change from normal practice? He is doing something different from his usual means of operating. That alone is not permission, but the fact tht it is used differently on weekdays makes the argument for permitting the device better, not worse.
The authors further say that even according to the manufacturers this device is permitted only conditionally for those who are elderly or infim or in emergencies. They object that a booklet detailing the circumstances under which it may be used is not included with the device. First, it is self-evident that a device for the infirm should only be used by them and no others, just as with prescription medication. Would anyone believe that such a scooter could be used by children as a race car? Second, I received an urn and a hotplate for use on Shabbat recently. Neither included a booklet detailing the laws of cooking on Shabbat, but all would agree that cooking on Shabbat may only be done under certain circumstances. The authors, quoting themselves in a letter say, "Moreover, can one possibly hand over to the general public a device whose use is only permitted under certain circumstances?" Does the Talmud set they received for their weddings include a note detailing which sections may be learned on Tisha B'av, lest they misuse the Talmud?
Here the question must be asked: Whose idea are these limitations? If something is forbidden, cripples are also not allowed to do melochoh on Shabbos. And if it is permissible, it is allowed for everyone. Do they mean to say that handicapped persons are allowed to "slightly transgress" a "relatively lenient" prohibition, while fit people are not? That sounds like a bad joke.
I'll mention the political incorrectness of the term "cripples" without comment, beyond saying that perhaps English is not their first language so they may not be aware. The idea that a person with a physical disability may have different halachot is not new. Rav Auerbach mentioned above felt that his mother, who was deaf could turn her hearing aid on and off on Shabbat (b/c the batteries in those days did not last long enough for the entire Shabbat). I doubt that he would have said the same regarding a person turning on and off his lights.
The authors then go on to rebuke those who seek leniency or seek to get around a problem created by observance of halacha. The Talmud is rife with examples of people endeavoring to solve just such a problem and seems to have no problem with this. For example, a male convert with a son (the convert converted after conception and is therefore halachically unrelated to the son) wished to give his property to this son. The amora with whom he had deposited his money attempted to delay, in hopes that the convert would die and his property become ownerless, allowing the amora to keep the money. The student of the beit midrash told this convert a trick to use, and he did. It does not appear that this was a bad thing for them to do. So why should moderns not seek a way to ease the burden on the disabled today? (If I were a bit looser with interpretation, I might say these are the widows and orphans of our day).
They say that a person should be sad over his exemption from mitzvot, which is not unreasonable. However, normally the exemption from mitzvot is due to another mitzva. A brother who does yibbum (obligatory marriage of a man to his brother's childless widow) is exempt from the prohibition of a brother's wife. But he should rejoice at the mitzva of yibbum. A doctor who must save lives on Shabbat should not mourn his sabbath desecration but rejoice in the saving of lives. A person who uses a halakhically approved device for his oneg Shabbat (sabbath joy) should rejoice in that mitzva and not mourn his loss that he must use something other Jews may not use.
Toward the end of the article, oneg Shabbos finally comes up. They play it as a slippery slope to other enjoyable activities, such as a grama tape deck. The analogy is poor for at least two other reasons. First, let's say I left a music player on from before Shabbos (with modern technologies, 25 hours worth of music is not so beyond imagination). Could I listen to it? Surely this would be advised against. (yes technically it is permitted but certainly violates the spirit of Shabbat). So it is because of that problem that one may not use a grama tape player. Second, one can draw a distinction between creating pleasure and preventing or removing pain. Rav Auerbach's permission for his mother's hearing aid would be unlikely to be applied for simple additional pleasure. It is quite likely that one would be permitted to administer morphine on Shabbat if needed, but not recreationally (even absent concerns of the prohibition on recreational drug use if such exists).
Furthermore, I will make kal v'chomer (argument from strong to weak) from animals (not to compare the infirm and elderly to animals). One may violate rabbinic prohibitions (carrying pillows & blankets in a non-Torah thoroughfare) to prevent pain to an animal on Shabbat. May one not violate rabbinic prohibitions to prevent pain to a human being? It is alluded to in the Shmirat Shabbat k'hilchata in 3-4 places (I have notes somewhere that say where) that R' Auerbach was only concerned for the opinion of the Chazon Ish to the level of a rabbinic prohibition. (The Chazon Ish prohibited use of elecricity on Shabbat and R' Auerbach wondered why as it appeared to him there was no reason to do so at all).
In "An issue that has sufaced in the past" they first requote at greater length the above quotation regarding the likelihood of misuse and neccesary warnings, to which I have already responded. Then they quote R' Aharon Kotler as suggesting that certain things are being done to make Torah Judaism more appealing to the masses, which will lead to Reform Judaism. I am certain R' Kotler was discussing something else. No one is deciding that the one thing keeping them from observing Shabbat & all the other mitzvot is the inability to use an electric scooter. Thus I think R' Kotler's quotation is being misapplied here.
The authors argue that building a device with grama means that the action is not a grama but a direct action. This is possible. Furthermore, if the device may only be used by those for whom Torah prohibitions are permitted, grama is unnecesary. The Nishmat Avraham (Dr Avraham S. Abraham) said in a lecture that he asked R' Auerbach if he should get himself a grama phone (not a grammaphone) because he gets so many medical calls on Shabbat that he answers his phone. R' Auerbach said that such calls require no grama phone and can be answered normally. Dr Abraham said however that he occassionally recieves other calls on Shabbat and he wishes to diminish this inadvertant Shabbat violation. R' Auerbach said it was entirely unneccesary. So while it is possible that no middle ground exists between those who may not use the grama devices and those who may use regular devices and don't need grama devices, the other arguments presented in this article seem to fall flat.
.
EDIT: I misunderstood uvda d'chol (correctly translated as: weekday activity). one may not engage in a particularly weekday-like activity on the Sabbath, either because it will lead one to forget it is Shabbat or because it is disrespectful to Shabbat. It is still somewhat unclear what its boundaries are. Uvda d'chol has no relationship to objects, and as a result I am somewhat unclear on how the authors understood uvda d'chol to apply here. For the person who is in an electric wheelchair, using it is no different of an activity than walking is to a healthy person. I cannot therefore understand the useage of uvda d'chol in this context despite my new understanding.
Uvda d'chol in general seems to only be applied to circumstances which are otherwise problematic, that by adding together several small issues, one can see why something should be avoided or prohibited. Rarely does one find that uvda d'chol is used by itself.