Any lessons from Domodedovo?
Zdravstvuite, tovarishchi! Hi, comrades! I'm not surprised yesterday's event in Moscow went widely unnoticed in the Anglophone media- and blogosphere, and yet it's a fact: one of the deadliest terror acts for the last years has happened at the Domodedovo airport. A man of Northern Caucasian origin blew himself up in the middle of the crowd in the waiting room, killing over 30 people and injuring 150. The act is part of an endless string of terror attacks in Russia for the last years.
The first question is of course who organized it and why? Making conclusions and allegations at this point would be too premature because modern terrorism has many faces and sources, but surely the info we've got at the moment could lead us to some preliminary thoughts.
First, what is that bomb capable of? Well, it happened in the waiting room where the relatives and friends of the arriving passengers were waiting for them to check out and take their luggage after passing the customs control. The bomb was blown up by a suicide terrorist, who, according to witnesses, screamed "I'll kill you all!" a few seconds before pulling the trigger. The power of the bomb (between 3 and 7 kg of TNT) was enhanced with additional ironware and various heavy stuff locked in a suitcase that the terrorist was carrying, and which flew everywhere and cut people's arms, legs and heads. Actually the terrorist's head was found rolling in the wreckage and he was recognized as "Caucasian looking". No surprise there. It was later specified that the bomb had 5 kg TNT, and that's quite a lot. It's similar to the anti-tank missiles which can penetrate armored vehicles.
The effect from the blast could have been even more horrific. Let's remember that a bomb worth 4 kg TNT was blown up in the Moscow subway in 2004, killing 41 people and injuring 250. This time the effect the terrorists were aiming for didn't work up so "well" as they were hoping, mostly because of the specifics of the room. Also we should mention that it's not necessary that they used TNT, there are actually even more powerful substances producing far more energy from a more compact quantity.
Some media mentioned a second blast but that wasn't confirmed.
But the point is, who ordered the attack and why? That's the main thing. Well, we might still not have a 100% certain answer, although a number of media already tried to dumb down the issue, instantly naming a culprit. I cringed as I watched some of the Russian channels, they were so ready with a conclusion already! I was especially gutted by a talk-show of theirs, where people scored points (literally), jumping over each other with accusations, each next one more generalizing and preposterous than the other.
Whatever they might blabber, the fact is that only people from the special security services (FSB) could speak of any clear evidence. If the hints that the FSB had caught a track of this particular terrorist group a week ago, but then failed to foil the attack turn out to be true, this means there's a major breach of security. In fact there's no system of "levels of threat" in Russia like there are in the US and UK, and the security level around New Year's holidays was only generally raised a bit as it's always done at that time of the year. But then, because nothing happened around and after the holidays (the Russian Christmas is on January 7th), it was brought down again and this is when the terrorists hit.
The main suspect is the already well-known terrorist organization Imarat Kavkaz, whose leader Dok Umarov took responsibility for the Moscow subway attack last year. Another possibility that couldn't be discounted is that this time it was a fringe group of fanatics ("Shahids", as they're called in Russia) who work on their own. Such groups could be a much more difficult target to deal with because they remain largely invisible until the very moment of their attack. Also they often use women kamikazes ("shahidki").
But one thing is certain. Being at a constant state of war against Islamist and Caucasian terrorism, constantly clashing with radical groups sponsored from the Middle East, Russia is surely under an immense terrorist threat, much more than most other leading countries in the world. Having in mind the huge number of candidates to destroy the otherwise rather fragile peace in Northern Caucasus, and the fact most of these terrorists never get caught, I could say the situation's deterioration is anything but unexpected.
This is putting a huge dent on Russia's credibility now in a very delicate moment for them, when they're about to host the Sochi Olympics in 2014 and the FIFA World Cup in 2018, and even for Medvedev's plans to try to persuade more foreign investors to come to Russia (he was actually heading to Switzerland for the annual Davos meeting, but he had to interrupt his plans).
We could only guess who the possible perpetrators of the terorr act are at this point; but we could point out that using suicide bombers has become a trademark for the radical pseudo-Islamic groups in the region. This method is widely used against Israel too. But who's to blame, really?
Most often the answer is: "the enemy!" (whoever it is), but when you dig a little deeper, it's not so simple. The airport authorities and the special services of Russia bear the main responsibility for this failure, when looked superficially. Medvedev hinted that he suspects the national security laws are not being put to practice as they should. I haven't been to Domodedovo, I've been in Sheremetyevo, the other major airport of Moscow, and I have no reasons to believe the situation was much different there - and I can tell you one could freely enter the airport from the street, carry a handbag right to the customs desks and leave it there whenever they wanted. And then mix with the crowd.
On the other hand, the ultra-paranoid security measures often lead to nothing productive, because they tend to wear out people's vigilance (remember The Boy Who Cried Wolf story). They traumatise society and people get overly paranoid, irritable, and ineffective in their reactions. Especially when it's done for too long periods.
Unfortunately, other countries' experience could turn out useless in many cases. Like Israel's example of separating itself from the Palestinian territories with a wall. To build a wall along the Russian Federation / Northern Caucasus borders is impossible. And separating these regions, which some allege is the most viable solution, is definitely not an option. Chechnya's de facto sovereignty during the 1996-99 period did in no way increase the citizens' security, nor that of Russia as a whole, and it only made things worse for the neighboring territories. And finally, we should understand that many leaders of terrorist organizations would rejoyce immensely from such an outcome.
So what should be done, really? First and foremost it's important to understand that no increase of security measures and no expansion of prerogatives for the Russian special anti-terror services would provide lasting results. That's only dealing with the symptoms, not the causes. As was said, the terrorists just have a too wide range of targets. Besides, by gradually bringing down the internal threats, it doesn't mean you're bringing down the external threats, because a number of foreign sponsors of terrorism would hardly stay restful when they see that their influence is being curbed.
The success of the fight against these terrorist attacks would depend on several complex factors, and Putin and Medvedev know this perfectly well but for some reason they refuse to face it and to do something about it:
- Economical - developing the economy of Russia and especially Northern Caucasus because those parts are extremely poor, while they're bathing in resources, or have a strategic location for transporting those resources, which could be used properly, this time bringing some actual benefit for the local economies themselves, instead of being totally sucked out by the imperial federal center.
- Political and administrative - no development is ever possible in the conditions of a widespread corruption and dismal professional qualification of the bureaucratic machinery who are supposedly responsible for said development. Imposing deadlines for doing a certain amount of work does not... eh, work. At all. You can't make someone who doesn't have the capacity and expertise to do something, to do it, no matter what deadlines you give them.
For the time being, the threat of terror acts is a fact that remains. What's left is to hope that this won't be the start of a series of such acts (most of us still remember Beslan), and that the Russian authorities would finally drag their heads out of the sand and start addressing these issues because I'm not sure how much longer the Russian people would stand this. And we know what happens when someone pushes the Russians to do something stupid.
Extra credit to luvdovz for turning out prophetic - sadly, the result wasn't joyous.
The first question is of course who organized it and why? Making conclusions and allegations at this point would be too premature because modern terrorism has many faces and sources, but surely the info we've got at the moment could lead us to some preliminary thoughts.
First, what is that bomb capable of? Well, it happened in the waiting room where the relatives and friends of the arriving passengers were waiting for them to check out and take their luggage after passing the customs control. The bomb was blown up by a suicide terrorist, who, according to witnesses, screamed "I'll kill you all!" a few seconds before pulling the trigger. The power of the bomb (between 3 and 7 kg of TNT) was enhanced with additional ironware and various heavy stuff locked in a suitcase that the terrorist was carrying, and which flew everywhere and cut people's arms, legs and heads. Actually the terrorist's head was found rolling in the wreckage and he was recognized as "Caucasian looking". No surprise there. It was later specified that the bomb had 5 kg TNT, and that's quite a lot. It's similar to the anti-tank missiles which can penetrate armored vehicles.
The effect from the blast could have been even more horrific. Let's remember that a bomb worth 4 kg TNT was blown up in the Moscow subway in 2004, killing 41 people and injuring 250. This time the effect the terrorists were aiming for didn't work up so "well" as they were hoping, mostly because of the specifics of the room. Also we should mention that it's not necessary that they used TNT, there are actually even more powerful substances producing far more energy from a more compact quantity.
Some media mentioned a second blast but that wasn't confirmed.
But the point is, who ordered the attack and why? That's the main thing. Well, we might still not have a 100% certain answer, although a number of media already tried to dumb down the issue, instantly naming a culprit. I cringed as I watched some of the Russian channels, they were so ready with a conclusion already! I was especially gutted by a talk-show of theirs, where people scored points (literally), jumping over each other with accusations, each next one more generalizing and preposterous than the other.
Whatever they might blabber, the fact is that only people from the special security services (FSB) could speak of any clear evidence. If the hints that the FSB had caught a track of this particular terrorist group a week ago, but then failed to foil the attack turn out to be true, this means there's a major breach of security. In fact there's no system of "levels of threat" in Russia like there are in the US and UK, and the security level around New Year's holidays was only generally raised a bit as it's always done at that time of the year. But then, because nothing happened around and after the holidays (the Russian Christmas is on January 7th), it was brought down again and this is when the terrorists hit.
The main suspect is the already well-known terrorist organization Imarat Kavkaz, whose leader Dok Umarov took responsibility for the Moscow subway attack last year. Another possibility that couldn't be discounted is that this time it was a fringe group of fanatics ("Shahids", as they're called in Russia) who work on their own. Such groups could be a much more difficult target to deal with because they remain largely invisible until the very moment of their attack. Also they often use women kamikazes ("shahidki").
But one thing is certain. Being at a constant state of war against Islamist and Caucasian terrorism, constantly clashing with radical groups sponsored from the Middle East, Russia is surely under an immense terrorist threat, much more than most other leading countries in the world. Having in mind the huge number of candidates to destroy the otherwise rather fragile peace in Northern Caucasus, and the fact most of these terrorists never get caught, I could say the situation's deterioration is anything but unexpected.
This is putting a huge dent on Russia's credibility now in a very delicate moment for them, when they're about to host the Sochi Olympics in 2014 and the FIFA World Cup in 2018, and even for Medvedev's plans to try to persuade more foreign investors to come to Russia (he was actually heading to Switzerland for the annual Davos meeting, but he had to interrupt his plans).
We could only guess who the possible perpetrators of the terorr act are at this point; but we could point out that using suicide bombers has become a trademark for the radical pseudo-Islamic groups in the region. This method is widely used against Israel too. But who's to blame, really?
Most often the answer is: "the enemy!" (whoever it is), but when you dig a little deeper, it's not so simple. The airport authorities and the special services of Russia bear the main responsibility for this failure, when looked superficially. Medvedev hinted that he suspects the national security laws are not being put to practice as they should. I haven't been to Domodedovo, I've been in Sheremetyevo, the other major airport of Moscow, and I have no reasons to believe the situation was much different there - and I can tell you one could freely enter the airport from the street, carry a handbag right to the customs desks and leave it there whenever they wanted. And then mix with the crowd.
On the other hand, the ultra-paranoid security measures often lead to nothing productive, because they tend to wear out people's vigilance (remember The Boy Who Cried Wolf story). They traumatise society and people get overly paranoid, irritable, and ineffective in their reactions. Especially when it's done for too long periods.
Unfortunately, other countries' experience could turn out useless in many cases. Like Israel's example of separating itself from the Palestinian territories with a wall. To build a wall along the Russian Federation / Northern Caucasus borders is impossible. And separating these regions, which some allege is the most viable solution, is definitely not an option. Chechnya's de facto sovereignty during the 1996-99 period did in no way increase the citizens' security, nor that of Russia as a whole, and it only made things worse for the neighboring territories. And finally, we should understand that many leaders of terrorist organizations would rejoyce immensely from such an outcome.
So what should be done, really? First and foremost it's important to understand that no increase of security measures and no expansion of prerogatives for the Russian special anti-terror services would provide lasting results. That's only dealing with the symptoms, not the causes. As was said, the terrorists just have a too wide range of targets. Besides, by gradually bringing down the internal threats, it doesn't mean you're bringing down the external threats, because a number of foreign sponsors of terrorism would hardly stay restful when they see that their influence is being curbed.
The success of the fight against these terrorist attacks would depend on several complex factors, and Putin and Medvedev know this perfectly well but for some reason they refuse to face it and to do something about it:
- Economical - developing the economy of Russia and especially Northern Caucasus because those parts are extremely poor, while they're bathing in resources, or have a strategic location for transporting those resources, which could be used properly, this time bringing some actual benefit for the local economies themselves, instead of being totally sucked out by the imperial federal center.
- Political and administrative - no development is ever possible in the conditions of a widespread corruption and dismal professional qualification of the bureaucratic machinery who are supposedly responsible for said development. Imposing deadlines for doing a certain amount of work does not... eh, work. At all. You can't make someone who doesn't have the capacity and expertise to do something, to do it, no matter what deadlines you give them.
For the time being, the threat of terror acts is a fact that remains. What's left is to hope that this won't be the start of a series of such acts (most of us still remember Beslan), and that the Russian authorities would finally drag their heads out of the sand and start addressing these issues because I'm not sure how much longer the Russian people would stand this. And we know what happens when someone pushes the Russians to do something stupid.
Extra credit to luvdovz for turning out prophetic - sadly, the result wasn't joyous.