Russia's policy in Caucasus = fail
Good post by panookah about Iraq. Now I'll talk a little about Caucasus. I haven't been in Caucasus, the closest I've been to there is Sochi (which is just a few km away from Abkhazia anyway), but I've been following the events for quite some time.
It seems the frequency of the terrorist attacks there has increased a lot for the last year. I think this shows that the local and federal government's attempts to solve the problem by force are in vain.
The anti-terror operations of the Russian special forces have increased too in response to the increasing terror attacks across the northern Caucasus and further inside Russia. Before, the federal security service (FSS) used to avoid taking responsibility for these things and it left the fight with terrorism to the ministry of interior. But now the FSS activity in the region has increased. Unfortunately I think they're taking the wrong approach - trying to eliminate the insurgents themselves, instead of going deeper into the issue and focusing on its causes rather than its symptoms. And the cause is that Moscow has installed a corrupt local clan to rule the country as feudals, the Kadyrovs. With total disregard of the needs of the local people. This tends to put extra fuel to the fire of hatred that the locals have to Moscow in the first place. That's not the way you win hearts and minds, and no matter how many insurgents you manage to kill or capture, there'll be 5 new ones popping up in the place of each 1 that you've eliminated. It's beyond me how come Putin and Medvedev cannot see this very simple fact. Or maybe they just lack the resources (and I do mean reliable human resources) to implement a much more sensible and effective approach to the region.
Northern Caucasus owes this new 'terror surge' tendency to the multiple illegal groups that keep popping up everywhere and who now attack not just the police but also officers from the secret services. This shows that they've improved their intelligence and organization. What the Russian and the local governments are responding with is not a proactive position but rather a futile effort to chase ghosts.
Some data. According to the Russian ministry of interior, the first three quarters of 2010 saw 4-times more terror attacks than the entire previous year. Until November last year there were 609 registered terror attacks, 242 staff from the police and other government security services were killed, 620 were wounded and a total of 127 civilians were murdered. And that's just the official data.
The events of 2010 have effectively destroyed the old legend that the policies of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov of fighting the armed insurgents anywhere he sees them, would give any results. Among all these attacks in Chechnya, the rebels also made two big attacks with a symbolic significance - in August they attacked the Tzentoroy villlage which was considered a bastion of the Kadyrov clan, and in autumn they even besieged the Chechen parliament. The official information claims 'just' 9 people of Kadyrov's family were killed, but the more important thing is that these attacks showed how vulnerable the power in Chechnya is.
There is also frequent news about civilian and cargo trains blown to smithereens, powerlines, power grids and mobile hubs and oil pipelines being disrupted in Northern Caucasus. The insurgence continues to mount, and it's focused on strategic facilities now. The propaganda effect of these attacks by far surpasses the economic damages.
One terror attack which had the biggest echo throughout 2010 was when two Dagestani women blew themselves up in the subway in Moscow in March, which was the first sign of the failure of Moscow's anti-terror policy. Everyone could see that, except maybe Kremlin's smart heads who were still in denial and preferred to throw all the blame on the secret services who had supposedly failed to avert the attack. But like I said, this is like chasing ghosts.
Today's concept of fighting terrorism shouldn't be formed around the premise that the number of casualties is the factor number one for the terrorists; it's the threat of a political destabilization that should be addressed first and foremost, because that's obviously what the insurgents are aiming for. That's why the secret services trying to avert rebel attacks on the power structures (police, security services, etc) like the one which happened in Ingushetia in 2004 should be 'The' top priority. The insurgents have shifted their focus away from the civilian population, although, granted, there are still a number of attacks in that area too, which are designed to maintain a relatively high tension and a sense of intimidation and instability among the populace. But their attention has now primarily moved on the pillars of Kremlin's power in Caucasus, and if Putin and Medvedev don't want another mega-crisis and another Chechen war to happen sometime within the next 2-3 years, they'd better think a bit harder on these things.
It seems the frequency of the terrorist attacks there has increased a lot for the last year. I think this shows that the local and federal government's attempts to solve the problem by force are in vain.
The anti-terror operations of the Russian special forces have increased too in response to the increasing terror attacks across the northern Caucasus and further inside Russia. Before, the federal security service (FSS) used to avoid taking responsibility for these things and it left the fight with terrorism to the ministry of interior. But now the FSS activity in the region has increased. Unfortunately I think they're taking the wrong approach - trying to eliminate the insurgents themselves, instead of going deeper into the issue and focusing on its causes rather than its symptoms. And the cause is that Moscow has installed a corrupt local clan to rule the country as feudals, the Kadyrovs. With total disregard of the needs of the local people. This tends to put extra fuel to the fire of hatred that the locals have to Moscow in the first place. That's not the way you win hearts and minds, and no matter how many insurgents you manage to kill or capture, there'll be 5 new ones popping up in the place of each 1 that you've eliminated. It's beyond me how come Putin and Medvedev cannot see this very simple fact. Or maybe they just lack the resources (and I do mean reliable human resources) to implement a much more sensible and effective approach to the region.
Northern Caucasus owes this new 'terror surge' tendency to the multiple illegal groups that keep popping up everywhere and who now attack not just the police but also officers from the secret services. This shows that they've improved their intelligence and organization. What the Russian and the local governments are responding with is not a proactive position but rather a futile effort to chase ghosts.
Some data. According to the Russian ministry of interior, the first three quarters of 2010 saw 4-times more terror attacks than the entire previous year. Until November last year there were 609 registered terror attacks, 242 staff from the police and other government security services were killed, 620 were wounded and a total of 127 civilians were murdered. And that's just the official data.
The events of 2010 have effectively destroyed the old legend that the policies of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov of fighting the armed insurgents anywhere he sees them, would give any results. Among all these attacks in Chechnya, the rebels also made two big attacks with a symbolic significance - in August they attacked the Tzentoroy villlage which was considered a bastion of the Kadyrov clan, and in autumn they even besieged the Chechen parliament. The official information claims 'just' 9 people of Kadyrov's family were killed, but the more important thing is that these attacks showed how vulnerable the power in Chechnya is.
There is also frequent news about civilian and cargo trains blown to smithereens, powerlines, power grids and mobile hubs and oil pipelines being disrupted in Northern Caucasus. The insurgence continues to mount, and it's focused on strategic facilities now. The propaganda effect of these attacks by far surpasses the economic damages.
One terror attack which had the biggest echo throughout 2010 was when two Dagestani women blew themselves up in the subway in Moscow in March, which was the first sign of the failure of Moscow's anti-terror policy. Everyone could see that, except maybe Kremlin's smart heads who were still in denial and preferred to throw all the blame on the secret services who had supposedly failed to avert the attack. But like I said, this is like chasing ghosts.
Today's concept of fighting terrorism shouldn't be formed around the premise that the number of casualties is the factor number one for the terrorists; it's the threat of a political destabilization that should be addressed first and foremost, because that's obviously what the insurgents are aiming for. That's why the secret services trying to avert rebel attacks on the power structures (police, security services, etc) like the one which happened in Ingushetia in 2004 should be 'The' top priority. The insurgents have shifted their focus away from the civilian population, although, granted, there are still a number of attacks in that area too, which are designed to maintain a relatively high tension and a sense of intimidation and instability among the populace. But their attention has now primarily moved on the pillars of Kremlin's power in Caucasus, and if Putin and Medvedev don't want another mega-crisis and another Chechen war to happen sometime within the next 2-3 years, they'd better think a bit harder on these things.