Логистика. Четыре.
В Laurence Evans. Junks, Rice, and Empire: Civil Logistics and the Mandate of Heaven // Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques , Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall 1984), pp. 271-313.
General W.T. Sherman's account, "The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion" in the Century Magazine, of February 1888, gives the maximum distance of a hundred miles for supplying an army.
В The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion
Accordingfo the Duke of Wellington, an army moves upon its belly, not upon its legs; and no army dependent on wagons can operate more than a hundred miles from its base, because the teams going and returning consume the contents of their wagons, leaving little or nothing for the maintenance of the men and animals at the front, who are fully employed in fighting; hence the necessity to "forage liberally on the country," a measure which fed our men and animals chiefly on the very supplies which had been gathered near the railroads by the enemy for the maintenance of his own armies. "The march to the sea " in strategy was only a shift of base for ulterior and highly important purposes.
То есть 100 миль это для армии:
- которая не занимается фуражировкой
- получает снабжение с тыловой базы методом непрерывного подвоза
- с вполне определенным соотношением транспортных возов к "боевому составу".
И сентенция превращается из "универсальной, освященной именами Уэлсли и Шермана", в "узко-конкретную".
Это опять к теме "кратких и емких цитат" вида
Как отмечал генерал-интендант 1-й русской Западной армии, а впоследствии, при Николае I, министр финансов Российской империи Е.Ф. Канкрин, армия может полагаться на принцип «Война кормит войну» только при условии, что она будет действовать в регионе, плотность населения в котором будет не меньше 35 чел. на км2.
Какой численности армия? С каким соотношением пехоты и конницы? С каким соотношением людей и лошадей? С каким соотношением людей и лошадей в "боевой части" и "тыловой части"? С каким числом возов? С какой долей людей привлекаемой к фуражировке и на какой площади? С какой системой подвоза? И так далее, и тому подобное...
P.S. Cам Шерман в 1864 году с четырьмя корпусами прошел 360 миль от Атланты до Саванны со средним темпом в 15 миль в день, опираясь на взятые из Атланты запасы и фуражировку.
When the army set out it had approximately supplies of bread for twenty days, sugar, coffee, and salt for forty and about three days' forage in grain; it had also a sufficient quantity of ammunition; all this was carried in 2500 wagons with a team of six mules to each. Droves of cattle, enough to insure fresh meat for more than a month, were part of the commisariat. The ambulances were 600 in number; the artillery had been reduced to 65 guns. Pontoon trains were carried along as the invading host had many rivers to cross. ... each corps marched on a separate road. The division of the wagon trains gave each corps about 800 wagons, which occupied on the march five miles or more of road. ... As the state was sparsely settled and the plan of making requisitions on the civil authorities therefore impracticable, this was the only possible mode of supplying the troops. The arrangements for the foraging were made and carried out with military precision. Each brigade sent out a party of about fifty men on foot who would return mounted, driving cattle and mules and hauling wagons or family carriages loaded with fresh mutton, smoked bacon, turkeys, chickens, ducks, corn meal, jugs of molasses and sweet potatoes. The crop having been large, just gathered and laid by for the winter, the section never before having been visited by a hostile army, the land was rich in provisions and forage. ... We have consumed the corn and fodder in the region of country thirty miles on either side of a line from Atlanta to Savannah as also the sweet potatoes, cattle, hogs, sheep and poultry, and have carried away more than 10,000 horses and mules as well as a countless number of their slaves
Джорджия перед Гражданской войной - миллион человек при 150 тысячах км2. То есть - 6-7 человек на км2, но плотность населения в пределах штата одинаковой, конечно, не была.
Earl J. Hess. Civil War Logistics. A Study of Military Transportation. 2017
We must not stress the American logistical triumph too much. It was very impressive and it certainly provided a key foundation for Union army success in the Civil War. But it was not entirely sufficient. The national logistical systems did not provide literally every article of food consumed by Yankee troops; much foraging off the countryside occurred for a variety of reasons, one of which was that the logistical systems had real limits. The rail-based system in particular could stretch only so far. William T. Sherman achieved the biggest logistical success of the war when he fed and supplied 100,000 men operating at the end of a single-track rail line stretching 350 miles from Louisville, Kentucky, to his army group advancing toward Atlanta. But once he captured that important city, Sherman realized the tenuous rail link could not support further operations south of Atlanta. Logistical limitation was the primary cause for a significant shift in Union strategy once the Upper South was conquered and the Deep South became the next Federal target. Instead of connected lines of communication, Federal forces now developed large-scale raids to tear up Confederate transportation and industrial assets in central Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia during the last few months of the war. Only the Mississippi River and the steamboats that used it could provide Federal armies secure supply routes to penetrate the Deep South and stay there rather than merely raiding.
...
In the end, Bragg was compelled to evacuate the state in October 1862 in part because he did not have a secure line of communications with the South. But he had demonstrated how fast and far an army could move if it severely reduced its land transportation and counted on the endurance of its personnel. The lesson struck many Northern officers. “Napoleon asserted that 500 wagons were enough for 40,000 men,” Meigs told Henry Halleck. “We are using at the rate of three times this number. . . . If the army is to move with efficiency, vigorous measures must reduce this luxury of transportation.” Halleck reluctantly admitted to Edwin M. Stanton that the Confederate armies had “exhibited much more mobility and activity than our own.” Halleck knew it was necessary to reduce the baggage trains but found much resistance. “Once accustomed to a certain amount of transportation, an army is unwilling to do without the luxuries which it supplies in the field.”