A Moldovan View on Russian Foreign Policy
The Essence of Russia's New Foreign Policy
by Denis Cenusa (September 15th, 2008)
"Lead by D. Medvedev, Russia continues following the foreign policy set out yet by V. Putin back in 2000. The main elements of Russia's external behavior have been focused on recovering its status of a big regional and international power, resuming its relations with the West, reasserting itself on the post-Soviet area, reestablishing and/or updating the security system, adequately responding to challenges, threats and risks of the 21st century. The high prices for hydrocarbons, the weakened role of the USA in solving international problems (due to the compromised image in Iraq and modest success in Afghanistan), the emergence of China and other international actors (the EU, India, etc.), the increasing interdependence between international exponents in managing international cases (the issues of Iran, North-Korea, Middle East, international terrorism, etc.) have consequently contributed to the consolidation of Russia's positions at international level. This context has largely determined the contents of the current Foreign Policy Concept adopted by the Russian president, D. Medvedev, on July 15 this year."
The central idea of the document is that Moscow has self-determined as an international law subject imperative for the system of international relations. Thus, the Concept stipulates that Russia has not only become able to fulfill certain tasks on the international political agenda, but also to take part in drawing up the latter (the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 15, 2008, www.mid.ru). At the same time, the "new" Concept sets the following objectives:
1. To ensure national security, to preserve and strengthen Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to consolidate its authority in the international community to meet the interests of the Russian Federation as one of influential poles in international relations to the best.
2. To create favorable external conditions for the modernization of Russia through internal development and welfare in order to ensure its competitiveness in a globalizing world.
3. To influence global processes to ensure formation of a just and democratic world order based on supremacy of the international law (the UN Charter and other international treaties), collectiveness in finding solutions to international problems under the conditions of parity and partnership with a central and coordinating role of the UN.
4. To promote good neighborly relations with the bordering states, to contribute to elimination of tension and conflicts along the Russian border and in other regions of the world.
5. To look for compromises and coinciding interests with other states and international associations in the process of finding ways to fulfill the objectives qualified as national priorities for Russia, to establish bilateral or multilateral partnerships aimed to ensure stability of the international position of the country in the face of international foreign policy volatility.
6. To protect the rights of Russian citizens and compatriots (people born on the Soviet area) abroad.
7. To transform Russia in a democratic state with a socially-oriented market economy and an independent foreign policy.
8. To support and promote the Russian culture and language abroad.
In addition to these complicated objectives that are sometimes incompatible or even contradict international political realities, the foreign activity of Russia is based on several essential PRIORITIES:
" The emergence of a new world order;
" The primacy of law in international relations;
" Strengthening international security;
" International economic, environmental, humanitarian cooperation and human rights;
" Information support for Russia's foreign policy activities.
However, because of the "tandemocracy" established in Russia after the presidential elections in 2008 and/or of the obvious influence still exercised by V. Putin (a strong representative of the security structure that is part of the political elite ruling Russia) on the act of governance, the implementation of directions set out in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept has acquired several deliberate or accidental deficiencies. These deficiencies were especially obvious in the military conflict in Georgia. As a result, Russia's military intervention on the Georgian territory has deteriorated its image at international level. Russia was labeled a "non-credible" and difficult partner for its failure to observe the Cease-Fire Agreement, also called the "Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan". For, the prestige of Russia at regional and world level has been shattered, even if its importance has increased significantly in the eyes of the European and former Soviet countries as far as power is concerned.
Moreover, the Caucasian crisis will inevitably generate difficulties in terms of the possibility to create an advantageous external context for the modernization of Russia, not to mention its active involvement in the globalization processes. Thus, after the "military actions to force Georgia to peace" by disproportionate use of force (aspects emphasized in the EU Declarations of August 13 and September 1 this year, as well as in the declaration of NATO states made on August 19), the hostile external environment will indirectly oppose granting benefits to Russia. This can bring difficulties in the negotiations on joining the World Trade Organization, in the whole functioning of "G8" and return to the old structure, as well as in the possibility of Russia being invited to join the prestigious Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
As for the emergence of a just and responsible world order, Moscow has managed to stand out the most. The community of developed states has qualified the period after the events in Georgia as a new era in international relations. There have been attempts to question the provisions of the international law and the activity of international organizations focusing on force-based policy and evident violation of fundamental principles of international security and stability (territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, non-interference in the internal affairs of a subject of international law, sovereignty, etc.), and the UN has been excluded from the agenda more and more frequently. Even if we hypothetically accept the idea that the settlement of the Kosovo case is a violation of the international law, the solution applied by the EU and the USA (within 2007-2008) contains minimum deviations from the customs and norms at the basis of the current international relations system. For, the problem was solved peacefully, the new political entity was acknowledged at European (although without the EU endorsement) and international level with no military intervention, etc.
In addition to the above-mentioned, we can say that Russia will have to deal with challenges related to its credibility in the eyes of the neighbors. After the military attack on Georgia, including by engaging the Russian Black Sea Fleet dislocated in the Crimea, Ukraine has already started certain processes aimed at reconsidering its bilateral relations with Russia (Yushchenko has signed a decree to adopt a new verification procedure for entries-exits of the Russian Fleet, aircrafts and military in Sevastopol), thus trying to prevent catastrophic scenarios of "dismemberment" of the Ukrainian territory (the idea suggested by Putin at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, as well as by other Russian authorities on different occasions). The Ukrainian government has also intensified its external activity to get as close as possible to the collective security space provided by NATO. The same prospects are valid for Azerbaijan bordering Russia in the North and having a frozen conflict on its territory (Nagorno-Karabakh), in which Armenia is involved (a strategic partner of Moscow in the Caucasia and the host country of a significant part of Russian weapons evacuated from Georgia as part of the commitments undertaken in Istanbul in 1999). After its adventure in the Caucasia, Moscow has discredited itself as an exponent able to settle conflict situations, which could make it more difficult for it to take part in the settlement of the Transnistrian, Nagorno-Karabakh and other separatist conflicts. Despite the fact that at the recent Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Russian actions were left without criticism, the member states stressed the need to solve territorial conflicts peacefully once again (romanialibera.com, 1.09.08). This shows that the principle is followed not only by western countries, but also by the SCO member states (many of them are also part of the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization).
In the light of August events (the military conflict in Georgia), there can be serious deficiencies in fulfilling the objective, according to which Russia is to solve urgent problems for its foreign policy in partnership with other states of the world. The increasing reticence before the EU and NATO can influence the existing mechanisms for managing priority regional issues, especially for Moscow (such as stabilization of Afghanistan, combating of terrorism in the proximity of Russian borders, stopping drug trafficking, etc.). Under these circumstances, Russian authorities count on the involvement of Asian organizations Russia is a party to (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization). However, if there are real premises for equal cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic organizations, then in the case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Moscow will have to continue coordinating its actions with the "egocentric" China and other regional actors that are problematic for the international community and dangerous for Russia. Thus should Beijing decide to protect the interests of the Chinese abroad (according to the Russian model), the Russian territorial integrity could become the first target of Chinese actions.
Certain success of the new Russian foreign policy can be noticed with regard to Russia's capacity "to protect" the interests of Russian citizens and compatriots living outside the Russian state. The Russian military aggression against Georgia in order to protect Russian citizens living in South Ossetia is a convincing proof that Moscow will not hesitate to use armed methods to protect people who have Russian citizenship and live especially in the CIS countries. Besides, the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs will soon start working at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (kommersant.ru, July 31, 2008). If the military campaign against Georgia has been a demonstration of the Russian power, then the new federal institution will become a non-military tool for protection and promotion of the interests of Russian citizens in close proximity to Russia, as well as of Russian-speaking population from CIS countries (in most cases associated with the notion of "compatriot"). This agency will be directly funded from the state budget of the Russian Federation and will support Russian-speaking civil society from the CIS countries according to the USAID model. The difference between the mission of the American Department of State and the Russian agency is that the former supports projects irrespective of the language and ethnic origin of the applicant, while the latter will provide financial assistance to Russian and/or Russia-friendly NGOs. While the USAID contributes especially to the implementation of socially-oriented projects, the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs will have the role of a key donor for activities in educational, cultural and humanitarian fields targeting Russian speakers. Moscow also intends to intensify its influence in the CIS countries through this agency by ensuring itself strong support at the level of the civil society and community, generally throughout the Community of Independent States. This in combination with the information share of Russian media sources in the media field of the majority of CIS countries (the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Belarus, Central Asia countries, and Ukraine to a smaller extent), as well as taking into account the intention to lay the basis of a single information system for the CIS (by funding the "MIR" TV Company, advancing the broadcast technologies of this TV station in the CIS countries, etc., aif.ru, February 22, 2008) will assure Russia with solid positions in forming the public opinion loyal to the Russian influence in the region and an external policy agenda of post-Soviet states compatible with Russian priorities.
In the context of tenser relations with western states because of the Caucasian crisis, the Russian president D. Medvedev presented the principles underlying the further development of Russia's foreign policy (kommersant.ru, September 1, 2008). Besides the intention to guarantee the viability and inviolability of the international law, on which communication between the civilized countries is based, another objective is to create a multi-pole world, including by preventing attempts to maintain the one-pole order and/or to dominate the system of international relations. The Russian leader also brought up the need to protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens irrespective of their place of residence. For, Russia will continue taking part in the internal affairs of other states by using both the "hard power" and "soft power" should it decide that the rights of its citizens are endangered. In this sense, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, etc. could become possible victims of the Russian policy launched by Putin and zealously continued by Medvedev. Apart from Russian citizens, Russian business was also mentioned. The latter received political guarantees of Russia's commitments to protect the activity of Russian businesses abroad. Under this pretext, Moscow will try to use its diplomatic, political and other capacities to take active part in the achievement of economic interests of the Russian government (of the government components represented by Medvedev or the team of "liberals" within the state structures, by business groups that are docile to the government and by Putin's "followers" infiltrated into Russian state companies).
Another principle consists in avoiding confrontation and isolationism by Russia, which, in reality, is ignored by Russian authorities. Confrontation comes first in the messages of Russian officials in relation to the USA and the European states that are reticent and/or have a hostile reaction to the actions of Russia in the energy, political, economic fields, as well as in the field of regional and international security and stability. In fact, it is by confrontation that Russia risks isolating itself from the western world, having to seek consolidation of its positions through relations with Asian countries (where it will have to resist the Chinese influence later) and with the countries that are problematic for the international community (Iran, Syria, etc.). This means that the less confrontation in Russian foreign policy, the less probability of Russia's separation in the relations with the states that are current and/or potential poles of the global order.
Finally, Medvedev reminded of the need for the international community to acknowledge the "zones of privileged interest" for Russia. According to the new Russia's Foreign Policy Concept, its top regional priority is the CIS. This means that the Kremlin will oppose the "inadequate" activity of NATO and, possibly, of the EU in what the vital influence zone for Russian geopolitical interests is concerned. As a result, the efforts of Russia will be oriented against the Euro-Atlantic extension to the East (Ukraine, Caucasia), and at paralyzing European projects intended for the Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Zone (the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy). The right of Moscow over the Caucasia was acknowledged indirectly and subtly by the Shanghai Organization member states that appreciated the active role of Russia in the stabilization of situation in that region (gazeta.ru, 28.08.08). Despite that, the West refuses to accept these claims for geopolitical and energy reasons. In this sense, Brussels plans to accelerate the integration of the region and of the East European states (Ukraine, RM, etc.) in the European space without giving them clear European prospects (through the Eastern Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy and other dimensions of the European Neighborhood Policy). NATO will become more dynamic for the same reasons and will try to facilitate the conditions for meeting the criteria required to obtain the MAP (Membership Action Plan) by Ukraine and Georgia to the most.
Despite the current actions and future strategies launched by the NATO and the EU, Russia will always try to consolidate its geopolitical superiority over the post-Soviet space, focusing on the idea to create a geopolitical pole of Russia-Eurasia, also planning to reanimate the CIS and eventually to incorporate it in the Eurasian Economic Community with the possibility to create a political-economic entity similar to the European Union, already called the East European Union by certain Russian ideologists.
by Denis Cenusa (September 15th, 2008)
"Lead by D. Medvedev, Russia continues following the foreign policy set out yet by V. Putin back in 2000. The main elements of Russia's external behavior have been focused on recovering its status of a big regional and international power, resuming its relations with the West, reasserting itself on the post-Soviet area, reestablishing and/or updating the security system, adequately responding to challenges, threats and risks of the 21st century. The high prices for hydrocarbons, the weakened role of the USA in solving international problems (due to the compromised image in Iraq and modest success in Afghanistan), the emergence of China and other international actors (the EU, India, etc.), the increasing interdependence between international exponents in managing international cases (the issues of Iran, North-Korea, Middle East, international terrorism, etc.) have consequently contributed to the consolidation of Russia's positions at international level. This context has largely determined the contents of the current Foreign Policy Concept adopted by the Russian president, D. Medvedev, on July 15 this year."
The central idea of the document is that Moscow has self-determined as an international law subject imperative for the system of international relations. Thus, the Concept stipulates that Russia has not only become able to fulfill certain tasks on the international political agenda, but also to take part in drawing up the latter (the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 15, 2008, www.mid.ru). At the same time, the "new" Concept sets the following objectives:
1. To ensure national security, to preserve and strengthen Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to consolidate its authority in the international community to meet the interests of the Russian Federation as one of influential poles in international relations to the best.
2. To create favorable external conditions for the modernization of Russia through internal development and welfare in order to ensure its competitiveness in a globalizing world.
3. To influence global processes to ensure formation of a just and democratic world order based on supremacy of the international law (the UN Charter and other international treaties), collectiveness in finding solutions to international problems under the conditions of parity and partnership with a central and coordinating role of the UN.
4. To promote good neighborly relations with the bordering states, to contribute to elimination of tension and conflicts along the Russian border and in other regions of the world.
5. To look for compromises and coinciding interests with other states and international associations in the process of finding ways to fulfill the objectives qualified as national priorities for Russia, to establish bilateral or multilateral partnerships aimed to ensure stability of the international position of the country in the face of international foreign policy volatility.
6. To protect the rights of Russian citizens and compatriots (people born on the Soviet area) abroad.
7. To transform Russia in a democratic state with a socially-oriented market economy and an independent foreign policy.
8. To support and promote the Russian culture and language abroad.
In addition to these complicated objectives that are sometimes incompatible or even contradict international political realities, the foreign activity of Russia is based on several essential PRIORITIES:
" The emergence of a new world order;
" The primacy of law in international relations;
" Strengthening international security;
" International economic, environmental, humanitarian cooperation and human rights;
" Information support for Russia's foreign policy activities.
However, because of the "tandemocracy" established in Russia after the presidential elections in 2008 and/or of the obvious influence still exercised by V. Putin (a strong representative of the security structure that is part of the political elite ruling Russia) on the act of governance, the implementation of directions set out in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept has acquired several deliberate or accidental deficiencies. These deficiencies were especially obvious in the military conflict in Georgia. As a result, Russia's military intervention on the Georgian territory has deteriorated its image at international level. Russia was labeled a "non-credible" and difficult partner for its failure to observe the Cease-Fire Agreement, also called the "Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan". For, the prestige of Russia at regional and world level has been shattered, even if its importance has increased significantly in the eyes of the European and former Soviet countries as far as power is concerned.
Moreover, the Caucasian crisis will inevitably generate difficulties in terms of the possibility to create an advantageous external context for the modernization of Russia, not to mention its active involvement in the globalization processes. Thus, after the "military actions to force Georgia to peace" by disproportionate use of force (aspects emphasized in the EU Declarations of August 13 and September 1 this year, as well as in the declaration of NATO states made on August 19), the hostile external environment will indirectly oppose granting benefits to Russia. This can bring difficulties in the negotiations on joining the World Trade Organization, in the whole functioning of "G8" and return to the old structure, as well as in the possibility of Russia being invited to join the prestigious Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
As for the emergence of a just and responsible world order, Moscow has managed to stand out the most. The community of developed states has qualified the period after the events in Georgia as a new era in international relations. There have been attempts to question the provisions of the international law and the activity of international organizations focusing on force-based policy and evident violation of fundamental principles of international security and stability (territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, non-interference in the internal affairs of a subject of international law, sovereignty, etc.), and the UN has been excluded from the agenda more and more frequently. Even if we hypothetically accept the idea that the settlement of the Kosovo case is a violation of the international law, the solution applied by the EU and the USA (within 2007-2008) contains minimum deviations from the customs and norms at the basis of the current international relations system. For, the problem was solved peacefully, the new political entity was acknowledged at European (although without the EU endorsement) and international level with no military intervention, etc.
In addition to the above-mentioned, we can say that Russia will have to deal with challenges related to its credibility in the eyes of the neighbors. After the military attack on Georgia, including by engaging the Russian Black Sea Fleet dislocated in the Crimea, Ukraine has already started certain processes aimed at reconsidering its bilateral relations with Russia (Yushchenko has signed a decree to adopt a new verification procedure for entries-exits of the Russian Fleet, aircrafts and military in Sevastopol), thus trying to prevent catastrophic scenarios of "dismemberment" of the Ukrainian territory (the idea suggested by Putin at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, as well as by other Russian authorities on different occasions). The Ukrainian government has also intensified its external activity to get as close as possible to the collective security space provided by NATO. The same prospects are valid for Azerbaijan bordering Russia in the North and having a frozen conflict on its territory (Nagorno-Karabakh), in which Armenia is involved (a strategic partner of Moscow in the Caucasia and the host country of a significant part of Russian weapons evacuated from Georgia as part of the commitments undertaken in Istanbul in 1999). After its adventure in the Caucasia, Moscow has discredited itself as an exponent able to settle conflict situations, which could make it more difficult for it to take part in the settlement of the Transnistrian, Nagorno-Karabakh and other separatist conflicts. Despite the fact that at the recent Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Russian actions were left without criticism, the member states stressed the need to solve territorial conflicts peacefully once again (romanialibera.com, 1.09.08). This shows that the principle is followed not only by western countries, but also by the SCO member states (many of them are also part of the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization).
In the light of August events (the military conflict in Georgia), there can be serious deficiencies in fulfilling the objective, according to which Russia is to solve urgent problems for its foreign policy in partnership with other states of the world. The increasing reticence before the EU and NATO can influence the existing mechanisms for managing priority regional issues, especially for Moscow (such as stabilization of Afghanistan, combating of terrorism in the proximity of Russian borders, stopping drug trafficking, etc.). Under these circumstances, Russian authorities count on the involvement of Asian organizations Russia is a party to (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization). However, if there are real premises for equal cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic organizations, then in the case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Moscow will have to continue coordinating its actions with the "egocentric" China and other regional actors that are problematic for the international community and dangerous for Russia. Thus should Beijing decide to protect the interests of the Chinese abroad (according to the Russian model), the Russian territorial integrity could become the first target of Chinese actions.
Certain success of the new Russian foreign policy can be noticed with regard to Russia's capacity "to protect" the interests of Russian citizens and compatriots living outside the Russian state. The Russian military aggression against Georgia in order to protect Russian citizens living in South Ossetia is a convincing proof that Moscow will not hesitate to use armed methods to protect people who have Russian citizenship and live especially in the CIS countries. Besides, the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs will soon start working at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (kommersant.ru, July 31, 2008). If the military campaign against Georgia has been a demonstration of the Russian power, then the new federal institution will become a non-military tool for protection and promotion of the interests of Russian citizens in close proximity to Russia, as well as of Russian-speaking population from CIS countries (in most cases associated with the notion of "compatriot"). This agency will be directly funded from the state budget of the Russian Federation and will support Russian-speaking civil society from the CIS countries according to the USAID model. The difference between the mission of the American Department of State and the Russian agency is that the former supports projects irrespective of the language and ethnic origin of the applicant, while the latter will provide financial assistance to Russian and/or Russia-friendly NGOs. While the USAID contributes especially to the implementation of socially-oriented projects, the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs will have the role of a key donor for activities in educational, cultural and humanitarian fields targeting Russian speakers. Moscow also intends to intensify its influence in the CIS countries through this agency by ensuring itself strong support at the level of the civil society and community, generally throughout the Community of Independent States. This in combination with the information share of Russian media sources in the media field of the majority of CIS countries (the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Belarus, Central Asia countries, and Ukraine to a smaller extent), as well as taking into account the intention to lay the basis of a single information system for the CIS (by funding the "MIR" TV Company, advancing the broadcast technologies of this TV station in the CIS countries, etc., aif.ru, February 22, 2008) will assure Russia with solid positions in forming the public opinion loyal to the Russian influence in the region and an external policy agenda of post-Soviet states compatible with Russian priorities.
In the context of tenser relations with western states because of the Caucasian crisis, the Russian president D. Medvedev presented the principles underlying the further development of Russia's foreign policy (kommersant.ru, September 1, 2008). Besides the intention to guarantee the viability and inviolability of the international law, on which communication between the civilized countries is based, another objective is to create a multi-pole world, including by preventing attempts to maintain the one-pole order and/or to dominate the system of international relations. The Russian leader also brought up the need to protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens irrespective of their place of residence. For, Russia will continue taking part in the internal affairs of other states by using both the "hard power" and "soft power" should it decide that the rights of its citizens are endangered. In this sense, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, etc. could become possible victims of the Russian policy launched by Putin and zealously continued by Medvedev. Apart from Russian citizens, Russian business was also mentioned. The latter received political guarantees of Russia's commitments to protect the activity of Russian businesses abroad. Under this pretext, Moscow will try to use its diplomatic, political and other capacities to take active part in the achievement of economic interests of the Russian government (of the government components represented by Medvedev or the team of "liberals" within the state structures, by business groups that are docile to the government and by Putin's "followers" infiltrated into Russian state companies).
Another principle consists in avoiding confrontation and isolationism by Russia, which, in reality, is ignored by Russian authorities. Confrontation comes first in the messages of Russian officials in relation to the USA and the European states that are reticent and/or have a hostile reaction to the actions of Russia in the energy, political, economic fields, as well as in the field of regional and international security and stability. In fact, it is by confrontation that Russia risks isolating itself from the western world, having to seek consolidation of its positions through relations with Asian countries (where it will have to resist the Chinese influence later) and with the countries that are problematic for the international community (Iran, Syria, etc.). This means that the less confrontation in Russian foreign policy, the less probability of Russia's separation in the relations with the states that are current and/or potential poles of the global order.
Finally, Medvedev reminded of the need for the international community to acknowledge the "zones of privileged interest" for Russia. According to the new Russia's Foreign Policy Concept, its top regional priority is the CIS. This means that the Kremlin will oppose the "inadequate" activity of NATO and, possibly, of the EU in what the vital influence zone for Russian geopolitical interests is concerned. As a result, the efforts of Russia will be oriented against the Euro-Atlantic extension to the East (Ukraine, Caucasia), and at paralyzing European projects intended for the Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Zone (the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy). The right of Moscow over the Caucasia was acknowledged indirectly and subtly by the Shanghai Organization member states that appreciated the active role of Russia in the stabilization of situation in that region (gazeta.ru, 28.08.08). Despite that, the West refuses to accept these claims for geopolitical and energy reasons. In this sense, Brussels plans to accelerate the integration of the region and of the East European states (Ukraine, RM, etc.) in the European space without giving them clear European prospects (through the Eastern Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy and other dimensions of the European Neighborhood Policy). NATO will become more dynamic for the same reasons and will try to facilitate the conditions for meeting the criteria required to obtain the MAP (Membership Action Plan) by Ukraine and Georgia to the most.
Despite the current actions and future strategies launched by the NATO and the EU, Russia will always try to consolidate its geopolitical superiority over the post-Soviet space, focusing on the idea to create a geopolitical pole of Russia-Eurasia, also planning to reanimate the CIS and eventually to incorporate it in the Eurasian Economic Community with the possibility to create a political-economic entity similar to the European Union, already called the East European Union by certain Russian ideologists.