Prospectus, Brusilov, and Papua New Guinea?
This morning I had planned on augmenting some class notes and perhaps browsing UNT’s catalog for more sources for my term paper, but alas the ‘inter’ part of the Internet seemed to be down, which means everyone is stuck with another random entry from John.
I presented my prospectus yesterday, and it actually went quite well. Anxiety and quasi-paranoia do pay off at times. To reiterate a bit, a prospectus is basically a proposal for a given paper or research project. I eventually settled on the Brusilov Offensive of 1916 as my subject.
Prior to Tsar Nicholas II’s abdication, the Russians enjoyed one last military victory, virtually decimating the Austro-Hungarian forces during the summer months. Their approach was based on the principle of attacking simultaneously along an extended front rather than focusing all available resources on a single point of attack. The focus of my research is whether or not Brusilov received too much credit, since he was both a competent military commander for imperial Russia, as well as a reliable ally when the Bolsheviks took power in November, 1917.
During the fall, the Russians suffered heavy losses. One source I came across pointed out that Brusilov’s approach had a tactical advantage, but strategically it was erroneous. In other words, it was effective in the short-term; but with no real concentration of infantry at a single point, the line was easily penetrated by the enemy’s reinforcements. The question I seek to answer is how much of this was due to a failure on Brusilov’s part and how much could be attributed to factors he had no control over, such as officer incompetence, the ill training of the incoming Russian conscripts, and the inadequacy of the Romanian military, who had entered the war as a result of the offensive’s initial success.
I must pass on a great word of thanks to everyone who participated in the show this past Tuesday. I often broadcast to relieve stress, and this week was particularly stressful. I know that I’ll be busy quite a bit this fall, but it’s always that first real proverbial kick in the clavicle that’s the most difficult. People have thanked me before for providing them with a distraction from some of the not-so-pleasant things going on in their lives, but believe me you all do the same for me, and I will always be indebted to a great many of you.
Since this entry has been a bit too straight forward and not as random as some of mine have been in the past, I think each and every one of us should celebrate the nation of Papua New Guinea, which received its independence on this day thirty-five years ago.
I presented my prospectus yesterday, and it actually went quite well. Anxiety and quasi-paranoia do pay off at times. To reiterate a bit, a prospectus is basically a proposal for a given paper or research project. I eventually settled on the Brusilov Offensive of 1916 as my subject.
Prior to Tsar Nicholas II’s abdication, the Russians enjoyed one last military victory, virtually decimating the Austro-Hungarian forces during the summer months. Their approach was based on the principle of attacking simultaneously along an extended front rather than focusing all available resources on a single point of attack. The focus of my research is whether or not Brusilov received too much credit, since he was both a competent military commander for imperial Russia, as well as a reliable ally when the Bolsheviks took power in November, 1917.
During the fall, the Russians suffered heavy losses. One source I came across pointed out that Brusilov’s approach had a tactical advantage, but strategically it was erroneous. In other words, it was effective in the short-term; but with no real concentration of infantry at a single point, the line was easily penetrated by the enemy’s reinforcements. The question I seek to answer is how much of this was due to a failure on Brusilov’s part and how much could be attributed to factors he had no control over, such as officer incompetence, the ill training of the incoming Russian conscripts, and the inadequacy of the Romanian military, who had entered the war as a result of the offensive’s initial success.
I must pass on a great word of thanks to everyone who participated in the show this past Tuesday. I often broadcast to relieve stress, and this week was particularly stressful. I know that I’ll be busy quite a bit this fall, but it’s always that first real proverbial kick in the clavicle that’s the most difficult. People have thanked me before for providing them with a distraction from some of the not-so-pleasant things going on in their lives, but believe me you all do the same for me, and I will always be indebted to a great many of you.
Since this entry has been a bit too straight forward and not as random as some of mine have been in the past, I think each and every one of us should celebrate the nation of Papua New Guinea, which received its independence on this day thirty-five years ago.