Kant's Pre-Critical Proof of God's Existence
Introduction
Like Newton and Gassendi before him, Kant rejects Descartes’s ontological proof of God’s existence, but contra Newton, he doesn't believe we can have an a posteriori proof of God’s existence. 1
You'll recall that Newton believed he could prove the existence of God by pointing out that his laws of motion, on their own, were incapable of explaining the regular motions of the planets around the Sun. The act of creation on its own did not establish the conditions necessary for a stable solar system, so God had to step in occasionally to correct the aberrant behavior of the planets.
Kant rejected this proof of God's existence, because through it infinite space becomes a necesary condition for the exercise of divine dominion. A God that requires physical conditions to exercise his will cannot serve as an absolute ground. But just such a ground is what we need to respond to AT.
God must be the ultimate, absolute ground in order to respond to AT, but Newton's a posteriori proof makes God either identical with nature (with absolute space) or subordinate to it. For this reason, Kant comes up with his own, original, a priori demonstration of the existence of God.
Kant’s Proof of God’s Existence
The strength of the proof is that it bypasses the typical problems surrounding Anselm's and Descartes's ontological proofs of God's existence while at the same time avoiding the physicalization of God that comes with Newton's a posteriori proof.
The problems clearly come up in step five. Why is it the case that possible predicates must have some basis in actuality? Initially Kant claims that possibility precedes existence, but in step five he claims that existence precedes possibility. Nothing would be possible were this actuality not present. The predicates are only possible insofar as they belong to the ontological furniture of the world. The argument hinges upon this move, but what's the justification for it?
If one were to examine "possibility," two features of it would be evident: possibility is instantiated in possible concepts, and possible concepts are determined by predicates that characterize them. But it's not evident that such predicates have to exist prior to the possible concept itself. A conceptual analysis of "possibility" reveals the possibility of a conceptual whole (the omnitudo realitatis) and the possibility of its conceptual elements, but it does not reveal the possibility of a conceptual whole and an independent and prior existence of its conceptual elements. But it's precisely this independent and prior existence of the conceptual elements that Kant needs to complete the proof. Since Kant can't get this independent whole by means of an analysis of "possibility" itself, and since this is supposed to be a conceptual proof, the proof fails.
Notes
1 The formulation of the proof comes from Paul Franks, All of Nothing, 32. The commentary comes from Schonfeld, The Philosophy of the Young Kant, 205
I've used a lot of terms and abbreviations in the previous posts on the Agrippan Trilemma, and I may use them again in a few more posts. For your convenience, I'm appending a glossary of terms and abbreviations to this post, back to which I'll link in subsequent posts should I write them.
Glossary of Abbreviations & Terms
Absolute Necessity (AN)
Necessity pertaining to eternal truths which subsist in the divine intellect, independent of the divine will. The relation between the nature of a substance and all the Monadic Properties instantiated by the substance is a matter of absolute necessity.
Agrippan Trilemma (AT)
For any answer given to a “why” question, the Agrippan skeptic will claim it is either (1) a brute assertion, (2) a justification that raises a further why question, or (3) a justification that presupposes what it is supposed to establish. These three outcomes comprise the Agrippan Trilemma. More info.
Derivability Monism (DM)
The idea that the explanatory conditions to which modern physics appeals (the primary properties of matter) must be, in principle, derivable from a set of metaphysical conditions (i.e., intrinsic properties of substances whose coexistence constitutes the best of all possible worlds). These metaphysical conditions are grounded in the absolute first principle, God, who is infinite in His knowledge, wisdom, and power.
Dualistic Demand (DD)
The demand that metaphysical grounding and physical grounding be kept separate.
Hypothetical Necessity (HN)
Necessity depending on the divine will which, although all-powerful, depends upon the divine and all-beneficent wisdom.
Monistic Demand (MD)
The demand that every genuine grounding participate in a single systematic unity of grounds, terminating in a single absolute ground. This is an expression of the second response to AT.
Monistic Property (MP)
Property requiring the existence of only one subject, e.g., wisdom, redness, hardness, etc.
Pre-Established Harmony (PEH)
God chooses to actualize, in His creative act, exactly the set of possible substances whose representations harmonize maximally with one another.
Progressive Grasp of Derivability Monism
Starts from the metaphysical foundations and tends forward toward the physical phenomena. We grasp the a priori existence of God and certain principles of His activity as well as the existence of substances and certain principles of their activity.
Regressive Grasp of Derivability Monism
We start from phenomena and work backward toward their metaphysical foundations.
Relational Properties (RP’s)
Properties whose instantiation requires the existence of more than one subject, e.g., the distance between two points or the gravitational forces between two bodies.
Like Newton and Gassendi before him, Kant rejects Descartes’s ontological proof of God’s existence, but contra Newton, he doesn't believe we can have an a posteriori proof of God’s existence. 1
You'll recall that Newton believed he could prove the existence of God by pointing out that his laws of motion, on their own, were incapable of explaining the regular motions of the planets around the Sun. The act of creation on its own did not establish the conditions necessary for a stable solar system, so God had to step in occasionally to correct the aberrant behavior of the planets.
Kant rejected this proof of God's existence, because through it infinite space becomes a necesary condition for the exercise of divine dominion. A God that requires physical conditions to exercise his will cannot serve as an absolute ground. But just such a ground is what we need to respond to AT.
God must be the ultimate, absolute ground in order to respond to AT, but Newton's a posteriori proof makes God either identical with nature (with absolute space) or subordinate to it. For this reason, Kant comes up with his own, original, a priori demonstration of the existence of God.
Kant’s Proof of God’s Existence
- Concepts of things are composed of real determinations (i.e., predicates signifying properties capable of composing essences).
- If concepts are possible, then real determinations must be available.
- There must therefore be a stock of available real determinations, the sum total of whose possible combinations would be the sum total of all possible concepts of things.
- This stock must be available prior to any actual existing thing, for it consists in the possibility of anything, and things are possible before becoming actual (assuming they do become actual).
- But this omnitudo realitatis (sum total of reality) is itself merely a stock of possible thoughts of possible properties and therefore cannot subsist without some actual basis.
- This basis must be God, considered as the ens realissimum (most real being), the unique being from whose real determinations all other real determinations must be derived.
The strength of the proof is that it bypasses the typical problems surrounding Anselm's and Descartes's ontological proofs of God's existence while at the same time avoiding the physicalization of God that comes with Newton's a posteriori proof.
The problems clearly come up in step five. Why is it the case that possible predicates must have some basis in actuality? Initially Kant claims that possibility precedes existence, but in step five he claims that existence precedes possibility. Nothing would be possible were this actuality not present. The predicates are only possible insofar as they belong to the ontological furniture of the world. The argument hinges upon this move, but what's the justification for it?
If one were to examine "possibility," two features of it would be evident: possibility is instantiated in possible concepts, and possible concepts are determined by predicates that characterize them. But it's not evident that such predicates have to exist prior to the possible concept itself. A conceptual analysis of "possibility" reveals the possibility of a conceptual whole (the omnitudo realitatis) and the possibility of its conceptual elements, but it does not reveal the possibility of a conceptual whole and an independent and prior existence of its conceptual elements. But it's precisely this independent and prior existence of the conceptual elements that Kant needs to complete the proof. Since Kant can't get this independent whole by means of an analysis of "possibility" itself, and since this is supposed to be a conceptual proof, the proof fails.
Notes
1 The formulation of the proof comes from Paul Franks, All of Nothing, 32. The commentary comes from Schonfeld, The Philosophy of the Young Kant, 205
I've used a lot of terms and abbreviations in the previous posts on the Agrippan Trilemma, and I may use them again in a few more posts. For your convenience, I'm appending a glossary of terms and abbreviations to this post, back to which I'll link in subsequent posts should I write them.
Glossary of Abbreviations & Terms
Absolute Necessity (AN)
Necessity pertaining to eternal truths which subsist in the divine intellect, independent of the divine will. The relation between the nature of a substance and all the Monadic Properties instantiated by the substance is a matter of absolute necessity.
Agrippan Trilemma (AT)
For any answer given to a “why” question, the Agrippan skeptic will claim it is either (1) a brute assertion, (2) a justification that raises a further why question, or (3) a justification that presupposes what it is supposed to establish. These three outcomes comprise the Agrippan Trilemma. More info.
Derivability Monism (DM)
The idea that the explanatory conditions to which modern physics appeals (the primary properties of matter) must be, in principle, derivable from a set of metaphysical conditions (i.e., intrinsic properties of substances whose coexistence constitutes the best of all possible worlds). These metaphysical conditions are grounded in the absolute first principle, God, who is infinite in His knowledge, wisdom, and power.
Dualistic Demand (DD)
The demand that metaphysical grounding and physical grounding be kept separate.
Hypothetical Necessity (HN)
Necessity depending on the divine will which, although all-powerful, depends upon the divine and all-beneficent wisdom.
Monistic Demand (MD)
The demand that every genuine grounding participate in a single systematic unity of grounds, terminating in a single absolute ground. This is an expression of the second response to AT.
Monistic Property (MP)
Property requiring the existence of only one subject, e.g., wisdom, redness, hardness, etc.
Pre-Established Harmony (PEH)
God chooses to actualize, in His creative act, exactly the set of possible substances whose representations harmonize maximally with one another.
Progressive Grasp of Derivability Monism
Starts from the metaphysical foundations and tends forward toward the physical phenomena. We grasp the a priori existence of God and certain principles of His activity as well as the existence of substances and certain principles of their activity.
Regressive Grasp of Derivability Monism
We start from phenomena and work backward toward their metaphysical foundations.
Relational Properties (RP’s)
Properties whose instantiation requires the existence of more than one subject, e.g., the distance between two points or the gravitational forces between two bodies.