Чего хочет Россия

[tijd]

Trump talks to Tucker Carlson about his desire to withdraw US troops and "get out of a lot of areas," complains:
"We're the policeman for the whole world. You know, if you look at Russia, Russia doesn't police the world. Russia has - you know, they police Russia."
h/t @MatBabiak pic.twitter.com/quSVnvlU0e
- Julia Davis (@JuliaDavisNews) July 2, 2019

Группа экспертов подготовила по заказу Пентагона (Объединённого комитета начальников штабов) "белую книгу" на тему "Russian Strategic Intentions".
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/30/pentagon-russia-influence-putin-trump-1535243

Основной вывод: оставаясь в рамках " второй этической системы" и играя в игру с нулевой суммой, Путин стремится не просто утвердить себя в качестве мирового "игрока", но и нанести максимальный урон США.

There is broad consensus among the contributors that Russian President Vladimir Putin is indeed adhering to a global grand strategy, which aims to achieve the following goals:
• Reclaim and secure Russia’s influence over former Soviet nations
• Regain worldwide recognition as a “great power”
• Portray itself as a reliable actor, a key regional powerbroker, and a successful mediator in order to gain economic, military, and political influence over nations worldwide and to refine the liberalist rules and norms that currently govern the world order.
According to Dr. Robert Person, these goals are motivated by Russia’s deep-seated geopolitical insecurity. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to find its place in the global community, which has left the leadership with a lingering desire to regain the influence and power that it once had. In particular, Russia seeks to regain its influence over former Soviet states, which it claims are in its rightful “sphere of influence”. As a result, one of the United States’ core goals, namely promoting and protecting the international liberal order, comes into contention with the goals of Russia’s grand strategy. This underpins the Kremlin’s belief that it must contain and constrain US influence and activities in Europe and elsewhere across the globe. As Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya’s contribution suggests, the Russian leadership’s worldview is zero-sum; it believes that in order for Russia to win, the US must lose.



Анна Борщевская своими словами: "Putin’s worldview is zero-sum, so it’s hard to imagine a win-win scenario. For Putin to win-to look “great,” the US has to lose. Due to our fundamentally opposing values and worldviews, we are likely to have a hard time coming up with genuinely shared goals that both sides can truly work on together."

Другой эксперт, Джереми Ламоро (Lamoreaux), призывает противостоять путинской кампании влияния в Европе путем поддержки политического либерализма: "Economic and political liberalism both create strong states capable of providing the institutions necessary for societal liberalism. Societal liberalism, when it is upheld by the rule of law, helps create a more diverse, yet united, populace more committed to the state, to its basic institutions, and less likely to be influenced by outside sources (in this case, Russia)."

Роберт Персон пишет о том, что центральной темой путинской глобальной стратегии является ватная мечта о разделе сфер влияния (Ялте-2.0): "This paper argues that a deep-seated sense of geopolitical insecurity motivates Russia to pursue strategic objectives to establish an uncontested sphere of influence within the post-Soviet region, secure for Russia a seat at the table of other great powers in critical regions outside its sphere, and contain and constrain America’s unilateral and multilateral pursuit of its own interests globally. Since 2007, it has developed a sophisticated set of gray zone tactics of “asymmetric balancing” through which Russia pursues its strategic ends within relatively limited means."



Представление про "deep-seated sense of geopolitical insecurity" в понимание российской психологии внес дипломат Джордж Кеннан, автор политики сдерживания. В знаменитой "длинной телеграмме" 1946 года он писал:

“At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it. <...>
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face.”
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm



Приехав послом в Москву в 1952, Кеннан предвкушал возможность сыграть важную роль, особенно в случае смерти Сталина и ослабления режима. Но столкнулся с тотальной изоляцией и впал в депрессию. Опасаясь возможности подвергнуться обработке со стороны советских спецслужб, он попросил в ЦРУ (недавно созданном не без его влияния) таблетки с ядом.

"There is something you must do for me," he said to Peer de Silva - "I have here a letter." And he then handed me a letter, and I noticed that it was addressed to Pope Pius."
"I have a very pessimistic view of our immediate future with the Soviets, particularly at the diplomatic level. I want you to get this letter to Allen Dulles, and make sure that it is passed by secure means to the Pope in Rome."
My questioning look brought the following explanation: "I fear that there is a good possibility that I will wind up some day before long on the Soviet radio. I may be forced to make statements that will be damaging to American policy. This letter will show the world that I am under duress, and I am not making statements out of my own free will."
"The letter to the Pope will let him make public my position and the true situation there."
"I was astounded at the grimness with which these words were delivered," de Silva writes, "but I was in no way prepared for the following."
Again Kennan speaking: "I understand that the CIA has some form of pill that a person could use to kill himself instantly. Is this right?" <...>
And so the upshot is that Kennan asked Peer de Silva, according to the latter's memoir, for these pills, and Peer de Silva says that through the diplomatic pouch two pills were sent to Ambassador Kennan.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mssmisc/mfdip/2005%20txt%20files/2004dav02.txt

СССР развалился, но политика сдерживания российских амбиций остается "greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face".

Kennan was a very smart man. https://t.co/8EQiKn3J4o
- Michael McFaul (@McFaul) June 27, 2018