I completely fail to see how, given the laws of nature governing sentient beings (physical, biological and psychological, primarily), why there can't be a way for sentient beings to interact that has the greatest benefit for all involved; I think simply asserting that the "isness" of natural law precludes being able to derive some "oughts" is begging the question, plain and simple. If there are any "ises" from which "oughts" can be validly derived, it's natural law, which are "ises" only in the sense that they're actual ways that "govern" the way things can interact; so, really, it's deriving oughts from possible consequences. There has to be a mathematical way to model spreading benefit among more people being better than extreme benefit to a few and little to no benefit to the rest or, even worse, harm to some for the benefit of the rest.
I'm having a little trouble parsing this. Correct me if the following is not a summary of your position:
1) There might be a code or mode of behavior that, if universally adopted, would result in the greatest benefit for all involved. 2) We can do this because benefit is a natural consequence of certain behaviors. I.e., it's all in the realm of 'is.' 3) We would expect be able to model the distribution of benefit and harm under particular codes or modes of behavior, especially one that distributes that benefit in an equitable, or otherwise appropriate, way.
I agree with all of these, pretty much. However, I've put in bold the points where I think this runs into the is/ought distinction. Specifically:
- What is benefit? - What is the appropriate way to distribute it?
Other questions I'd ask are:
- Once we've defined benefit--why should we feel like we ought to be accumulating it at all? - What's to say whether the thing that we ought to be doing ought to be dictated by some sort of consequence (that we would call 'benefit')
( ... )
I won't go so far as to say that there aren't terms specific to ethics that are only explicable through their interrelations with each other. Then again, I have absolutely no problem with holism and I don't see why anybody else would
( ... )
1. Benefit, biologically and psychologically speaking, is healthy growth. 2. It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms. 2b. (Substituting from 1 into 2) It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms. 3. The fact that somebody can fail to want to grow in a healthy manner is pretty irrelevant; I don't have to provide reasoning for why one ought not be pathological beyond pointing out the fact that being pathological leads to harm. 3b. (Substituting what I infer is your definition of harm) The fact that somebody can fail to want to grow in a healthy manner is pretty irrelevant; I don't have to provide reasoning for why one ought not be pathological beyond pointing out the fact that being pathological leads to unhealthinessI am very sympathetic to holism in justification--I think when I use 'coherentism,' I mean something similar to what you mean by 'holism.' However, that creates the problems I was making notes
( ... )
Re: Meet Toxieunnamed525February 23 2006, 17:32:37 UTC
Well, with (1), you're wrong. Biological and psychological benefit is healthy growth. What is the ultimate result of anything you would want to call "beneficial" in a psychological or biological context? There's nothing wrong with wanting to continue to grow in a healthy manner, which is precisely how you should interpret "accumulate benefit
( ... )
Re: Meet ToxiepaulhopeFebruary 23 2006, 17:57:04 UTC
Good lord.
Could you elaborate on what 'methodological pragmatism' is, and why your espousal of it should make me take you seriously when you claim that for some reason anybody that is using substantively different ethical terms than you are is 'wrong' and 'stubbornly refus[ing] to be convinced'?
The compassion systempaulhopeFebruary 23 2006, 19:48:38 UTC
Toxie is wrong. Compassion without desire to alleviate suffering is hollow since real compassion creates the desire to alleviate suffering.
Despite all sorts of personal reasons why I am a little repulsed at having to defend Toxie's position, intellectual honesty wins out. I can't let this slide....
This objection isn't really relevant to the compassion-based system that Toxie (I think--he'll have to forgive me if I misrepresent him, I guess) espouses. What makes you think that he thinks compassion does not include the desire to alleviate suffering?
All he needs is:
ARGUMENT 1
We should maximize the good in society.
Compassion is the only good.
Conclusion: We should maximize the compassion in society.
We can even replace "compassion" with "the desire to alleviate others' suffering":
ARGUMENT 2
We should maximize the good in society.
The desire to alleviate others' suffering is the only good.
Conclusion: We should maximize the desire to alleviate others' suffering in society.
Note that the conclusion of argument 2 does NOT
( ... )
Re: Meet ToxiepaulhopeFebruary 23 2006, 18:00:37 UTC
Just realized typos here. Might help to clarify.
2. It's just an axiom that benefit ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms. 2b. (Substituting from 1 into 2) It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms.
My concept of healthy growth does not have a normative aspect--it's not analytically true, to me, that I ought to accrue healthy growth (however much I may want to)
My concept of benefit does have a normative aspect--it seems analytically true, to me, that I ought to accrue benefit, whatever that is.
The constructive work you need to do is show that benefit--with its normative aspect--is identical with healthy growth. So far, I've only seen an assertion to that effect.
Reply
1) There might be a code or mode of behavior that, if universally adopted, would result in the greatest benefit for all involved.
2) We can do this because benefit is a natural consequence of certain behaviors. I.e., it's all in the realm of 'is.'
3) We would expect be able to model the distribution of benefit and harm under particular codes or modes of behavior, especially one that distributes that benefit in an equitable, or otherwise appropriate, way.
I agree with all of these, pretty much. However, I've put in bold the points where I think this runs into the is/ought distinction. Specifically:
- What is benefit?
- What is the appropriate way to distribute it?
Other questions I'd ask are:
- Once we've defined benefit--why should we feel like we ought to be accumulating it at all?
- What's to say whether the thing that we ought to be doing ought to be dictated by some sort of consequence (that we would call 'benefit') ( ... )
Reply
Reply
2. It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms.
2b. (Substituting from 1 into 2) It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms.
3. The fact that somebody can fail to want to grow in a healthy manner is pretty irrelevant; I don't have to provide reasoning for why one ought not be pathological beyond pointing out the fact that being pathological leads to harm.
3b. (Substituting what I infer is your definition of harm) The fact that somebody can fail to want to grow in a healthy manner is pretty irrelevant; I don't have to provide reasoning for why one ought not be pathological beyond pointing out the fact that being pathological leads to unhealthinessI am very sympathetic to holism in justification--I think when I use 'coherentism,' I mean something similar to what you mean by 'holism.' However, that creates the problems I was making notes ( ... )
Reply
Reply
Could you elaborate on what 'methodological pragmatism' is, and why your espousal of it should make me take you seriously when you claim that for some reason anybody that is using substantively different ethical terms than you are is 'wrong' and 'stubbornly refus[ing] to be convinced'?
Reply
Despite all sorts of personal reasons why I am a little repulsed at having to defend Toxie's position, intellectual honesty wins out. I can't let this slide....
This objection isn't really relevant to the compassion-based system that Toxie (I think--he'll have to forgive me if I misrepresent him, I guess) espouses. What makes you think that he thinks compassion does not include the desire to alleviate suffering?
All he needs is:
ARGUMENT 1
We can even replace "compassion" with "the desire to alleviate others' suffering":
ARGUMENT 2
- We should maximize the good in society.
- The desire to alleviate others' suffering is the only good.
- Conclusion: We should maximize the desire to alleviate others' suffering in society.
Note that the conclusion of argument 2 does NOT ( ... )Reply
2. It's just an axiom that benefit ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms.
2b. (Substituting from 1 into 2) It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms.
My concept of healthy growth does not have a normative aspect--it's not analytically true, to me, that I ought to accrue healthy growth (however much I may want to)
My concept of benefit does have a normative aspect--it seems analytically true, to me, that I ought to accrue benefit, whatever that is.
The constructive work you need to do is show that benefit--with its normative aspect--is identical with healthy growth. So far, I've only seen an assertion to that effect.
Reply
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