I completely fail to see how, given the laws of nature governing sentient beings (physical, biological and psychological, primarily), why there can't be a way for sentient beings to interact that has the greatest benefit for all involved; I think simply asserting that the "isness" of natural law precludes being able to derive some "oughts" is begging the question, plain and simple. If there are any "ises" from which "oughts" can be validly derived, it's natural law, which are "ises" only in the sense that they're actual ways that "govern" the way things can interact; so, really, it's deriving oughts from possible consequences. There has to be a mathematical way to model spreading benefit among more people being better than extreme benefit to a few and little to no benefit to the rest or, even worse, harm to some for the benefit of the rest.
I'm having a little trouble parsing this. Correct me if the following is not a summary of your position:
1) There might be a code or mode of behavior that, if universally adopted, would result in the greatest benefit for all involved. 2) We can do this because benefit is a natural consequence of certain behaviors. I.e., it's all in the realm of 'is.' 3) We would expect be able to model the distribution of benefit and harm under particular codes or modes of behavior, especially one that distributes that benefit in an equitable, or otherwise appropriate, way.
I agree with all of these, pretty much. However, I've put in bold the points where I think this runs into the is/ought distinction. Specifically:
- What is benefit? - What is the appropriate way to distribute it?
Other questions I'd ask are:
- Once we've defined benefit--why should we feel like we ought to be accumulating it at all? - What's to say whether the thing that we ought to be doing ought to be dictated by some sort of consequence (that we would call 'benefit')
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I won't go so far as to say that there aren't terms specific to ethics that are only explicable through their interrelations with each other. Then again, I have absolutely no problem with holism and I don't see why anybody else would
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1. Benefit, biologically and psychologically speaking, is healthy growth. 2. It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms. 2b. (Substituting from 1 into 2) It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms. 3. The fact that somebody can fail to want to grow in a healthy manner is pretty irrelevant; I don't have to provide reasoning for why one ought not be pathological beyond pointing out the fact that being pathological leads to harm. 3b. (Substituting what I infer is your definition of harm) The fact that somebody can fail to want to grow in a healthy manner is pretty irrelevant; I don't have to provide reasoning for why one ought not be pathological beyond pointing out the fact that being pathological leads to unhealthinessI am very sympathetic to holism in justification--I think when I use 'coherentism,' I mean something similar to what you mean by 'holism.' However, that creates the problems I was making notes
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1) There might be a code or mode of behavior that, if universally adopted, would result in the greatest benefit for all involved.
2) We can do this because benefit is a natural consequence of certain behaviors. I.e., it's all in the realm of 'is.'
3) We would expect be able to model the distribution of benefit and harm under particular codes or modes of behavior, especially one that distributes that benefit in an equitable, or otherwise appropriate, way.
I agree with all of these, pretty much. However, I've put in bold the points where I think this runs into the is/ought distinction. Specifically:
- What is benefit?
- What is the appropriate way to distribute it?
Other questions I'd ask are:
- Once we've defined benefit--why should we feel like we ought to be accumulating it at all?
- What's to say whether the thing that we ought to be doing ought to be dictated by some sort of consequence (that we would call 'benefit') ( ... )
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2. It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms.
2b. (Substituting from 1 into 2) It's just an axiom that healthy growth ought to be accumulated; it follows from the meanings of the terms.
3. The fact that somebody can fail to want to grow in a healthy manner is pretty irrelevant; I don't have to provide reasoning for why one ought not be pathological beyond pointing out the fact that being pathological leads to harm.
3b. (Substituting what I infer is your definition of harm) The fact that somebody can fail to want to grow in a healthy manner is pretty irrelevant; I don't have to provide reasoning for why one ought not be pathological beyond pointing out the fact that being pathological leads to unhealthinessI am very sympathetic to holism in justification--I think when I use 'coherentism,' I mean something similar to what you mean by 'holism.' However, that creates the problems I was making notes ( ... )
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