Teleological theories of mental representations make me want to hit things.
So all semester I've had to cope with Hill's embrace of Dretske's theory of representation:
X represents property F if and only if X has the function of indicating F (from here)
I gather this is supposed to be an improvement on the purely causal/correlational/informational account (roughly, "R represents F iff R co-varies with F") because it (a) allows for an account of what misrepresentation is, and also because it (b) allows us to say reasonable things like "The height of the alhohol in the thermometer represents the temperature, but it does not represent how happy Hot Lovin' Steve," where we suppose Hot Lovin' Steve is somebody whose happiness co-varies with the temperature (hence the name).
But dammit--the teleosemantic theory may work for artifacts, but taking it to biological and mental representations has got to be going too far. Reifying biological functions is so 1800's. Seriously. I'm am so sick of all these people imputing their teleological thinking onto natural selection. Yes, it's difficult to talk about it in any other way. Yes, we have an intuitive bias toward teleological explanations. No, that doesn't mean we should think that talk about "functions" in a biological sense is anything but artificial.
Sorry, just had to rant about that. Now, ladies and gentlemen, watch me contradict myself in a month. I feel myself starting to right now; makes me go crazy.
X represents property F if and only if X has the function of indicating F (from here)
I gather this is supposed to be an improvement on the purely causal/correlational/informational account (roughly, "R represents F iff R co-varies with F") because it (a) allows for an account of what misrepresentation is, and also because it (b) allows us to say reasonable things like "The height of the alhohol in the thermometer represents the temperature, but it does not represent how happy Hot Lovin' Steve," where we suppose Hot Lovin' Steve is somebody whose happiness co-varies with the temperature (hence the name).
But dammit--the teleosemantic theory may work for artifacts, but taking it to biological and mental representations has got to be going too far. Reifying biological functions is so 1800's. Seriously. I'm am so sick of all these people imputing their teleological thinking onto natural selection. Yes, it's difficult to talk about it in any other way. Yes, we have an intuitive bias toward teleological explanations. No, that doesn't mean we should think that talk about "functions" in a biological sense is anything but artificial.
Sorry, just had to rant about that. Now, ladies and gentlemen, watch me contradict myself in a month. I feel myself starting to right now; makes me go crazy.