Стенограмма Нюрнбергского процесса. Том X.
ONE HUNDREDTH DAY
Friday, 5 April 1946
DR. NELTE: Could the Counterintelligence department send members of its staff to North Africa?
KEITEL: I believe that certain channels of information existed via Spanish Morocco; and I know that Canaris maintained intelligence links with Morocco by way of Spain.
DR. NELTE: My question was meant to find out whether it was officially possible to visit North Africa in agreement with France.
KEITEL: Of course it was possible. After the Armistice, there were Disarmament Commissions in North Africa, as well as in France. We had several Army departments there in connection with checking up the armaments of the North African troops.
DR. NELTE: What was the point, or was there any point, in wishing General Weygand ill? Was he a declared opponent of the policy Germany wished to carry through? What was the reason?
KEITEL: We had no reason to think that General Weygand might be, shall we say, inconvenient. In view of the connection with Marshal Pétain, which was started about the end of September and the beginning of October of that year, and the well-known collaboration policy which reached its height in the winter of 1940-41, it was absurd even to think of doing away with the Marshal's Chief of Staff. An action of this kind would not have fitted into the general policy followed in dealing with the situation in North Africa. We released a large number of officers in the regular French Colonial Army from French prisoner-of-war camps in the winter of 1940-1941 for service with the colonial forces. There were generals among them; I remember General Juin in particular who, as we knew at the time, had been Chief of the General Staff in North Africa for many years. At my suggestion he was put at the disposal of the Marshal by Hitler, obviously with the aim of utilizing him in the colonial service. There had not been the slightest motive for wishing General Weygand ill or to think of anything of the sort.
Friday, 5 April 1946
DR. NELTE: Could the Counterintelligence department send members of its staff to North Africa?
KEITEL: I believe that certain channels of information existed via Spanish Morocco; and I know that Canaris maintained intelligence links with Morocco by way of Spain.
DR. NELTE: My question was meant to find out whether it was officially possible to visit North Africa in agreement with France.
KEITEL: Of course it was possible. After the Armistice, there were Disarmament Commissions in North Africa, as well as in France. We had several Army departments there in connection with checking up the armaments of the North African troops.
DR. NELTE: What was the point, or was there any point, in wishing General Weygand ill? Was he a declared opponent of the policy Germany wished to carry through? What was the reason?
KEITEL: We had no reason to think that General Weygand might be, shall we say, inconvenient. In view of the connection with Marshal Pétain, which was started about the end of September and the beginning of October of that year, and the well-known collaboration policy which reached its height in the winter of 1940-41, it was absurd even to think of doing away with the Marshal's Chief of Staff. An action of this kind would not have fitted into the general policy followed in dealing with the situation in North Africa. We released a large number of officers in the regular French Colonial Army from French prisoner-of-war camps in the winter of 1940-1941 for service with the colonial forces. There were generals among them; I remember General Juin in particular who, as we knew at the time, had been Chief of the General Staff in North Africa for many years. At my suggestion he was put at the disposal of the Marshal by Hitler, obviously with the aim of utilizing him in the colonial service. There had not been the slightest motive for wishing General Weygand ill or to think of anything of the sort.