EIGHTY-FOURTH DAY
Monday, 18 March 1946
PROFESSOR DOCTOR HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): ... Witness, at the Munich conferences Hitler, it is alleged, put the following question: "What is to happen if the Czechs are not in agreement with our occupation of the Sudetenland?" Thereupon Daladier answered, "Then we will force them." Is that correct?
GÖRING: This question was actually broached by the Führer during the discussion. Premier Daladier said, in substance, whether with the same words or not, something which corresponds to the sense of this statement. As far as I can still remember fairly exactly, he emphasized that now a decision in that direction had been reached by the great powers for the purpose of maintaining peace, and this peace must not be threatened anew by Czechoslovakia's refusal, otherwise neither England nor France would feel themselves in any way in duty bound to help, if Czechoslovakia did not follow this advice.
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DR. HORN: American war propaganda consistently spoke of Germany's aggressive intentions toward the Western Hemisphere. What do you know about this?
GÖRING: The Western Hemisphere? Do you mean America?
DR. HORN: Yes.
GÖRING: Even if Germany had completely dominated the nations of Europe, between Germany and the American continent there are, as far as I still recall from my geographic knowledge, about 6,000 kilometers of water, I believe. In view of the smallness of the German fleet and the regrettable lack of bombers to cover this distance, which I have already mentioned, there was never a question of a threat against the American continent; on the contrary, we were always afraid of that danger in reverse, and we would have been very glad if it had not been necessary to consider this at all.
As far as South America: is concerned, I know that we were always accused, by propaganda at least, of economic penetration and attempted domination there. If one considers the financial and commercial possibilities which Germany had before and during the war, and if one compares them with those of Great Britain or America, one can see the untenability of such a statement. With the very little foreign exchange and the tremendous export difficulties which we had, we could never constitute a real danger or be in competition. If that had been the case, the attitude of the South American countries would presumably have been a different one. Not the mark, but only the dollar ruled there.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
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GÖRING: ... I was more interested, however, in the concentration of squadrons of aircraft in the Syrian area, not only of French but also English squadrons. As far I remember I received these reports about the intentions of the French-British air squadrons through agents in Turkey, that is to say, from Turks, because there had been negotiations with Turkey regarding permission to fly over her territory in order to carry out the intention of the English-French air squadrons of suddenly bombing the Baku area and thereby severely damaging the Russian oil fields and eliminating deliveries to Germany.
...this would have been, and actually was, a confirmation of the alleged intentions. In this case, as soon as I was fully convinced of this, I should have to point out to the Führer that Germany should draw Russia's attention to the danger threatening her.
... Only later, after the termination of the French campaign, absolute confirmation of these intentions was obtained by the discovery of the secret reports of the French General Staff and of the meetings of the combined Supreme Military Council of England and France, which proved that my information was entirely correct and that a plan for a surprise bombing attack on all the Russian oilfields had been prepared. In the meantime the confirmation of the plan to eliminate the Romanian oilfields, already known to us, was communicated to the Romanian Government and this attack on neutral Romania was then prevented.
DR. SIEMERS: I understood you correctly, did I not, that these plans were made by both England and France?
GÖRING: Yes.