Стенограмма Нюрнбергского процесса. Том IX.
EIGHTIETH DAY
Wednesday, 13 March 1946
GÖRING: … On Sunday, the 22nd of January 1933-the 30th was a Monday - I was in Dresden at a large political meeting, when I was summoned in the morning by the to motor to Berlin immediately. I arrived that afternoon, and he told me, which I already knew, that the Reich President was no longer satisfied with Von Schleicher and saw that political matters could not continue in this way; nothing was ever accomplished; the Reich President had independently arrived at the conclusion that somehow some responsibility must now be given to the strongest Party. Before that time, in a very clever way, a wrong personal impression of the Führer had been created in the old gentleman's mind and he was prejudiced -
he probably took offense at the word socialism, because he understood that in a different way.
Briefly, Hitler revealed to me that day, that that evening I was to speak to the Field Marshal's son at the home of Herr Von Ribbentrop. I believe Herr Von Papen was to be present also and - I am not sure about this - Meissner, who was the State Secretary of the Reich President. The Field Marshal's son wanted to inquire on behalf of his father what the possibilities were of Hitler as chancellor and the inclusion of the Party in responsibility. In a rather lengthy conversation I declared to the son that he should tell his father that, one way or another, Von Schleicher would lead to shipwreck. I explained to him the new basic conditions for forming a new government, and how I had heard now of the Field Marshal's willingness to entrust Hitler with the chancellorship, thereby regarding the Party as a main basis for a future government majority if Adolf Hitler were also able to succeed on this occasion in drawing in the German Nationals and the Stahlhelm - for he wanted to see a definite national basis. The Stahlhelm was not a parliamentary party but it had many followers. The German Nationals under Hugenberg were a parliamentary party.
...Secondly, the Reich President desired that the Foreign Office, independent of all parties, should be in the hands of Herr Von Neurath. Herr Von Neurath also brought us nothing in the way political power, apart from his knowledge and ability.
...The second danger threatened from Schleicher who, through his confidant, on the Sunday made the following offer to the Führer and me: He wanted to emphasize that the Reich President was not a sure factor as far as the new government was concerned; it would serve the purpose better if he - even though he had withdrawn the day before were to join us to form a government now quite definitely not on a parliamentary basis of any kind, but rather on the basis of an entirely new situation, a coalition of the Reichswehr and the NSDAP.
The Führer refused, recognizing that this would be impossible and that the intentions were not honest.
When Herr Von Blomberg arrived at the railroad station from Geneva on the Monday morning, he was given two orders, one from Herr Von Hammerstein, Chief of the Army Command and his superior, to come to him immediately; the other from Hindenburg, his commander-in-chief, to come to him immediately. There was at that time, known only to a few, the threat of a Putsch by Schleicher and Hammerstein with the Potsdam Garrison. On the Sunday evening I mentioned that to Reich President Von Hindenburg, and that is the reason why, 2 hours before the rest of the Cabinet, Herr Von Blomberg was appointed Minister of War, or at that time Reich Defense Minister, in order to prevent any wrong move by the Reichswehr.
At 11 o'clock on the morning of the 30th the Cabinet was formed and Hitler appointed Reich Chancellor.
...The second point which I want to emphasize especially in regard to the legality of our coming to power, is the following:
Had the democratic election system of England or the United States of America existed in Germany, then the National Socialist German Workers Party would, at the end of 1931 already, have legally possessed all seats in the Reichstag, without exception. For in every electoral district in Germany at that time, or at the beginning of 1932 at the latest, in every one - I emphasize this once more - the NSDAP was the strongest party; that is to say, given an electoral system as it is in Great Britain or in the United States all these weaker parties would have failed to gain any seats and from this time on we would have had only National Socialists in the Reich, in a perfectly legal way according to the democratic principles of these two great democracies.
...I filled a few important provincial offices with leading Catholic persons who were much closer to the Center Party than to us.