Стенограмма Нюрнбергского процесса. Том IX.
EIGHTIETH DAY
Wednesday, 13 March 1946
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the reason you did not build the four-engine aircraft was your low opinion of it?
KESSELRING: May I say the following: That was the conception of a service department; the decisions in all these questions were made in the highest service department.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The highest service department made a mistake about the utility of the four-engine bomber?
KESSELRING: Well, looking at the situation retrospectively, I must say that the absence of a four-engine bomber became extremely awkward.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the highest authority in aircraft production was Hermann Göring. He was the head of the Whole plan of aircraft production, was he not?
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MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in the Polish campaign you have said?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that the, German Air Force made the decisive contribution to that campaign as regards the time taken to conquer Poland?
KESSELRING: From the point of view of the Air Force officers I must agree with that conception absolutely, but the army officers did not quite share it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you are testifying now as to your opinion. And in that campaign you developed the technique of low level attacks by fighters, light bombers, and dive-bombers against marching columns, and the dive-bomber, the light bomber, and the fighters all contributed to the success of that movement.
KESSELRING: I must admit that. The foundations of the short-range bombing technique were certainly laid during the Polish campaign.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I turn now to the French campaign. You were in the air in the French campaign, were you not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Air Force contributed decisively to the success of that campaign, did it not? .
KESSELRING: From the point of view of an Air Force officer, I must consider that view as correct.
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MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were one of the principal advocates of the plan to invade England, were you not?
KESSELRING: Personally I am of the opinion that, if the war against England was to be brought to a successful end, this end could only be achieved for certain by invasion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had an adequate Air Force after having defeated Poland, defeated Holland, defeated Belgium, and defeated France, so that you advocated proceeding with an invasion of England, did you not?
KESSELRING: I must give an explanation on that point.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First tell me if that is true.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you please understand that you must answer the question first, and give an explanation afterwards. Every question, or nearly every question, admits of either an affirmative or negative answer, and you will kindly give that answer and make your explanation afterwards.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not advocate the invasion of England, and was not the Air Force ready to invade England?
KESSELRING: Subject to certain conditions, considering the existing air situation at that time the Air Force was ready to fulfill that task.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you recommended very strongly to the Reich Marshal that the invasion take place immediately after Dunkirk, did you not?
KESSELRING: Yes, and I still advocated that view later on too.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the preparations of the Luftwaffe for this invasion were complete, and the invasion was called off only because the procurement of sea-going craft was not sufficient, is that not true?
KESSELRING: Yes. I have to supplement the previous statement by saying that, of course, a certain interval between the French campaign and the English campaign would have had to elapse in order to effect the material replenishment of the air force.