Pushing the boat out (a bit) on Russian "spy ships"

May 06, 2020 19:44


Introduction

Definition: "To put forth the maximum amount of effort and/or resources toward some product or event."

There has always been an appetite for sensationalising events and tasks, none more so with the Russian spy ship hyperbole of recent years, the type of ships keep on multiplying, from just the real intelligence-gathering SIGINT ships, to ocean-going tugs and now the latest being the newest fleet replenishment ship, the 'Akademik Pashin'.  Assigning this type of nomenclature to what is known informally as an 'oiler' is really pushing the boat out.



Article headline Naval News, 6 May 2020

Different types of auxiliaries ships are being literally conflated into the one category and the absurdity of this is that is seemingly reserved uniquely for the Russian Navy and to a lesser extent the Chinese Navy, (PLAN), but never for a NATO vessel.  Could you imagine the situation where naval experts label the UK's Wave-class tankers of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) as a spy ship, you'd probably get laughed at and rightly so.  To claim that the 'Akademik Pashin' has a "potential second role, as an intelligence gathering ship", is intriguing to say the least.  Yet, the author follows it up by writing that " All naval vessels have a potential to gather intelligence if they are in the right place at the right time". It would be very rudimentary intelligence gathering, monitoring radio frequencies and visual monitoring mostly.   However, to call such ships "spy ships" is worthy of a Hollywood film script.



To add that conflating the activities of Russian auxiliary naval ships with the world of intrigue and espionnage is part of a wider trend, as well as a sort of propaganda effort to frame routine naval activities into a more sinister manner. More on this aspect later in a future article.

The context

A little bit about the 'Akademik Pashin' first in order to understand better the context.  After a hiatus of 30 years +, the Russian Navy commissioned the 'Akademik Pashin', formally known as a Project 23130 medium-sized marine tanker, in 21 January 2020 in Severomorsk, the homeport of the Northern Fleet. Its purpose is to supply fuel, dry cargo and provide support to surface ships and submarines, like most oilers around the world.  It is the lead ship of its class, of just 2 ships, a far different story to the vast 70's and 80's Soviet Navy with its numerous supply, oiler and logistical ships. The significance of the commissioning of this oiler cannot be underestimated, as it is a long overdue vital addition to the Northern Fleet.

Referring  to the article in question, stating "Near French Submarine trials", is misleading per excellent really.   The article doesn't mention the actual distance of the Russian Navy oiler outside of French territorial waters.  Well, here is an AIS screenshot of the 'Akademik Pashin' in the bay of the Seine, a place described in the article as "a usual haunt for Russian warships and auxiliaries but always gets attention."



AIS screenshot - 20 April, (VesselFinder). The scale is at the top: 19NM.

Indeed, this routine activity by the Russian Navy always triggers a flurry of ludicrous clickbait headlines from UK tabloids, thereby perpetuating the scariness factor.  The Bay of Seine, along with its Western Mediterranean counterpart, Al Tofiño Bank off  Hociema, Morocco are two anchorages where the Russian Navy, (as with the Soviet Navy previously), carry out from time to time their "one-stop" replenishment activities.

The article outlines that the 'Akademik Pashin' arrived off the Normandy coast along with the ocean-going tug 'Nikolay Chiker', on 16 April.  The Project 5757  'Nikolay Chiker' was later off the Portuguese coast by 22nd April. The 'Akademik Pashin' left the Channel, northbound on April 27 along with the Baltic Fleet based Russian Navy corvette 'Boikiy', both escorted by HMS Mersey, as detailed by the Royal Navy press release. Below are the AIS screenshots taken on 27th April of the tracks:



AIS screenshot - 27 April, (VesselFinder).

The 'Akademik Pashin' arrived on the French coast, off St Vaast, earlier than 16 April, as there is an AIS screenshot from 10 April and the oiler was already there. To note that 'Akademik Pashin' was inbound into the Channel on 19 March and then left on 28 March, departing back to the Barents Sea.  As a staging post for inbound ships, the 'Akademik Pashin', indeed loitered as at least 2 groups of ships transited through the Channel and thus needed  logistical support, (7 ships in total according to the Royal Navy press release). This is especially the case for the Steregushchiy-class corvettes given their limited endurance.

Both the 'Nikolay Chiker' and the Akademik Pashin were seen on AIS on 27 March in the company of the 'Yantar', an intelligence gathering ship that gained notoriety for being the "spy ship that lurks around submarine cables" in the West.   The 'Yantar', operated by the GUGI, is designated as an Auxiliary General Oceanographic Research (AGOR).  The 'Yantar' would be an better platform for intelligence gathering, 100 times more so than an oiler.  Intriguingly, nothing has been reported officially about the 'Yantar' off St Vaast, although the ship was heading to Kaliningrad for an overdue engine refit.

The Bay of Seine anchorage has been used by the Russian Navy on many occasions, regardless of the activities of French Navy's latest generation submarine, 'Suffren', which conducted its first test dive. There is more to the story than the speculation of a connection to the French submarine tests, since it also relates to the transit of the 'Akademik Cherskiy' a pipe lying ship. This is something that I will go into more detail in the next article.

Intelligence-gathering versus spying

A trivial point, but being on AIS for the world to see doesn't lend itself to real clock and dagger spying.  Spying is clandestine, illegal, involves deceit, stealth and operates in a very grey area. On the other hand, intelligence-gathering is about getting information through different methods including visual, electronic and sound.

It can be either simple observations made, (looking through a pair of binoculars,  monitoring radio frequencies), to complex technological equipment, (for example - SIGINT, satellite imagery and digital tools).

Given that the 'Akademik Pashin' would not enter French 12nm territorial water and was seen on station in the "usual haunt" on AIS, approximately 28nm east of Cherbourg as the crow flies, to suspect it of spying is fanciful.  The closest that the 'Akademik Pashin' could get theoretically is just off 12NM, which isn't handy at all for clandestine spying.   To think that the 'Akademik Pashin' could get meaningful intelligence for the Russian Navy, would be a bit of a damp squib.

Replenishment at sea



Daniel, Donald C. “TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISES.” Naval War College Review, vol. 30, no. 4, 1978, pp. 39. JSTOR,

The commissioning of the 'Akademik Pashin' has singularly increased the Russian Navy's ability to carry out  underway replenishment (UNREP) at sea. An example of this is back in March, the 'Akademik Pashin', an ice class “Arc 4" oiler, carried out replenishment exercise with the latest Project 22350 frigate,  'Admiral Kasatonov', in the Barents Sea.

The 21st century equivalent of the "coaling stations", highly prized by both the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy, now consists of replenishment ships or forward bases.  What is taken for granted by the U.S. and NATO, isn't the same situation faced by the Russian Navy, a mere shadow of the former Soviet Navy.  The Russian Navy makes occasional far-flung deployments out to the North Atlantic, not to the same extent and intensity as for U.S. and NATO navies. Yet, there is a trend to frame these deployments in a highly negative, antagonistic and derogatory fashion.

The Soviet Navy had a far flung network of shore-based logistic and repair facilities across the globe.  Nowadays, the Russian Navy has just the one in Tartus, Syria, which is currently being improved. Equally, the Russian Navy a significantly lower operating tempo [OPTEMPO], than NATO and the U.S.Navy  put together.  Despite this, it seemingly rankles Washington and allies that the Russian Navy actually sails out of its homeport and transits through places such as the Mediterranean or the Channel.

Given this, Washington is always antagonistic regarding Russian Navy stopovers and it is determined to increase naval geographic constraints for the Russian Navy, usually through faux outrage over the Russian Navy 's tiny presence in Tartus.  The latest example of the push by Washington to deny the Russian Navy's ability to visit ports relates to Cyprus port calls. Previously, much think tank, pundit fuss was made over the Russian Navy calling into Ceuta several years ago.  There is a pattern to this in trying to kneecap the Russian naval logistical activities.  Even it is unwittingly done, by labelling an oiler as "spy ship" falls into this persistent narrative of tagging  Russian Navy activities in a malignant manner.

navy, oiler, nato, ais, russian navy, channel, akademik pashin, spy ship

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