Something on the RCGS Resolute incident
The circus has left but the clowns remain.
Updated with additional information on 18 April 2020
Nothing quite like browsing through social media and end up reading a load of inane comments on the recent incident between the RCGS Resolute and the Venezuelan offshore patrol vessel (OPV) Coast Guard «Naiguatá» (GC-23) on 30th March 2020.
Details: Venezuelan Navy / Coastguard ANBV Naiguata, (GCG-23), displacement 1453, length 80 meters, built 2009 Spain, commissioned 2011.
RCGS Resolute: operated by One Ocean Expedition, displacement 8,445 GT, length 122 meters, built 1991 & has the highest ice class (Lloyds 1AS),
So I'll put on my ex coastguard hat and present some clarifications and comments of my own. The most salient details leading up to & including the incident are outlined in the following blog: Halifax Shipping News. It provides full statements from both parties. This means I will not go into all of the details myself but kindly ask the reader to look at the articles posted instead.
There are two points that I would like to clarify:
- Circumstances leading up to the interception are reasons for triggering suspicion by the Venezuelan coastguard.
- Types of coastguard intercepts and UNCLOS
1. Circumstances
The sinking of the «Naiguatá» has resulted in further notoriety regarding the RCGS Resolute, already embroiled in a series of financial scandals, unpaid crew members, contractors, vendors and passengers left without Antarctic cruises and without being refunded due to financial situation of the charter company One Ocean Expeditions. All of which is detailed at length by Halifax Shipping News and in various articles (here, here and here).
This aspect needs to be considered when reviewing the circumstances leading up to the interception, but it is not significant, since at the time of the coastguard intercept, the RCGS Resolute was managed by Columbia Cruise Services (CCS) and the Bahamas based shipowner was Bunny’s Adventure and cruise shipping Co.Ltd.
For some reason the RCGS Resolute was the only polar expedition ship to head to the Dutch Antilles, while others headed back to Europe after the COVID-19 outbreak dramatically curtailed the 2020 cruise season.
Reviewing the radio comms and the AIS history, (via Halifax Shipping News), indicates a crucial aspect to why the cruise ship was intercepted, namely that it drifted for two days towards the Venezuelan island of Tortuga, while reporting as being Not Under Command, (NUC) with no AIS destination set either. In my book, this would arouse suspicion by the coastguard. There is no information in the press statement to ascertain whether there was radio communications either between the RCGS Resolute to report the NUC situation with either the MRCC in Curaçao or the Venezuelan coastguard, given the proximity to the islands of Tortuga and also Margarita.
The press statement from Columbia Cruise Services (CCS), outlines why the ship was NUC, "to conduct some routine engine maintenance on its idle voyage to its destination, Willemstad/ Curaçao." Personally, hardly the place and time to do routine engine maintenance, unless it is code for in fact dealing with an engine breakdown and doing at sea repairs. Bear in mind that the ship was in Buenos Aires for months, idle, so we're talking about engine maintenance that couldn't have been done alongside during lay-time, or sooner on its lengthy voyage.
Add in this piece of information: "On the morning of the 26th she rendezvoused with the tanker Kerkyra, out of Port of Spain, Trinidad, and presumably refueled." (31 March 2020, Halifax Shipping News). This might mean little to a non-nautical, however, this is a rather unusual activity for a cruise ship to do, since in port refuelling is the norm. To note that the RCGS Resolute had been under arrest for several months in Buenos Aires due to millions of dollars worth of unpaid bills, so this seems a way for the ship operators to avoid going into port and avoid refuelling in Curaçao as well.
The issue of coastguard intercepts is seemingly lacking in the articles relating to the sinking of the «Naiguatá». The CCS statement described the intercept as "subject to an act of aggression by the Venezuelan Navy in international waters, around 13.3 nautical miles from Isla de Tortuga". This description is really to be taken with a pinch of salt. I will elaborate why this is so further below.
2. Intercepts and UNCLOS
The freedom of navigation principles contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), allows for navigational transit in territorial waters, (this aspect is in fact touched upon in the radio comms audio released by Venezuela military), but being NUC for one day isn't strictly being in transit either. There is some debate whether the interception took place just inside territorial waters or just outside it.
Given the reporting in the media of the incident, this seems to be the crux of the matter, but contextual information is missing from these articles. What can a coastguard service do and not do? Taking the example of the U.S. Coastguard, the scope of the missions are very diverse.
Most coastguard intercepts outside territorial waters are either because of suspected of carrying narcotics, arms, migrants or carrying out illegal fishing activities. Let's consider the routine activities of coastguards and navies elsewhere in the world, take for instance, the Japanese Coastguard warning off a Chinese survey ship.
Additionally, coastguards can also intercept ships for contravening national laws, here is one example from South Korea regarding a tanker that fled an anchorage, "after it tried to leave Busan's anchorage without clearance". The radio comms between the Naiguatá and RCGS Resolute outline the coastguard questioning of the cruise ship's intentions and activities, specifically mentioning that it did not have permission to enter to Venezuelan territorial waters.
A coastal state can claim a 200 nautical miles (NM) exclusive economic zone, (EEZ). Adjacent to the 12NM territorial sea, there is also the 24NM contiguous zone, under which it has the jurisdiction to carry out law enforcement activities. All of which is codified in UNCLOS. The Venezuelan Navy & Coastguard has the right with the contiguous one, to approach any vessel and to visit and search it, and even to stop it.
«Para los fines de vigilancia marítima y resguardo de sus intereses., la República Bolivariana de Venezuela tiene, contigua a su mar territorial, una zona que se extiende hasta veinticuatro millas náuticas (24 MN), contadas a partir de las líneas de más baja marea o las líneas de base desde las cuales se mide el mar territorial»
"For the purposes of maritime surveillance and the protection of its interests, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has, adjacent to its territorial sea, a zone extending up to twenty-four nautical miles (24 NM), counted from the lowest tide lines or baselines from which the territorial sea is measured."
The RCGS Resolute, having drifted towards Tortuga, was in the contiguous zone at the time of the intercept. As a comparison, the Venezuelan navy intercepted in May 2019, the USCGC James which was 14NM (16 miles) off Venezuela’s coast.
As mentioned briefly above, I can sense a degree of jitters can be noted by the officer handling the VHF comms onboard the RCGS Resolute with regards to navigational transit. Having to heave to and be escorted into a Venezuelan port wasn't really something wished given all of the issues encountered previously.
Comments on the interception
A. Interaction
The Coastguard navy vessel was severely damaged and ultimately sank as a result of contact with the ice-strengthened bulbous bow of the ice-class cruise ship, designed and operated for polar expeditions. As indicated in the Columbia Ship Management statement, the OPV went across the bow "on the starboard side at speed with an angle of 135°", then this shows that the Coastguard commander was totally unaware of the cruise ship's ice-strengthened hull or didn't full situational awareness of doing such manoeuvre with a larger vessel.
As a comparison, take a look at this video of a collision between a Pakistani and Indian warship, seemingly due to not only bravado but a good dose of overconfidence, but also a big misjudgment of how the Bernoulli effect works. Something similar happened between the Naiguatá and the RCGS Resolute and this situation is stated in the extract below from the Portuguese accident report:
"The reduction of the distance between the two ships, with the ship Naiguatá GC-23 having a higher speed, caused that when the bow of the ship Naiguatá Gc-23 passed the bow of the ship RCGS Resolute a suction effect occurred, causing a rapid turn of the ship Naiguatá GC-23 to port."
Probable sequence of events based on evidence gathered from the vessel RCGS Resolute. Source: GAMA p.13 Fig.6
The report also mentioned in the preceding paragraph that:
"This apparent change of course may have been caused by the vessel RCGS Resolute increasing speed, with the port propulsion machine alone, thus causing a tendency to steer to starboard and reduce the distance between the two ships."
(In bold is my emphasis)
No mentioned as to why the RCGS Resolute was increasing speed though.
" Due to the unexpected turn of the ship Naiguatá GC-23 it collided with the starboard rim of the ship RCGS Resolute.
The sudden turn to port of the ship Naiguatá GC-23 resulted in a starboard bow, probably aggravated by the fact that the contact point is well above the water line. The adornment (adorno - overhang?) also caused the approach of the port side of the ship Naiguatá GC- 23 which may have been hit in below the waterline by the bulbous bow of the ship RCGS Resolute, causing a massive flooding."
2. Zodiacs
The notion that the ship was "transporting mercenaries to attack military bases in Venezuela", was outlined by various high-level Venezuelan is laughable to say the least. Again, this shows that is little awareness of understanding what a polar expedition ship actually does and its necessary capabilities of being self reliant in resources and safety. The Zodiacs are used for passenger transfers to the Antarctic / Arctic coast from the ship itself. A quick glance at polar cruise online catalogues and blogs clearly shows this.
3. Doctrine on use of force
On another tangent, the idea that the Venezuelan authorities acted aggressively by firing warning shots from rifles is equally farcical. To present in this matter takes it completely out of context. If a ship refuses to obey the orders to stop or change course to be escorted into port, then the coastguard can and do fire warning shots. A prime example is the Argentine coastguard, (the Prefectura Naval Argentina), that opened fire on a Chinese vessel illegally fishing in the EEZ in 2019, (notice the closeness & angle of the fishing vessel's bow in an attempt to collide with the patrol cutter) and also in May 2016, after the Chinese fishing vessel was alleged to have tried to ram the coastguard vessel. The radio order used by the Naguiata isn't different to how the PNA radioed to the Chinese vessel in 2019.
The doctrine on the use of force must be proportional, limited in duration, intensity and extent to what is reasonably required to neutralise either an aggressive act or to stop an offender, this doctrine is used widely worldwide. As far as I can see this is the case in the video clips released by the Venezuelan high command. This doctrine also outlines that at first, warning shots must be done gradually, starting with the smallest caliber weapons first, up to the largest caliber weapon as a last resort. Again, the video clips show coastguard personnel firing small caliber weapons, in a direction that do not pose a danger to persons on board the offending vessel. The radio comms excerpt highlights that the coastguard also warned that they will open fire.
5. Rescue and SAR
The CCS statement mentioned that the Captain of RCGS Resolute contacted the Curaçao Maritime Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC) and he got permission to leave the scene from the MRCC. Strictly speaking, this does not make sense because the incident occurred within the SAR area under the responsibility of La Guaira, Venezuela. What's the full story behind these contradictory statements? We do know that Curaçao Maritime Rescue Coordination Center passed on the information of the sinking of the «Naiguatá» over to the Venezuelan MRCC and the latter denied the sinking.
At 01:38 am on 30/03/2020 - The ship Naiguatá GC-23 activated the SART (search and rescue transponder). The ship RCGS Resolute tried to communicate with the ship Naiguatá GC- 23 via VHF radio Ch 16 and got no response. The ship RCGS Resolute was instructed by DPA (Designed Person Ashore) to remain on site and to contact the MRCC (Maritime Search and Coordination Center). Source: GAMA p.8
At 02:30 a.m. on 30/03/2020 the JRCC Curaçao asked the MRCC La Guaira if the ship RCGS Resolute could leave the area of the occurrence and continue its journey. The MRCC La Guaira confirmed the request and informed that the vessel RCGS Resolute should continue its trip. Source: GAMA p.12
Geopolitics
The United States has been for many years very vocal about bringing down the government of Nicolas Maduro. Thus, tensions between the United States and Venezuela continue to be very high. With a growing focus on potential military intervention led by the US looming on the horizon, discussed, it is any wonder that the Venezuelans monitor ship traffic along its coast? To add into the mix, a number of events took place over recent years, including one that involved an attempt sending humanitarian by ship. Consequently, this has meant that Venezuela sees the United States as taking "threatening" actions, accordingly, moving military & civil society pieces to achieve the intended aim of regime change. Is it any surprising that Venezuela is edgy with regards to weird ship activities off its coast?
Set against this troubled situation, along comes the RCGS Resolute, unwittingly acting suspiciously for several days, as evidenced in the audio transcript. Two days of loitering off the coast of Venezuela, not exactly a textbook definition of a transit passage from Buenos Aires to Curaçao, where it is still there.
It has to be noted that the RCGS Resolute was a Portuguese flagged ship, hence there is also the geopolitical angle between Portugal and Venezuela to be taken into consideration. There was a recent diplomatic dispute between the two countries back in February over the airline TAP flying Juan Guaido into Caracas. Another cloud on the horizon, which makes the background to the whole RCGS Resolute incident all the more intriguing.
Lastly, there are those who really sneered and gloated over the sinking. It simply underlines some really partisan mindsets at work and I take issue with those who are blatant cheerleaders for Washington sponsored regime change efforts, since they are never being able to see the uglier widespread aspects of sanctions and resulting violent upheaval triggered by regime change.
Some other curious details on the charter cruise company
The RCGS Resolute was leased by One Ocean Expeditions in 2018 in addition to two leased ice-class Russian research ships. Problems started to happen after the well-publicised August 2018 grounding of the 'Akademik Ioffe', in the Northwest Passage. Although some damage was sustained by the ship, there was no pollution and no injuries.
To compound the financial woes even further, One Ocean Expeditions was the company was left high and dry in May 2019 after the the Russian Shirshov Institute of Oceanology (IO RAS) stopped the leasing of the two research vessels, 'Akademik Ioffe' and 'Akademik Sergey Vavilov'. This annual leasing arrangement had been in place since 2011. IO RAS said that the pair of expedition ships were on a time charter deal to another ship management company until autumn 2019.
At this stage, One Ocean Expedition has no chartered ships and potentially is in the process of insolvency in Canada with a skeleton staff and also tied up in litigation with the Russians.
Summary
The idea of of the RCGS Resolute being NUC for so long, not far off Venezuela and unintentionally not arouse suspicion seems to me a little weird given the wider geopolitical issues at play. The notion that the key crew were allowed and carried out routine maintenance so close to geopolitical hotspot is mind-boggling as well. Denial and obfuscation by the Venezuelan authorities also hampered the outcome, by stating 'piracy' to cover up their mishandling of the incident and rescue of the crew.
To sum up: hindsight is great and plenty of lessons from this incident for everyone to learn from: ship operators, navies and coastguards.
Documents
Portuguese Investigation Report