Getting bin Laden: All your base are belong to. . .
As promised last night, another in the reaction series to the death of bin Laden. Last night focused on what a coup this was for American special forces. It was just the public and perfect operation they needed to really prove to average Americans who well they can work. The best way you can tell it went well? No one is complaining about wasted manpower, wasted efforts or generally "why are we there and why did we sacrifice so many men to get to the target?". No, some people are concerned about legality (will be covered later) and other tangential issues. And right now, much of the world is focused on one question: now that bin Laden has been killed, what will happen to al-Qaeda now? Some have pointed out the al-Qaeda bylaws that call for a council of the highest ranked people to officially elect the vice emir (ie second in command) to the position of emir (which bin Laden held). Of course, take a second to breathe in the irony of having a vote on something for which the outcome is already known. Of course, here in reality, it's not nearly that simple. Like any power, but de-centralized group, there are all kinds of people and factions vying for power and, given that this is the head of a terrorist group and not the local Rotary, there will be a power struggle and not an orderly change of power. Bin Laden was, for better and worse, a very charismatic figure. He commanded allegiances no other terrorist has between very different groups. The problem, from his perspective, was how he did it. He didn't just unite disparate groups in a fight against America, he made them swear personal fealty to him and made himself one of the biggest talking points for al-Qaeda. In short, he was the man behind al-Qaeda and now he's the man behind the 8-ball. The greatest strength that al-Qaeda, namely its total decentralization and lack of clear chain of command (aka, list of targets the Us should target first) will now become its biggest weakness.
First of all, let's take a look at Usama. He was the scion of a powerful construction family. The Bin Laden Group was best known for years for being Saudi Arabia's largest contractor, to the point where they were asked to modernize Mecca in terms of infrastructure and all kinds of construction. He was the son of Muhammed bin Laden and his tenth wife and one of many, many children. His older brother, and heir presumptive at one point, was killed in the late 80s when he flew a plane into some power lines. By this time, bin Laden had been working in Afghanistan with the mujahideen to drive out the Soviets. This was seen as noble of him since a) he didn't really have to do much other than hang back, but he chose to be in the field and b) he organized a lot of things and played a key role for man in his late 20s/early 30s. He, like the Crusaders he despises, was a lesser son (the spare, in the "heir and a spare") who sought his fame and fortune by driving evil forces out of a holy land. Unlike most European crusaders, he was successful, along with many others, but unlike most of them, he chose to stay in the guerrilla warfare/terrorism game. He met up with other people over the years who were influential and as driven as he was to carry on the jihad, as he saw it: defeating the "Crusader-Jew alliance" to drive the US off of Saudi soil and the Israelis out of everywhere. What he managed to do was gather Palestinians, Egyptians, disaffected Saudis and others around him to fight a very specific war. His own brand of Wahhabist Islam combined with the time he lived in Europe to give a culturally specific target for his people to attack. He managed to get the loyalties of such men as Ayman al-Zawahiri, a wealthy Egyptian pediatrician who decided Egypt should have never made peace with Israel, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani member of the Muslim Brotherhood who studied in the US and many, many others. This was both a wondrous feat of charisma, one of al-Qaeda's great strengths and now one of the US's best chances for getting rid of al-Qaeda.
Bin Laden, like many other terrorist leaders, did not make his people swear an oath to a flag, a nation or even a set of ideals. The word al-Qaeda means "the base", but not as in military base or the opposite of an acid, but in the case a foundation or bedrock from which others could grow and commit terror attacks; they would be directly relatable to him and his influence even if he had no direct control. He made his key people swear fealty to him, directly. Manson, Korresh and others have all done this as means of security and loyalty. It's also a good sign for many personality disorders. What this does is it keeps the underlings fighting a bit, but not in a way that hurts him. He tried to set up rules for succession in case something ever happened, but these were not realistic steps to succession. First of all, his title was Emir, meaning roughly "lord" or "master"; we get our word "admiral" from the phrase "emir al-bahr" or lord of the bay. Ayman al-Zawawhiri, while widely seen as al-Qaeda's number two man, was not well liked by others in the group. He's a firebrand of an ideologue and tolerates no deviation from his ideals. He's also very intelligent, educated and loves to hold that over the others in the upper echelons. Others saw him as too intellectual who had no gotten any blood on his hands in the fight in decades if ever. Others were too focused operationally to think long term strategically; that is, they'd be worried about how to pull off the next big attack and not about how to maintain as a group. Others were far more concerned about Palestine/Israel than about other more intellectual matters of foreign affairs. Or, more simply put, without a single man to rally behind and to rally them, the cell-like nature works AGAINST unifying as single movement without someone with a hell of a lot of charisma at the helm.
But that's why the name might survive but the real group will likely be gone soon. as each leader and factions tries to carve a niche as the legitimate head of the organization, they will be fighting each other and not US interests. The fact there are more operative cells versus support cells means they all had different goals and directions. AQAP, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may still have plans for destabilizing Yemen to effect a take over of the weak state, they are doubtless not thinking about how to destabilize Bahrain and Qatar to make the entire Gulf ripe for "popular" uprisings. Subtlety is the hardest game for terrorists to play since most of their reason d'etre involves PUBLIC displays of power to encourage change and or reaction from the general population. So, they will be divided each claiming a legitimacy. Al-Qaeda could well end up like two other groups: Black September and the IRA. After the Munich massacre, members of Black September started dropping off, with most stories pointing to secret teams of Israeli commandos acting on a vengeance plan. Black September was destroyed but some of it's more ardent followers wound up in Hamas and Fatah. The IRA, on the other hand, keeps splitting over disagreements about treaties. The original IRA was formed after the treaty in 1922 that ended the Irish War of Independence and ceded the North to the British. As other, later treaties were signed, groups would split off from a main group and so and so on until know there are lots of groups who claim to be carrying on the real message of freedom Ireland from British Oppression. With each group getting smaller and smaller each time.
So what does THAT mean for America? Well, initially, we will see more attempts at attacks to avenge bin Laden. The upside, is that since we grabbed so much intel and these attacks are likely to be hastily planned, we will be able to stop them easier. After the last of those resources are used up, then others will re-form with other groups and others will be absorbed into existing groups. Some will fight Israel, others will fight Saudi Arabia and some will attempt to fight America. However, that will be harder if Obama pushes for troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan and Iraq quicker. Al-Zawahiri is pushing sixty and was never a military favorite; think Spock trying to take command of the Enterprise. Right now, they are so disconnected even IF a single voice could rise up to unite them all, it's doubtful opposing bands would listen to each other. So, as it stands, al-Qaeda is on life support even if the personnel are not. And even if the personnel still manage to stay active, there is no guarantee they will work together well.
And if NOTHING else, after this, will lots of people admit to working for al-Qaeda?
So it is written, so do I see it.
First of all, let's take a look at Usama. He was the scion of a powerful construction family. The Bin Laden Group was best known for years for being Saudi Arabia's largest contractor, to the point where they were asked to modernize Mecca in terms of infrastructure and all kinds of construction. He was the son of Muhammed bin Laden and his tenth wife and one of many, many children. His older brother, and heir presumptive at one point, was killed in the late 80s when he flew a plane into some power lines. By this time, bin Laden had been working in Afghanistan with the mujahideen to drive out the Soviets. This was seen as noble of him since a) he didn't really have to do much other than hang back, but he chose to be in the field and b) he organized a lot of things and played a key role for man in his late 20s/early 30s. He, like the Crusaders he despises, was a lesser son (the spare, in the "heir and a spare") who sought his fame and fortune by driving evil forces out of a holy land. Unlike most European crusaders, he was successful, along with many others, but unlike most of them, he chose to stay in the guerrilla warfare/terrorism game. He met up with other people over the years who were influential and as driven as he was to carry on the jihad, as he saw it: defeating the "Crusader-Jew alliance" to drive the US off of Saudi soil and the Israelis out of everywhere. What he managed to do was gather Palestinians, Egyptians, disaffected Saudis and others around him to fight a very specific war. His own brand of Wahhabist Islam combined with the time he lived in Europe to give a culturally specific target for his people to attack. He managed to get the loyalties of such men as Ayman al-Zawahiri, a wealthy Egyptian pediatrician who decided Egypt should have never made peace with Israel, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani member of the Muslim Brotherhood who studied in the US and many, many others. This was both a wondrous feat of charisma, one of al-Qaeda's great strengths and now one of the US's best chances for getting rid of al-Qaeda.
Bin Laden, like many other terrorist leaders, did not make his people swear an oath to a flag, a nation or even a set of ideals. The word al-Qaeda means "the base", but not as in military base or the opposite of an acid, but in the case a foundation or bedrock from which others could grow and commit terror attacks; they would be directly relatable to him and his influence even if he had no direct control. He made his key people swear fealty to him, directly. Manson, Korresh and others have all done this as means of security and loyalty. It's also a good sign for many personality disorders. What this does is it keeps the underlings fighting a bit, but not in a way that hurts him. He tried to set up rules for succession in case something ever happened, but these were not realistic steps to succession. First of all, his title was Emir, meaning roughly "lord" or "master"; we get our word "admiral" from the phrase "emir al-bahr" or lord of the bay. Ayman al-Zawawhiri, while widely seen as al-Qaeda's number two man, was not well liked by others in the group. He's a firebrand of an ideologue and tolerates no deviation from his ideals. He's also very intelligent, educated and loves to hold that over the others in the upper echelons. Others saw him as too intellectual who had no gotten any blood on his hands in the fight in decades if ever. Others were too focused operationally to think long term strategically; that is, they'd be worried about how to pull off the next big attack and not about how to maintain as a group. Others were far more concerned about Palestine/Israel than about other more intellectual matters of foreign affairs. Or, more simply put, without a single man to rally behind and to rally them, the cell-like nature works AGAINST unifying as single movement without someone with a hell of a lot of charisma at the helm.
But that's why the name might survive but the real group will likely be gone soon. as each leader and factions tries to carve a niche as the legitimate head of the organization, they will be fighting each other and not US interests. The fact there are more operative cells versus support cells means they all had different goals and directions. AQAP, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may still have plans for destabilizing Yemen to effect a take over of the weak state, they are doubtless not thinking about how to destabilize Bahrain and Qatar to make the entire Gulf ripe for "popular" uprisings. Subtlety is the hardest game for terrorists to play since most of their reason d'etre involves PUBLIC displays of power to encourage change and or reaction from the general population. So, they will be divided each claiming a legitimacy. Al-Qaeda could well end up like two other groups: Black September and the IRA. After the Munich massacre, members of Black September started dropping off, with most stories pointing to secret teams of Israeli commandos acting on a vengeance plan. Black September was destroyed but some of it's more ardent followers wound up in Hamas and Fatah. The IRA, on the other hand, keeps splitting over disagreements about treaties. The original IRA was formed after the treaty in 1922 that ended the Irish War of Independence and ceded the North to the British. As other, later treaties were signed, groups would split off from a main group and so and so on until know there are lots of groups who claim to be carrying on the real message of freedom Ireland from British Oppression. With each group getting smaller and smaller each time.
So what does THAT mean for America? Well, initially, we will see more attempts at attacks to avenge bin Laden. The upside, is that since we grabbed so much intel and these attacks are likely to be hastily planned, we will be able to stop them easier. After the last of those resources are used up, then others will re-form with other groups and others will be absorbed into existing groups. Some will fight Israel, others will fight Saudi Arabia and some will attempt to fight America. However, that will be harder if Obama pushes for troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan and Iraq quicker. Al-Zawahiri is pushing sixty and was never a military favorite; think Spock trying to take command of the Enterprise. Right now, they are so disconnected even IF a single voice could rise up to unite them all, it's doubtful opposing bands would listen to each other. So, as it stands, al-Qaeda is on life support even if the personnel are not. And even if the personnel still manage to stay active, there is no guarantee they will work together well.
And if NOTHING else, after this, will lots of people admit to working for al-Qaeda?
So it is written, so do I see it.