Mr. Barnes said he had no idea of the purpose of the Middle East trip when Mr. Connally invited him. They traveled to the region on a Gulfstream jet owned by Superior Oil. Only when they sat down with the first Arab leader did Mr. Barnes learn what Mr. Connally was up to, he said. Mr. Connally said, “‘Look, Ronald Reagan’s going to be elected president and you need to get the word to Iran that they’re going to make a better deal with Reagan than they are Carter,’” Mr. Barnes recalled. “He said, ‘It would be very smart for you to pass the word to the Iranians to wait until after this general election is over.’ And boy, I tell you, I’m sitting there and I heard it and so now it dawns on me, I realize why we’re there.” Mr. Barnes said that, except for Israel, Mr. Connally repeated the same message at every stop in the region to leaders such as President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt. He thought his friend’s motive was clear. “It became very clear to me that Connally was running for secretary of state or secretary of defense,” Mr. Barnes said. (Mr. Connally was later offered energy secretary but declined.) https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/18/us/politics/jimmy-carter-october-surprise-iran-hostages.html
После этого Гари Сик (изначальный автор теории про «октябрьский сюрприз») и три биографа Картера написали статью о том, что вопрос закрыт и сомнений не осталось:
Forty-three years after the climactic events of 1980, the four of us-all steeped in the history of the Carter administration-believe that it’s time to move past conspiracy theories to hard historical conclusions about the so-called October Surprise. We think there’s now enough evidence to say definitively that Ronald Reagan’s campaign manager, the late William Casey, ran a multipronged covert operation to manipulate the 1980 presidential election-and that these acts of betrayal might have affected the outcome. <…> Casey’s unpatriotic conduct should now be viewed by historians as an established fact. And there is strong circumstantial evidence-though no documentary proof-that an actual deal was struck. But even if there was no consummated deal, the signals Casey sent to the Iranians through multiple channels that they would get a better shake if Reagan was elected almost certainly delayed the release of the hostages. In the end, it was Carter, not Reagan, who secured their freedom. Early on the morning of January 20, 1981, just hours before he left office, Carter completed the final, complex negotiations, with Algeria as the intermediary. He considered it one of the greatest achievements of his life that the hostages all came home safely, though the flight carrying them from Tehran didn’t clear Iranian air space until minutes after Reagan was sworn in. Within a week of the inauguration, Reagan’s new secretary of state, Alexander Haig, signed off on secret arms sales to a country that had just held Americans hostage for 444 days. We believe the burden of historical evidence now supports viewing this as a quid pro quo, even if one accounts for the Israelis wanting to help Iran resist Iraq’s invasion. In 1982, the delivery route shifted to Sweden, with covert operations that used some of the same shady airlines and even the same planes that were employed by the Reagan administration four years later to send arms to Iran in the Iran-Contra affair of 1985-86, which in retrospect looks like an outgrowth of these earlier arms deals. (Casey was deeply implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal but died suddenly in 1987, just as he was scheduled to testify before Congress.) https://newrepublic.com/article/172324/its-settled-reagan-campaign-delayed-release-iranian-hostages
Любопытно, что ссылка этого года. Не отпускают журналисты эту историю, пытаются развивать. God speed.
>> And there is strong circumstantial evidence-though no documentary proof-that an actual deal was struck.
То, что четыре историка так считают, это хорошо. Но я думаю, придется проводить более широкую научную конференцию, из как минимум 50 историков, чтобы еще раз перепроверить и закрепить такой вывод.
>> the signals Casey sent to the Iranians through multiple channels that they would get a better shake
Кейси повезло, что война с Ираком началась в сентябре 1980. Сама собой в руки приплыла морковка, которой можно было махать перед иранским носом. Иранцам теперь требовалось нанять гэллоп-политолога, чтобы понять, кто идет впереди и точно ли то, что Картер проигрывает.
>> In the end, it was Carter, not Reagan, who secured their freedom.
Трудяга.
>> this as a quid pro quo, even if one accounts for the Israelis wanting to help Iran resist Iraq’s invasion.
Если сделка была, то от историков хотелось бы услышать цифры. Вот, Вики пишет про 2 млрд. за год, что мне представляется громадной суммой. Я предполагаю, что Иран все эти поставки оплатил 100%, и с американской стороны бесплатным было только закрытие глаза на эмбарго, что в свою очередь является безденежной оплатой за иранское сотрудничество в деле с заложниками. То есть, 52 заложника обменяли не на оружие ценой в 2 млрд., а на канал поставки такого оружия.
>> In 1982, the delivery route shifted to Sweden, with covert operations that used some of the same shady airlines a
Вот такие детали требуется озвучивать на финальной конференции историков, по результатам которой будет выпущена коллективная монография, которую можно будет уже со спокойной совестью цитировать. Потому что 1982 год - это до «Иран-Контрас», до поправки Боланда, которая в 1983 году впервые поставила ЦРУ перед проблемой: где взять деньги для Контрас. В 1982 такой проблемы не было. Значит, эти самолеты летали с другой целью. Очередная косвенная улика.
Да, в статье эта книжка упоминается. Но немногие читали ее так же внимательно, как вы, и заметили этот момент. Поэтому интервью Барнса в этом году стало сенсацией.
Mr. Barnes identified four living people he said he had confided in over the years: Mark K. Updegrove, president of the L.B.J. Foundation; Tom Johnson, a former aide to Lyndon Johnson (no relation) who later became publisher of the Los Angeles Times and president of CNN; Larry Temple, a former aide to Mr. Connally and Lyndon Johnson; and H.W. Brands, a University of Texas historian. All four of them confirmed in recent days that Mr. Barnes shared the story with them years ago. “As far as I know, Ben never has lied to me,” Tom Johnson said, a sentiment the others echoed. Mr. Brands included three paragraphs about Mr. Barnes’s recollections in a 2015 biography of Mr. Reagan, but the account generated little public notice at the time. Records at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum confirm part of Mr. Barnes’s story. An itinerary found this past week in Mr. Connally’s files indicated that he did, in fact, leave Houston on July 18, 1980, for a trip that would take him to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel before returning to Houston on Aug. 11. Mr. Barnes was listed as accompanying him.
точно ли то, что Картер проигрывает
Для поклонников Картера обиднее всего, что в октябре он был впереди по опросам. Но в итоге проиграл с разгромным счетом.
Биографы вспоминают, как проклятый Кейси помог Рейгану выиграть дебаты с Картером с помощью ворованного плана.
Casey had no scruples in politics. In the run-up to the 1980 Carter-Reagan debate (there was only one that year), Casey paid $1,500 to an anti-Carter operative named Paul Corbin to obtain a stolen copy of Carter’s closely held debate briefing book. Baker later told Eizenstat that Casey walked into his office, put the stolen briefing book on his desk, and told him he might find it interesting. The stolen binders contained attack lines for Carter to use against Reagan’s controversial positions on issues like Social Security and Medicare. This helped Reagan anticipate Carter’s lines of attack, and he easily won the debate, just eight days before the election.
Но у Рейгана для дебатов были также собственные способности. По теме заложников он использовал домашнюю заготовку про «секретный план».
Governor Reagan. I have been accused lately of having a secret plan with regard to the hostages. Now, this comes from an answer that I've made at least 50 times during this campaign to the press. The question would be, "Have you any ideas of what you would do if you were there?" And I said, well, yes. And I think that anyone that's seeking this position, as well as other people, probably, have thought to themselves, "What about this, what about that?" These are just ideas of what I would think of if I were in that position and had access to the information, in which I would know all the options that were open to me. I have never answered the question, however. Second--the one that says, "Well, tell me, what are some of those ideas?" First of all, I would be fearful that I might say something that was presently under way or in negotiations, and thus expose it and endanger the hostages. And sometimes, I think some of my ideas might involve quiet diplomacy, where you don't say in advance or say to anyone what it is you're thinking of doing. Your question is difficult to answer, because, in the situation right now, no one wants to say anything that would inadvertently delay, in any way, the return of those hostages if there is a chance of their coming home soon, or that might cause them harm.
Что касается иранцев, то говорят, что они понятия не имели, кто такой Рейган, но сильно не любили Картера и поэтому в итоге затянули переговоры вплоть до вступления Рейгана в должность.
>> Для поклонников Картера обиднее всего, что в октябре он был впереди по опросам.
В таком случае опытный гэллоп-политолог должен был подсказать своим иранским заказчикам, что следует умасливать Картера, а не Рейгана. Однако, если считать, что аятоллы разбирались во внутренней политике США также плохо, как Сталин в 40-е (имели смутное и упрощенное представление о ее механизмах), то эту линию допущений можно дальше уже не развивать.
>> с помощью ворованного плана.
Получается, что Кейси выступал в роли политтехнолога. Был вроде Роджера Стоуна, который не брезговал методами.
>> First of all, I would be fearful that I might say something that was presently under way or in negotiations, and thus expose it and endanger the hostages.
Умно с его стороны. Намекнуть на причастность в операции освобождения, примазаться к возможному успеху.
>> Что касается иранцев, то говорят, что они понятия не имели, кто такой Рейган, но сильно не любили Картера
Брэндс также считает, что иранцы имели свою собственную логику поведения, а не только лишь зависели от того, что им пообещал или не пообещал Кейси. В истории были случаи, когда руководство одной страны принимало решение пересидеть руководство другой страны в надежде на более вменяемого собеседника и не развивало отношения здесь и сейчас. Например, Джонсону не нравился де Голль.
С другой стороны - началась война с Ираком. Терять 4 месяца поставок только лишь из-за сильных негативных эмоций… Аятоллы должны были в какой-то момент начать мыслить с позиций Real Politik.
Современные гэллоп-политологи говорят, что в то время Гэллоп работал плохо и искажал картину.
The legend of Reagan’s epic comeback is largely the result of anomalous Gallup polling, which even showed a Carter advantage over the final month of the campaign. But if RealClearPolitics or Pollster.com had existed in 1980, the conventional wisdom would have been a little different. In fact, Reagan held a lead from mid-September onward and had a two or three point lead heading into the debates. Private polling conducted for the Reagan and Carter campaigns showed the same thing. Reagan’s 10 point victory is a precedent for sweeping undecided voters, but it isn’t a model for a come-from-behind victory. https://newrepublic.com/article/107171/exploding-the-reagan-1980-comeback-myth
Для того, чтобы иранцы знали, что у Рейгана есть реальные шансы на победу, нужно было, чтобы кампания Рейгана поделилась с ними внутренними данными, как это сделал Пол Манафорт в 2016 с другой страной.
Кейси выступал в роли политтехнолога
Должность руководителя избирательной кампании Рейгана заставляла. Но из-за неопытности Кейси инициатива отводилась представителям кампании в отдельных штатах, в том числе 28-летнему Роджеру Стоуну в Нью-Йорке.
In the analysis of one familiar with inner workings of the Reagan operation, the replacement of Sears by Casey improved the campaign's management while diffusing strategic decisions. Political strategy is now largely a state-to-state affair in which heavy reliance is placed on field representatives recruited by Sears and deposed political director Charles Black -- such operatives as Roger Stone in New York and Connecticut, Gerald Carmen in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, Donald Totten in Illinois and Michigan and Lee Atwater in South Carolina. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/03/18/reagans-new-campaign-chief-so-far-so-good/03159ae7-6a81-4398-abfd-997e68892c2a/
Именно тогда Стоун через Роя Кона познакомился с Трампом.
руководство одной страны принимало решение пересидеть руководство другой страны
Более серьезный случай - когда Никсон в 1968 ради победы на выборах сорвал переговоры администрации Джонсона с вьетнамцами о прекращении войны.
A newfound cache of notes left by H. R. Haldeman, his closest aide, shows that Nixon directed his campaign’s efforts to scuttle the peace talks, which he feared could give his opponent, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, an edge in the 1968 election. On Oct. 22, 1968, he ordered Haldeman to “monkey wrench” the initiative. <…> Nixon had entered the fall campaign with a lead over Humphrey, but the gap was closing that October. Henry A. Kissinger, then an outside Republican adviser, had called, alerting Nixon that a deal was in the works: If Johnson would halt all bombing of North Vietnam, the Soviets pledged to have Hanoi engage in constructive talks to end a war that had already claimed 30,000 American lives. But Nixon had a pipeline to Saigon, where the South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, feared that Johnson would sell him out. If Thieu would stall the talks, Nixon could portray Johnson’s actions as a cheap political trick. The conduit was Anna Chennault, a Republican doyenne and Nixon fund-raiser, and a member of the pro-nationalist China lobby, with connections across Asia. “! Keep Anna Chennault working on” South Vietnam, Haldeman scrawled, recording Nixon’s orders. “Any other way to monkey wrench it? Anything RN can do.” Nixon told Haldeman to have Rose Mary Woods, the candidate’s personal secretary, contact another nationalist Chinese figure - the businessman Louis Kung - and have him press Thieu as well. “Tell him hold firm,” Nixon said. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/opinion/sunday/nixons-vietnam-treachery.html
4 месяца поставок только лишь из-за сильных негативных эмоций…
Неизвестно, что именно помешало иранцам выпустить заложников до выборов. Но переговоры после выборов они определенно затянули. Не хотелось тянуть до прихода новой администрации, чтобы начать переговоры сначала. Но не хотелось и давать Картеру удовлетворения.
The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion. <...> Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel’s Office was a “backdoor” way for Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate Trump’s assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status of the Trump Campaign and Manafort’s strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik, and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting. https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download
Отчет комиссии по разведке Сената США:
The Committee found that the Russian government engaged in an aggressive, multifaceted effort to influence, or attempt to influence, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. <...> Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer. Kilimnik quickly became an integral part of Manafort's operations in Ukraine and Russia, serving as Manafort's primary liaison to Deripaska and eventually managing Manafort's office in Kyiv. Kilimnik and Manafort formed a close and lasting relationship that would endure to the 2016 U.S. elections and beyond. <...> On numerous occasions over the course of his time on the Trump Campaign, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik. Gates, who served as Manafort's deputy on the Campaign, aided Manafort in this effort. Manafort communicated electronically with Kilimnik and met Kilimnik in person twice while serving on the Trump Campaign. Manafort briefed Kilimnik on sensitive Campaign polling data and the Campaign's strategy for beating Hiliary Clinton. At Manafort's direction, Gates used an encrypted messaging application to send additional Campaign polling data to Kilimnik. <...> Manafort also discussed with Kilimnik a peace plan for eastern Ukraine that benefited the Kremlin. <...> The Committee obtained some information suggesting Kilimnik may have been connected to the GRU's hack and leak operation targeting the 2016 U.S. election. <...> The Committee found that Manafort's presence on the Campaign and proximity to Trump created opportunities for the Russian intelligence services to exert influence over, and acquire confidential information on, the Trump Campaign. The Committee assesses that Kilimnik likely served as a channel to Manafort for Russian intelligence services, and that those services likely sought to exploit Manafort's access to gain insight into the Campaign. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
Фабрика троллей Пригожина повлияла мало, хотя Пригожин и потратил на выборы Трампа больше любого из доноров избирательной кампании Трампа, включая самого Трампа.
Деятельность ГРУ, в которой участвовал Килимник, была более успешной - включая и хакерские взломы, и агентов влияния. Попытка повторить успех на выборах 2020 провалилась, а Килимник попал из-за нее под санкции минфина США:
Konstantin Kilimnik (Kilimnik) is a Russian and Ukrainian political consultant and known Russian Intelligence Services agent implementing influence operations on their behalf. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0126
Законную гордость, которую россияне могут по праву испытывать за деятельность своих спецслужб, не сможет омрачить то, что в результате санкций, принятых из-за атаки на американские выборы, все они стали немного беднее.
2023? Интервью Барнса здесь:
Mr. Barnes said he had no idea of the purpose of the Middle East trip when Mr. Connally invited him. They traveled to the region on a Gulfstream jet owned by Superior Oil. Only when they sat down with the first Arab leader did Mr. Barnes learn what Mr. Connally was up to, he said.
Mr. Connally said, “‘Look, Ronald Reagan’s going to be elected president and you need to get the word to Iran that they’re going to make a better deal with Reagan than they are Carter,’” Mr. Barnes recalled. “He said, ‘It would be very smart for you to pass the word to the Iranians to wait until after this general election is over.’ And boy, I tell you, I’m sitting there and I heard it and so now it dawns on me, I realize why we’re there.”
Mr. Barnes said that, except for Israel, Mr. Connally repeated the same message at every stop in the region to leaders such as President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt. He thought his friend’s motive was clear. “It became very clear to me that Connally was running for secretary of state or secretary of defense,” Mr. Barnes said. (Mr. Connally was later offered energy secretary but declined.)
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/18/us/politics/jimmy-carter-october-surprise-iran-hostages.html
После этого Гари Сик (изначальный автор теории про «октябрьский сюрприз») и три биографа Картера написали статью о том, что вопрос закрыт и сомнений не осталось:
Forty-three years after the climactic events of 1980, the four of us-all steeped in the history of the Carter administration-believe that it’s time to move past conspiracy theories to hard historical conclusions about the so-called October Surprise. We think there’s now enough evidence to say definitively that Ronald Reagan’s campaign manager, the late William Casey, ran a multipronged covert operation to manipulate the 1980 presidential election-and that these acts of betrayal might have affected the outcome. <…>
Casey’s unpatriotic conduct should now be viewed by historians as an established fact. And there is strong circumstantial evidence-though no documentary proof-that an actual deal was struck. But even if there was no consummated deal, the signals Casey sent to the Iranians through multiple channels that they would get a better shake if Reagan was elected almost certainly delayed the release of the hostages.
In the end, it was Carter, not Reagan, who secured their freedom. Early on the morning of January 20, 1981, just hours before he left office, Carter completed the final, complex negotiations, with Algeria as the intermediary. He considered it one of the greatest achievements of his life that the hostages all came home safely, though the flight carrying them from Tehran didn’t clear Iranian air space until minutes after Reagan was sworn in.
Within a week of the inauguration, Reagan’s new secretary of state, Alexander Haig, signed off on secret arms sales to a country that had just held Americans hostage for 444 days. We believe the burden of historical evidence now supports viewing this as a quid pro quo, even if one accounts for the Israelis wanting to help Iran resist Iraq’s invasion. In 1982, the delivery route shifted to Sweden, with covert operations that used some of the same shady airlines and even the same planes that were employed by the Reagan administration four years later to send arms to Iran in the Iran-Contra affair of 1985-86, which in retrospect looks like an outgrowth of these earlier arms deals. (Casey was deeply implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal but died suddenly in 1987, just as he was scheduled to testify before Congress.)
https://newrepublic.com/article/172324/its-settled-reagan-campaign-delayed-release-iranian-hostages
Reply
Нет, в 2013. Я взял этот фрагмент из книги 2015 года.
>> https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/18
Любопытно, что ссылка этого года. Не отпускают журналисты эту историю, пытаются развивать. God speed.
>> And there is strong circumstantial evidence-though no documentary proof-that an actual deal was struck.
То, что четыре историка так считают, это хорошо. Но я думаю, придется проводить более широкую научную конференцию, из как минимум 50 историков, чтобы еще раз перепроверить и закрепить такой вывод.
>> the signals Casey sent to the Iranians through multiple channels that they would get a better shake
Кейси повезло, что война с Ираком началась в сентябре 1980. Сама собой в руки приплыла морковка, которой можно было махать перед иранским носом. Иранцам теперь требовалось нанять гэллоп-политолога, чтобы понять, кто идет впереди и точно ли то, что Картер проигрывает.
>> In the end, it was Carter, not Reagan, who secured their freedom.
Трудяга.
>> this as a quid pro quo, even if one accounts for the Israelis wanting to help Iran resist Iraq’s invasion.
Если сделка была, то от историков хотелось бы услышать цифры. Вот, Вики пишет про 2 млрд. за год, что мне представляется громадной суммой. Я предполагаю, что Иран все эти поставки оплатил 100%, и с американской стороны бесплатным было только закрытие глаза на эмбарго, что в свою очередь является безденежной оплатой за иранское сотрудничество в деле с заложниками. То есть, 52 заложника обменяли не на оружие ценой в 2 млрд., а на канал поставки такого оружия.
>> In 1982, the delivery route shifted to Sweden, with covert operations that used some of the same shady airlines a
Вот такие детали требуется озвучивать на финальной конференции историков, по результатам которой будет выпущена коллективная монография, которую можно будет уже со спокойной совестью цитировать. Потому что 1982 год - это до «Иран-Контрас», до поправки Боланда, которая в 1983 году впервые поставила ЦРУ перед проблемой: где взять деньги для Контрас. В 1982 такой проблемы не было. Значит, эти самолеты летали с другой целью. Очередная косвенная улика.
Reply
Да, в статье эта книжка упоминается. Но немногие читали ее так же внимательно, как вы, и заметили этот момент. Поэтому интервью Барнса в этом году стало сенсацией.
Mr. Barnes identified four living people he said he had confided in over the years: Mark K. Updegrove, president of the L.B.J. Foundation; Tom Johnson, a former aide to Lyndon Johnson (no relation) who later became publisher of the Los Angeles Times and president of CNN; Larry Temple, a former aide to Mr. Connally and Lyndon Johnson; and H.W. Brands, a University of Texas historian.
All four of them confirmed in recent days that Mr. Barnes shared the story with them years ago. “As far as I know, Ben never has lied to me,” Tom Johnson said, a sentiment the others echoed. Mr. Brands included three paragraphs about Mr. Barnes’s recollections in a 2015 biography of Mr. Reagan, but the account generated little public notice at the time.
Records at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum confirm part of Mr. Barnes’s story. An itinerary found this past week in Mr. Connally’s files indicated that he did, in fact, leave Houston on July 18, 1980, for a trip that would take him to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel before returning to Houston on Aug. 11. Mr. Barnes was listed as accompanying him.
точно ли то, что Картер проигрывает
Для поклонников Картера обиднее всего, что в октябре он был впереди по опросам. Но в итоге проиграл с разгромным счетом.
Биографы вспоминают, как проклятый Кейси помог Рейгану выиграть дебаты с Картером с помощью ворованного плана.
Casey had no scruples in politics. In the run-up to the 1980 Carter-Reagan debate (there was only one that year), Casey paid $1,500 to an anti-Carter operative named Paul Corbin to obtain a stolen copy of Carter’s closely held debate briefing book. Baker later told Eizenstat that Casey walked into his office, put the stolen briefing book on his desk, and told him he might find it interesting.
The stolen binders contained attack lines for Carter to use against Reagan’s controversial positions on issues like Social Security and Medicare. This helped Reagan anticipate Carter’s lines of attack, and he easily won the debate, just eight days before the election.
Но у Рейгана для дебатов были также собственные способности. По теме заложников он использовал домашнюю заготовку про «секретный план».
Governor Reagan. I have been accused lately of having a secret plan with regard to the hostages. Now, this comes from an answer that I've made at least 50 times during this campaign to the press. The question would be, "Have you any ideas of what you would do if you were there?" And I said, well, yes. And I think that anyone that's seeking this position, as well as other people, probably, have thought to themselves, "What about this, what about that?" These are just ideas of what I would think of if I were in that position and had access to the information, in which I would know all the options that were open to me. I have never answered the question, however. Second--the one that says, "Well, tell me, what are some of those ideas?" First of all, I would be fearful that I might say something that was presently under way or in negotiations, and thus expose it and endanger the hostages. And sometimes, I think some of my ideas might involve quiet diplomacy, where you don't say in advance or say to anyone what it is you're thinking of doing.
Your question is difficult to answer, because, in the situation right now, no one wants to say anything that would inadvertently delay, in any way, the return of those hostages if there is a chance of their coming home soon, or that might cause them harm.
Что касается иранцев, то говорят, что они понятия не имели, кто такой Рейган, но сильно не любили Картера и поэтому в итоге затянули переговоры вплоть до вступления Рейгана в должность.
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В таком случае опытный гэллоп-политолог должен был подсказать своим иранским заказчикам, что следует умасливать Картера, а не Рейгана. Однако, если считать, что аятоллы разбирались во внутренней политике США также плохо, как Сталин в 40-е (имели смутное и упрощенное представление о ее механизмах), то эту линию допущений можно дальше уже не развивать.
>> с помощью ворованного плана.
Получается, что Кейси выступал в роли политтехнолога. Был вроде Роджера Стоуна, который не брезговал методами.
>> First of all, I would be fearful that I might say something that was presently under way or in negotiations, and thus expose it and endanger the hostages.
Умно с его стороны. Намекнуть на причастность в операции освобождения, примазаться к возможному успеху.
>> Что касается иранцев, то говорят, что они понятия не имели, кто такой Рейган, но сильно не любили Картера
Брэндс также считает, что иранцы имели свою собственную логику поведения, а не только лишь зависели от того, что им пообещал или не пообещал Кейси. В истории были случаи, когда руководство одной страны принимало решение пересидеть руководство другой страны в надежде на более вменяемого собеседника и не развивало отношения здесь и сейчас. Например, Джонсону не нравился де Голль.
С другой стороны - началась война с Ираком. Терять 4 месяца поставок только лишь из-за сильных негативных эмоций… Аятоллы должны были в какой-то момент начать мыслить с позиций Real Politik.
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Современные гэллоп-политологи говорят, что в то время Гэллоп работал плохо и искажал картину.
The legend of Reagan’s epic comeback is largely the result of anomalous Gallup polling, which even showed a Carter advantage over the final month of the campaign. But if RealClearPolitics or Pollster.com had existed in 1980, the conventional wisdom would have been a little different. In fact, Reagan held a lead from mid-September onward and had a two or three point lead heading into the debates. Private polling conducted for the Reagan and Carter campaigns showed the same thing. Reagan’s 10 point victory is a precedent for sweeping undecided voters, but it isn’t a model for a come-from-behind victory.
https://newrepublic.com/article/107171/exploding-the-reagan-1980-comeback-myth
Для того, чтобы иранцы знали, что у Рейгана есть реальные шансы на победу, нужно было, чтобы кампания Рейгана поделилась с ними внутренними данными, как это сделал Пол Манафорт в 2016 с другой страной.
Кейси выступал в роли политтехнолога
Должность руководителя избирательной кампании Рейгана заставляла. Но из-за неопытности Кейси инициатива отводилась представителям кампании в отдельных штатах, в том числе 28-летнему Роджеру Стоуну в Нью-Йорке.
In the analysis of one familiar with inner workings of the Reagan operation, the replacement of Sears by Casey improved the campaign's management while diffusing strategic decisions. Political strategy is now largely a state-to-state affair in which heavy reliance is placed on field representatives recruited by Sears and deposed political director Charles Black -- such operatives as Roger Stone in New York and Connecticut, Gerald Carmen in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, Donald Totten in Illinois and Michigan and Lee Atwater in South Carolina.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/03/18/reagans-new-campaign-chief-so-far-so-good/03159ae7-6a81-4398-abfd-997e68892c2a/
Именно тогда Стоун через Роя Кона познакомился с Трампом.
руководство одной страны принимало решение пересидеть руководство другой страны
Более серьезный случай - когда Никсон в 1968 ради победы на выборах сорвал переговоры администрации Джонсона с вьетнамцами о прекращении войны.
A newfound cache of notes left by H. R. Haldeman, his closest aide, shows that Nixon directed his campaign’s efforts to scuttle the peace talks, which he feared could give his opponent, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, an edge in the 1968 election. On Oct. 22, 1968, he ordered Haldeman to “monkey wrench” the initiative. <…>
Nixon had entered the fall campaign with a lead over Humphrey, but the gap was closing that October. Henry A. Kissinger, then an outside Republican adviser, had called, alerting Nixon that a deal was in the works: If Johnson would halt all bombing of North Vietnam, the Soviets pledged to have Hanoi engage in constructive talks to end a war that had already claimed 30,000 American lives.
But Nixon had a pipeline to Saigon, where the South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, feared that Johnson would sell him out. If Thieu would stall the talks, Nixon could portray Johnson’s actions as a cheap political trick. The conduit was Anna Chennault, a Republican doyenne and Nixon fund-raiser, and a member of the pro-nationalist China lobby, with connections across Asia.
“! Keep Anna Chennault working on” South Vietnam, Haldeman scrawled, recording Nixon’s orders. “Any other way to monkey wrench it? Anything RN can do.”
Nixon told Haldeman to have Rose Mary Woods, the candidate’s personal secretary, contact another nationalist Chinese figure - the businessman Louis Kung - and have him press Thieu as well. “Tell him hold firm,” Nixon said.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/opinion/sunday/nixons-vietnam-treachery.html
4 месяца поставок только лишь из-за сильных негативных эмоций…
Неизвестно, что именно помешало иранцам выпустить заложников до выборов. Но переговоры после выборов они определенно затянули. Не хотелось тянуть до прихода новой администрации, чтобы начать переговоры сначала. Но не хотелось и давать Картеру удовлетворения.
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The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion. <...>
Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel’s Office was a “backdoor” way for Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate Trump’s assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status of the Trump Campaign and Manafort’s strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states.
Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik, and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting.
https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download
Отчет комиссии по разведке Сената США:
The Committee found that the Russian government engaged in an aggressive, multifaceted effort to influence, or attempt to influence, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. <...>
Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer. Kilimnik quickly became an integral part of Manafort's operations in Ukraine and Russia, serving as Manafort's primary liaison to Deripaska and eventually managing Manafort's office in Kyiv. Kilimnik and Manafort formed a close and lasting relationship that would endure to the 2016 U.S. elections and beyond. <...>
On numerous occasions over the course of his time on the Trump Campaign, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik. Gates, who served as Manafort's deputy on the Campaign, aided Manafort in this effort. Manafort communicated electronically with Kilimnik and met Kilimnik in person twice while serving on the Trump Campaign. Manafort briefed Kilimnik on sensitive Campaign polling data and the Campaign's strategy for beating Hiliary Clinton. At Manafort's direction, Gates used an encrypted messaging application to send additional Campaign polling data to Kilimnik. <...>
Manafort also discussed with Kilimnik a peace plan for eastern Ukraine that benefited the Kremlin. <...>
The Committee obtained some information suggesting Kilimnik may have been connected to the GRU's hack and leak operation targeting the 2016 U.S. election. <...>
The Committee found that Manafort's presence on the Campaign and proximity to Trump created opportunities for the Russian intelligence services to exert influence over, and acquire confidential information on, the Trump Campaign. The Committee assesses that Kilimnik likely served as a channel to Manafort for Russian intelligence services, and that those services likely sought to exploit Manafort's access to gain insight into the Campaign.
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
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Деятельность ГРУ, в которой участвовал Килимник, была более успешной - включая и хакерские взломы, и агентов влияния. Попытка повторить успех на выборах 2020 провалилась, а Килимник попал из-за нее под санкции минфина США:
Konstantin Kilimnik (Kilimnik) is a Russian and Ukrainian political consultant and known Russian Intelligence Services agent implementing influence operations on their behalf.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0126
Законную гордость, которую россияне могут по праву испытывать за деятельность своих спецслужб, не сможет омрачить то, что в результате санкций, принятых из-за атаки на американские выборы, все они стали немного беднее.
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