Все уже украдено до нас :-(
Хотя, конечно, и приятно видеть, что я, как говаривал Давыдов, набредая на чужие разработки любимых тем, не сумасшедший.
Так что пусть будет.
NB на ближайшее будущее.
As of today, there are two general readings of the relationship between
Arendt and Schmitt. The first focuses on the underlying similarities between
the two thinkers, which can be traced back to a shared political existentialism,
a common fascination with the autonomy and purity of the political,
and an analogous interest with a groundless decision (Schmitt) and act
(Arendt).5 Many sympathizers of Arendt have challenged this interpretation
in their attempt to demonstrate that her thought is not only incompatible
with Schmitt’s work but also hostile and fiercely opposed to it.6 I distance
myself from both readings. Instead of focusing on Schmitt’s and Arendt’s
alleged political existentialism, I shift the focus of attention to their writings
on extraordinary foundings. Likewise, rather than viewing her as an avowed
opponent of Schmitt, I see her as attempting to rethink the pivotal issue of
how to contain and limit the risks, arbitrariness, and excesses inherent in the
extraordinary politics of secular founding. Her approach seems to be neither
identical nor antithetical to Schmitt’s. It can be better described as unraveling
its internal paradoxes and pointing to its dilemmas and perplexities, but
also as sharing some comparable concerns and orientations.
In fact, I argue, both thinkers grappled with a similar set of questions and related themes,
and although they parted company in their respective answers, they shared a common interest in elucidating the vexing, sometimes obscure, relationship between the constituent power and those extraordinary instances of radical
political and constitutional innovation.
Andreas Kalyvas. Democracy and the Politics of the
Extraordinary. Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2008. P. 195 f
Так что пусть будет.
NB на ближайшее будущее.
As of today, there are two general readings of the relationship between
Arendt and Schmitt. The first focuses on the underlying similarities between
the two thinkers, which can be traced back to a shared political existentialism,
a common fascination with the autonomy and purity of the political,
and an analogous interest with a groundless decision (Schmitt) and act
(Arendt).5 Many sympathizers of Arendt have challenged this interpretation
in their attempt to demonstrate that her thought is not only incompatible
with Schmitt’s work but also hostile and fiercely opposed to it.6 I distance
myself from both readings. Instead of focusing on Schmitt’s and Arendt’s
alleged political existentialism, I shift the focus of attention to their writings
on extraordinary foundings. Likewise, rather than viewing her as an avowed
opponent of Schmitt, I see her as attempting to rethink the pivotal issue of
how to contain and limit the risks, arbitrariness, and excesses inherent in the
extraordinary politics of secular founding. Her approach seems to be neither
identical nor antithetical to Schmitt’s. It can be better described as unraveling
its internal paradoxes and pointing to its dilemmas and perplexities, but
also as sharing some comparable concerns and orientations.
In fact, I argue, both thinkers grappled with a similar set of questions and related themes,
and although they parted company in their respective answers, they shared a common interest in elucidating the vexing, sometimes obscure, relationship between the constituent power and those extraordinary instances of radical
political and constitutional innovation.
Andreas Kalyvas. Democracy and the Politics of the
Extraordinary. Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2008. P. 195 f