(no subject)
First, is it just me or does the New York Times have more ads in it than it used to? I've been reading it off the internet since classes ended, so maybe I've just forgotten, but the paper I bought this morning seems especially ad-y.
But anyway. I've been thinking about Hume's "Missing Shade of Blue," and the possible implications that could be had by the ability to dream an experience that you can't actually have. I first heard about this thought experiment when it was used as an objection to an argument for dualism which went something like this:
(1) The brain is limited, physically, in the actions it can perform.
(2) We have the ability to imagine unlimitedly.
(3) The functions of the brain alone cannot give us (2).
(4) Therefore, something else must exist which allows us to imagine unlimitedly.
(5) Therefore, we have a mind/soul.
Something like that. The missing shade of blue example would be an objection to (2). But what if we do have the ability to imagine the missing shade of blue, even if we cannot consciously imagine it, or consciously register having done as much? This is sort of like the debate over whether beliefs are formed immediately upon perception, or only later, upon reflection on the memory of the perception. It's generally accepted that we hold beliefs we may never actually verbalize, but can we hold beliefs it isn't possible for us to verbalize because it is not possible for us to realize that we hold them? It's sort of an empty query because either an affirmation or a denial would be based purely on unfounded speculation, and what's the point of theorizing about beliefs that are by definition inaccessible? Actually, I think there may be a purpose at least insofar as considerations of our ability to imagine unlimitedly, but even that issue seems irrelevant (As far as the above argument for dualism goes, I think (1) is a weak claim, at least as stated.) But it's a fun thing to think about, anyway.
I've been giving myself a crash course in epistemology, and I can't help but feel like it's going poorly. I've read a respectable amount of the literature (given the time frame within which I've been working) both historical and contemporary, and I'm about half way through Audi's Introduction to Epistemology from the RICP series, but I feel like I'm going about it wrong somehow. It might just be that I have no one to discuss any of it with and so I don't realize how much I'm picking up (this was the case when I took a class in metaphysics last semester. I'd do the reading and feel incredibly lost, then I would go to the study groups and I was able to explain it all clearly and thoroughly, as well as offer objections, etc not laid out in the text). I've tried writing responses to the reading for myself, but I have a hard time writing philosophy without mandatory time constraints because I never feel that I know enough about the topic to justify writing an analysis of it. I just feel like I'm reading myself into circles. I'm really nervous about the epistemology seminar I'm taking this semester, because it presupposes a survey of epistemology, which I haven't had formally. Andy's teaching it, and he's a solid educator (I'm not thinking of a better word) and a pretty easy grader, but he's planning on teaching it as a grad seminar and I'm interested in more than decent grades this semester. I have other classes I should be more worried about than this one, but it's this one I'm freaking out about anyway. I really should've started this crash course earlier.... Luckily, I have the house to myself all weekend and no plans, because I've turned into a loser with no life, so I should be able to get a decent amount of work done.
But anyway. I've been thinking about Hume's "Missing Shade of Blue," and the possible implications that could be had by the ability to dream an experience that you can't actually have. I first heard about this thought experiment when it was used as an objection to an argument for dualism which went something like this:
(1) The brain is limited, physically, in the actions it can perform.
(2) We have the ability to imagine unlimitedly.
(3) The functions of the brain alone cannot give us (2).
(4) Therefore, something else must exist which allows us to imagine unlimitedly.
(5) Therefore, we have a mind/soul.
Something like that. The missing shade of blue example would be an objection to (2). But what if we do have the ability to imagine the missing shade of blue, even if we cannot consciously imagine it, or consciously register having done as much? This is sort of like the debate over whether beliefs are formed immediately upon perception, or only later, upon reflection on the memory of the perception. It's generally accepted that we hold beliefs we may never actually verbalize, but can we hold beliefs it isn't possible for us to verbalize because it is not possible for us to realize that we hold them? It's sort of an empty query because either an affirmation or a denial would be based purely on unfounded speculation, and what's the point of theorizing about beliefs that are by definition inaccessible? Actually, I think there may be a purpose at least insofar as considerations of our ability to imagine unlimitedly, but even that issue seems irrelevant (As far as the above argument for dualism goes, I think (1) is a weak claim, at least as stated.) But it's a fun thing to think about, anyway.
I've been giving myself a crash course in epistemology, and I can't help but feel like it's going poorly. I've read a respectable amount of the literature (given the time frame within which I've been working) both historical and contemporary, and I'm about half way through Audi's Introduction to Epistemology from the RICP series, but I feel like I'm going about it wrong somehow. It might just be that I have no one to discuss any of it with and so I don't realize how much I'm picking up (this was the case when I took a class in metaphysics last semester. I'd do the reading and feel incredibly lost, then I would go to the study groups and I was able to explain it all clearly and thoroughly, as well as offer objections, etc not laid out in the text). I've tried writing responses to the reading for myself, but I have a hard time writing philosophy without mandatory time constraints because I never feel that I know enough about the topic to justify writing an analysis of it. I just feel like I'm reading myself into circles. I'm really nervous about the epistemology seminar I'm taking this semester, because it presupposes a survey of epistemology, which I haven't had formally. Andy's teaching it, and he's a solid educator (I'm not thinking of a better word) and a pretty easy grader, but he's planning on teaching it as a grad seminar and I'm interested in more than decent grades this semester. I have other classes I should be more worried about than this one, but it's this one I'm freaking out about anyway. I really should've started this crash course earlier.... Luckily, I have the house to myself all weekend and no plans, because I've turned into a loser with no life, so I should be able to get a decent amount of work done.