Секретные протоколы Ялтинской конференции. Бомбить Дрезден не просили
В спорах о Дрездене рано или поздно всплывает тема информированности СССР о бомбардировках Дрездена. При этом цитируют сторонники тезиса информированности СССР тексты или ссылки вот с этого ресурса http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm, где, в частности сказано, что уже 4 февраля, до бомбардировок Дрездена, были предприняты шаги по уведомлению русских
Information Officially Given to the Russians by the Allies Concerning the Intended Date of and the Forces to be Committed to the Bombing of Dresden:
21. Although the exact procedures for maintaining day to day liaison between the Russians and the Allies on Allied bombing operations was for a long time the subject of negotiation between the Allies and the Russians, certain procedures for such liaison were nevertheless in effect prior to the Allied bombings of Dresden.[32]
Therefore, the following actions were taken by Allied authorities to notify the Russians that in accordance with their expressed wishes as to actions and timing, stated at the ARGONAUT Conference on 4 February 1945, Allied strategic air forces would bomb Dresden during the first half of February.[33]
22. On 7 February 1945, General Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces, informed Major General J. R. Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission, Moscow, that the communications targets for strategic bombing by the Eighth Air Force were, in the order of their priority, Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Cheanitz (and others of lesser importance).[34]
On the same date, General Spaatz also notified General Deane that a 24-hour advance notice of the intention to conduct actual bombing operations against Dresden (and the other targets of mutual concern to the Russians and the Allies) would be forwarded in order that General Deane might so notify the Russians.[35]
Moscow notified the proper Russian authority that Dresden was among the targets selected for strategic bombing by the American Eighth Air Force.[36]
On February, General Spaatz informed the United States Military Mission that, weather permitting, the Eighth Air Force intended to attack the Dresden Marshalling Yards with a force of 1200 to 1400 bomber planes on 13 February.[37]
On 12 February, therefore, the Russians were informed of the Americans’ intention to bomb Dresden.[38]
Weather conditions did not permit the Eighth Air Force to carry out its attack against Dresden on 13 February.[39]
Accordingly, on 13 February by similar procedures the Americans informed the Russians, that the Eighth Air Force would attack the Dresden Marshalling Yards on the 14th.[40]
Subsequently, the Russians were informed by the Americans that Dresden, together with the other high priority communications centers targets, would be subject to attack whenever weather conditions permitted.[41]
32. Message, ARGONAUT-OUT-43, 061739Z, 6 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 16; Message HQ USTAAF UA-53861, 7 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 17; letter, Maj. Gen. S. P. Spalding, Acting Chief, U.S. Military Mission (Moscow), to Maj. Gen. N. V. Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of Red Army, 8 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 18; Message, ARGONAUT 122, 10 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 19; letter, Spalding to Slavin, 10 February 1945 , Supporting Document No. 20; Message, HQ HAAF MI-45899, 11 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 21.
33. Supporting Document No. 12
34. Message, USTAAF UA-53861, 7 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 22. It must be presumed that the Commander-in-Chief, RAF Bomber Command, forwarded a similar message to the British Military Mission, Moscow, although the documentary sources that would verify this fact are not available at the present time to the USAF.
35. Ibid.
36. Letter, Maj. Gen. S. P. Spalding, Acting Chief, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, to Maj. Gen. N. V. Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of Red Army, 8 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 23.
37. Message, HQ USTAFF US-642102, 12 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 24.
38. Letter, Maj. Gen. E. W. Hill, Chief, Air Division, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, to Maj. Gen. N. V. Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of Red Army, 12 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 25. Again, it must be presumed that similar information was conveyed to the Russians by the British, through the British Military Mission, indicating that the RAF Bomber Command was preparing to strike Dresden.
39. Message, Eighth Air Force D-63497, 13 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 26.
40. Message, Eighth Air Force D-0010, 13 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 27; Letter, Lt. Col. D. V. Anderson, Executive Officer, Air Division, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, to Maj. Gen. N. V. Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of Red Army, 13 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 28.
41. Message, HQ USTAFF UAX-64452, 18 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 29.
42. All figures in this paragraph taken from Eighth Air Force Target Summary, Period 17 August 1942 thru 8 May 1945, p. 20, and Allied Air Attacks Against Targets in Dresden. Headquarters, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, p.1. Supporting Documents Nos. 1 and 2.
43. Ibid.
44. See Supporting Document No. 3 and footnote 8.
Любопытно, однако, что в тексте идет речь о том, что русских уведомили 7 февраля 1945 года о планируемых стратегических бомбардировках Дрездена, Берлина и др. городов "... for strategic bombing by the Eighth Air Force were, in the order of their priority, Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Cheanitz"
Однако, на сегодняшний день известно, что это были не стратегические бомбардировки, а ковровые.
Кроме того, в 2006 году вышел док.фильм, где хотя и были указаны завышенные числа жертв бомбардировок Дрездена, однако былa продемонстрирована копия документа, где ни слова не было о том, что союзники уведомили руководство СССР
Секретные протоколы Ялтинской конференции. Бомбить Дрезден не просили
Денисов продемонстрировал протоколы заседаний Ялтинской конференции, которые до сегодняшнего дня никто не видел и которые были рассекречены специально для фильма.
"Именно на этих заседаниях обсуждались вопросы координации действий союзников на заключительном этапе войны. Город Дрезден упоминается лишь один раз - и то в связи с проведением разграничительной линии между англо-американскими и советскими войсками, - подчеркивает Денисов. - А вот о чем действительно просило советское командование, так это о нанесении ударов по железнодорожным узлам Берлина и Лейпцига в связи с тем, что немцы уже перебросили против нас с западного фронта порядка 20 дивизий и собирались перебросить еще около 30. Именно эта просьба и была вручена в письменном виде Рузвельту и Черчиллю".
В фильме приводятся мнения ряда историков, которые связывают бомбардировку саксонской столицы с желанием западных союзников продемонстрировать свою мощь наступающей Красной армии - войска маршала Конева находились к тому моменту всего в 100 километрах от Дрездена."
Под катом - скриншот из док.фильма 2006 г
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8743165879459553850#
Information Officially Given to the Russians by the Allies Concerning the Intended Date of and the Forces to be Committed to the Bombing of Dresden:
21. Although the exact procedures for maintaining day to day liaison between the Russians and the Allies on Allied bombing operations was for a long time the subject of negotiation between the Allies and the Russians, certain procedures for such liaison were nevertheless in effect prior to the Allied bombings of Dresden.[32]
Therefore, the following actions were taken by Allied authorities to notify the Russians that in accordance with their expressed wishes as to actions and timing, stated at the ARGONAUT Conference on 4 February 1945, Allied strategic air forces would bomb Dresden during the first half of February.[33]
22. On 7 February 1945, General Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces, informed Major General J. R. Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission, Moscow, that the communications targets for strategic bombing by the Eighth Air Force were, in the order of their priority, Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Cheanitz (and others of lesser importance).[34]
On the same date, General Spaatz also notified General Deane that a 24-hour advance notice of the intention to conduct actual bombing operations against Dresden (and the other targets of mutual concern to the Russians and the Allies) would be forwarded in order that General Deane might so notify the Russians.[35]
Moscow notified the proper Russian authority that Dresden was among the targets selected for strategic bombing by the American Eighth Air Force.[36]
On February, General Spaatz informed the United States Military Mission that, weather permitting, the Eighth Air Force intended to attack the Dresden Marshalling Yards with a force of 1200 to 1400 bomber planes on 13 February.[37]
On 12 February, therefore, the Russians were informed of the Americans’ intention to bomb Dresden.[38]
Weather conditions did not permit the Eighth Air Force to carry out its attack against Dresden on 13 February.[39]
Accordingly, on 13 February by similar procedures the Americans informed the Russians, that the Eighth Air Force would attack the Dresden Marshalling Yards on the 14th.[40]
Subsequently, the Russians were informed by the Americans that Dresden, together with the other high priority communications centers targets, would be subject to attack whenever weather conditions permitted.[41]
32. Message, ARGONAUT-OUT-43, 061739Z, 6 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 16; Message HQ USTAAF UA-53861, 7 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 17; letter, Maj. Gen. S. P. Spalding, Acting Chief, U.S. Military Mission (Moscow), to Maj. Gen. N. V. Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of Red Army, 8 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 18; Message, ARGONAUT 122, 10 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 19; letter, Spalding to Slavin, 10 February 1945 , Supporting Document No. 20; Message, HQ HAAF MI-45899, 11 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 21.
33. Supporting Document No. 12
34. Message, USTAAF UA-53861, 7 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 22. It must be presumed that the Commander-in-Chief, RAF Bomber Command, forwarded a similar message to the British Military Mission, Moscow, although the documentary sources that would verify this fact are not available at the present time to the USAF.
35. Ibid.
36. Letter, Maj. Gen. S. P. Spalding, Acting Chief, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, to Maj. Gen. N. V. Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of Red Army, 8 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 23.
37. Message, HQ USTAFF US-642102, 12 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 24.
38. Letter, Maj. Gen. E. W. Hill, Chief, Air Division, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, to Maj. Gen. N. V. Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of Red Army, 12 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 25. Again, it must be presumed that similar information was conveyed to the Russians by the British, through the British Military Mission, indicating that the RAF Bomber Command was preparing to strike Dresden.
39. Message, Eighth Air Force D-63497, 13 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 26.
40. Message, Eighth Air Force D-0010, 13 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 27; Letter, Lt. Col. D. V. Anderson, Executive Officer, Air Division, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, to Maj. Gen. N. V. Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of Red Army, 13 February 1945, Supporting Document No. 28.
41. Message, HQ USTAFF UAX-64452, 18 February 1945. Supporting Document No. 29.
42. All figures in this paragraph taken from Eighth Air Force Target Summary, Period 17 August 1942 thru 8 May 1945, p. 20, and Allied Air Attacks Against Targets in Dresden. Headquarters, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, p.1. Supporting Documents Nos. 1 and 2.
43. Ibid.
44. See Supporting Document No. 3 and footnote 8.
Любопытно, однако, что в тексте идет речь о том, что русских уведомили 7 февраля 1945 года о планируемых стратегических бомбардировках Дрездена, Берлина и др. городов "... for strategic bombing by the Eighth Air Force were, in the order of their priority, Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Cheanitz"
Однако, на сегодняшний день известно, что это были не стратегические бомбардировки, а ковровые.
Кроме того, в 2006 году вышел док.фильм, где хотя и были указаны завышенные числа жертв бомбардировок Дрездена, однако былa продемонстрирована копия документа, где ни слова не было о том, что союзники уведомили руководство СССР
Секретные протоколы Ялтинской конференции. Бомбить Дрезден не просили
Денисов продемонстрировал протоколы заседаний Ялтинской конференции, которые до сегодняшнего дня никто не видел и которые были рассекречены специально для фильма.
"Именно на этих заседаниях обсуждались вопросы координации действий союзников на заключительном этапе войны. Город Дрезден упоминается лишь один раз - и то в связи с проведением разграничительной линии между англо-американскими и советскими войсками, - подчеркивает Денисов. - А вот о чем действительно просило советское командование, так это о нанесении ударов по железнодорожным узлам Берлина и Лейпцига в связи с тем, что немцы уже перебросили против нас с западного фронта порядка 20 дивизий и собирались перебросить еще около 30. Именно эта просьба и была вручена в письменном виде Рузвельту и Черчиллю".
В фильме приводятся мнения ряда историков, которые связывают бомбардировку саксонской столицы с желанием западных союзников продемонстрировать свою мощь наступающей Красной армии - войска маршала Конева находились к тому моменту всего в 100 километрах от Дрездена."
Под катом - скриншот из док.фильма 2006 г
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8743165879459553850#