How to answer to Russian aggression
I think that political regulation of the situation in Ukraine needs more insight into the essence of conflict. There are several reasons why Russia continues escalating conflict, contrary to its official statements.
First, Russian aggression is a response to the imaginative threat of western countries to Russian state. Putin and his government believe that the West (EU and USA) organised the Maidan protests after the Association Agreement between EU and Ukraine had been postponed. They think that the West made this revolution which threatens Russian security. Putin’s experts believe in created revolutions, probably because of their own experience in this field, and their main concern is an export of Ukrainian revolution to Russia. They insist on their right to make an adequate response by organising a parody of Maidan in the eastern Ukraine. In this way they want to destroy western plans to approach Russian frontiers by taking Ukraine from the Russian sphere of influence.
Second, aggressive rhetoric redirects public attention in Russia from home affairs to external enemy. For this purpose, Russian propaganda created a myth of “fascists” (“Nazi”) in Ukraine. The myth fits in the ideological context of modern Russian propaganda based on Soviet symbols and history. This is one of the reasons why Russian public easily believes that fascists in Ukraine have usurped the power. Putin’s call for patriotic action in this context means national resistance to new fascists from the West. The project has been termed “Russian spring” as opposed to the “Arab spring”. Propaganda psychologically attacks the audience in Russia aiming to prevent mass protests and delay the fall of Putin’s regime. Another target is the Russian-speaking audience in Ukraine. Russian TV broadcasts in Ukraine have grave responsibility for inflaming the confrontation between eastern and western Ukrainians. Probably they did not expect such serious consequences.
Third, Putin’s regime aims to restore the power of USSR and to achieve the parity with USA, as in the Cold War period. This strategic plan is not a new one, and there appears a favourable opportunity for that. For Putin, close economic ties with Europe, especially gas and oil exports, are not only business, but a means of political influence. Putin relies on Russian gas and on the consequences of EU economic crisis to restrain European politicians from decisive measures against Russia. Probably he takes into account that there were already cases of Russian aggression in the former territory of the USSR, such as wars in Chechnya and with Georgia in 2008, which had very limited response from the western countries. These actions were not prevented by the world community in general and by the EU in particular.
Fourth, Putin and his officials act secretly in Ukraine using the methods of security services. Disguised troops in Crimea, most likely the same kind of forces in eastern Ukraine mixed with local activists and paramilitary groups, provocations of civil clashes - all these methods belong to the arsenal of security services. The acts of terrorisms committed by unidentified persons and other provocations have been also supposed. There is also a specific manner of communication originating from security and intelligence agencies. Putin and the officials linked to him extrapolate their professional style on diplomacy and business. Putin’s politics is generally based on the methods of security services.
Finally, there is a process of reconstruction of the cultural area, which results in political expansion. Although provoked by the governmental policy, this cultural process is evolving spontaneously and can go out from political control. People inspired by the annexation of Crimea support expansion through social networks and ideological movements. As history shows, movements of this kind are ultimately aimed at obtaining cultural sources and develop through the lines of cultural contacts. Today’s developments are a perfect illustration of that, for example, Kiev as historical “mother of Russian cities” (i.e. metropolis) is reconsidered as “our land”, same as historical places in Crimea. Further historical lines of Russian cultural contacts are Kiev - Sofia involving Czech Republic (Moravia), Serbia and Romania (Christian and Old Russian links), Kiev -Vilnius -Warsaw (links of 16-17 centuries), Crimea - Turkey -Syria (ancient and Christian links), and Estonia - Latvia, which can be virtually prolonged to Germany - France - Austria (western European links) and USA (recent close contacts). There are, of course, no signs of Russia’s military plans, but there is little doubt that virtually the aggression is spreading beyond Ukraine to more distant points. Propaganda has already extrapolated the concept of “neo-Nazi” and “fascists” on USA and the EU involving all western countries into semantic field of Russian enemies.
At the moment, Putin’s regime uses words and psychological pressure rather than weapons, and secret methods and special troops rather than military force. That means that Russian aggression requires an adequate rhetorical response and legal restrictive measures. Some of them are briefly the following.
1. It is necessary to regularly comment on false statements by official contradictions. Falsification and disinformation are the instruments of Russian propaganda that require regular official response. To resist the influence of propaganda only by means of the independent media would be insufficient. Instead, regular official statements with strict definitions of every important event seem to be more efficient. Such statements can be issued by Ukrainian government and by all other parties involved. In other words, the influence of propaganda on the audiences in Russia and other countries may be overcome in the context of diplomatic and legal documents. There is a need of monitoring and public control over propaganda. It is also true that propaganda clichés and meanings enter Russian diplomacy, which could be treated in the same way, i.e. by regular official contradictions and comments.
2. Any further attempts of territorial expansion must be decisively stopped by sanctions. It is clear that every next step of expansion makes the aggressor stronger. Crimea has inspired military patriots in Russia, separatists in eastern Ukraine and people in other regions. Therefore any kind of agreement with aggressors should be considered as their promotion. To this belongs not only the annexation of further territories, but also preparatory steps towards disintegration of Ukrainian state. “Referendum” in Donetsk and Luhansk belongs to this kind of actions. It is a "legal" pretext for further illegal actions which will follow. “Referendum” is meant to interfere into political process in Ukraine by showing that there is disagreement in the regions, another number of polls, etc. and to reject the results of elections. People voting for separation may declare themselves in the occupied territory and call upon Russia to “protect” them. Such actions are irrelevant to the democratic right of self-determination; they should be immediately assessed as illegal and followed by sanctions.
3. Criminal actions and cases of violence need to be investigated as soon as possible. Due to rapidly developing situation, the events are quickly forgotten; mass media deviate public attention to breaking news. However, all criminal cases which remain unexplained tend to repeat. There were, for example, unidentified snipers in Kiev, the results of the inquiry are still vague; now, there are unidentified snipers in Mariupol and tragic events in Odessa. These facts have to be transmitted from the media context into legal context to avoid impunity. They must remain on the agenda of Ukrainian government and international institutions as the most important issues.
4. The experience of using disguised forces in Crimea and eastern Ukraine needs legal treatment. The so-called new type of war looks as a criminal action that needs to be estimated by international boards. This type of military action must be condemned; it violates not only morals, but also the principles of military profession. Moreover, it threatens to turn international affairs into competition between security agencies. Calls for violence and the people involved are also subject to legal treatment and additional sanctions. The same refers to propaganda that uses high-tech methods of psychological pressure. The norms of freedom of speech are not applicable in this case: Russian media should be banned in Ukraine until the resolution of conflict.
5. Ukraine sovereignty should enjoy political, financial and economic support of the EU and USA. The forthcoming elections and constitutional reform are political instruments of de-escalation; the OBSE observers guarantee the international acknowledgement of their results. Russia seems to be relying on separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine to start federalisation, which in today’s situation will lead to disintegration of Ukrainian state. Russian interference in the regions of the former USSR is based on the knowledge of historical background of their cultural identity. Ukrainian government should use the same instruments for saving its territorial integrity by including civil representatives of eastern regions into political life in Kiev and broader cooperation with local civil society. It seems that the plan of Russian identity in Donetsk region has little ground because historically it is a part of Sloboda Ukraine. Russian politicians have to realise that a provoked historical cultural identity in the neighbouring country, threatens to return back to Russia with a new dissolution of state. It is necessary to regulate the conflict, in accordance with its informational nature, through discussions and negotiations based on the right of plurality of political associations.
6. Russian language in Ukraine needs political support. It is very important that Russian speaking public in Ukraine could receive information in Russian language. Ukrainian government should support local media in Russian language, while the broadcasts from Russian Federation should be temporally banned. The demand in Russian language should be satisfied by local media. The same refers to the educational sphere that should continue supporting traditional Ukrainian/Russian bilingualism in Ukraine with variants of the educational programmes in the regions.
7. Russian expansion can be converted into virtual sphere. Modern information resources enable such conversion. That means supporting Russian language and showing respect to Russian cultural achievements, literature, science, people, traditions, etc. The EU and other countries can satisfy the desire of Russian expansionists to prove their greatness by the recognition of Russian human achievements and simultaneous denial of empirical pretensions as anachronistic. It is absurd to insist on territorial expansion for collecting Russian people in one jurisdiction, while people in modern world coexist as plurality of diaspora.
8. The ultimate goal of Russian expansion is the presence of Russia in Europe. This demand is motivated by the European origin of Russian culture and the desire to gain a firm position in the cultural area. The EU has to welcome this tendency if it is not accompanied by military aggression. EU can propose Russia a plan for future broader cooperation in economic, political, cultural and military spheres provided Russian government refutes their aggressive plans and illegal methods. Both sides are mutually interested in positive developments instead of military and political confrontation. Probably, the EU will find it possible to prepare a road map of moving in the direction of future closer cooperation.
First, Russian aggression is a response to the imaginative threat of western countries to Russian state. Putin and his government believe that the West (EU and USA) organised the Maidan protests after the Association Agreement between EU and Ukraine had been postponed. They think that the West made this revolution which threatens Russian security. Putin’s experts believe in created revolutions, probably because of their own experience in this field, and their main concern is an export of Ukrainian revolution to Russia. They insist on their right to make an adequate response by organising a parody of Maidan in the eastern Ukraine. In this way they want to destroy western plans to approach Russian frontiers by taking Ukraine from the Russian sphere of influence.
Second, aggressive rhetoric redirects public attention in Russia from home affairs to external enemy. For this purpose, Russian propaganda created a myth of “fascists” (“Nazi”) in Ukraine. The myth fits in the ideological context of modern Russian propaganda based on Soviet symbols and history. This is one of the reasons why Russian public easily believes that fascists in Ukraine have usurped the power. Putin’s call for patriotic action in this context means national resistance to new fascists from the West. The project has been termed “Russian spring” as opposed to the “Arab spring”. Propaganda psychologically attacks the audience in Russia aiming to prevent mass protests and delay the fall of Putin’s regime. Another target is the Russian-speaking audience in Ukraine. Russian TV broadcasts in Ukraine have grave responsibility for inflaming the confrontation between eastern and western Ukrainians. Probably they did not expect such serious consequences.
Third, Putin’s regime aims to restore the power of USSR and to achieve the parity with USA, as in the Cold War period. This strategic plan is not a new one, and there appears a favourable opportunity for that. For Putin, close economic ties with Europe, especially gas and oil exports, are not only business, but a means of political influence. Putin relies on Russian gas and on the consequences of EU economic crisis to restrain European politicians from decisive measures against Russia. Probably he takes into account that there were already cases of Russian aggression in the former territory of the USSR, such as wars in Chechnya and with Georgia in 2008, which had very limited response from the western countries. These actions were not prevented by the world community in general and by the EU in particular.
Fourth, Putin and his officials act secretly in Ukraine using the methods of security services. Disguised troops in Crimea, most likely the same kind of forces in eastern Ukraine mixed with local activists and paramilitary groups, provocations of civil clashes - all these methods belong to the arsenal of security services. The acts of terrorisms committed by unidentified persons and other provocations have been also supposed. There is also a specific manner of communication originating from security and intelligence agencies. Putin and the officials linked to him extrapolate their professional style on diplomacy and business. Putin’s politics is generally based on the methods of security services.
Finally, there is a process of reconstruction of the cultural area, which results in political expansion. Although provoked by the governmental policy, this cultural process is evolving spontaneously and can go out from political control. People inspired by the annexation of Crimea support expansion through social networks and ideological movements. As history shows, movements of this kind are ultimately aimed at obtaining cultural sources and develop through the lines of cultural contacts. Today’s developments are a perfect illustration of that, for example, Kiev as historical “mother of Russian cities” (i.e. metropolis) is reconsidered as “our land”, same as historical places in Crimea. Further historical lines of Russian cultural contacts are Kiev - Sofia involving Czech Republic (Moravia), Serbia and Romania (Christian and Old Russian links), Kiev -Vilnius -Warsaw (links of 16-17 centuries), Crimea - Turkey -Syria (ancient and Christian links), and Estonia - Latvia, which can be virtually prolonged to Germany - France - Austria (western European links) and USA (recent close contacts). There are, of course, no signs of Russia’s military plans, but there is little doubt that virtually the aggression is spreading beyond Ukraine to more distant points. Propaganda has already extrapolated the concept of “neo-Nazi” and “fascists” on USA and the EU involving all western countries into semantic field of Russian enemies.
At the moment, Putin’s regime uses words and psychological pressure rather than weapons, and secret methods and special troops rather than military force. That means that Russian aggression requires an adequate rhetorical response and legal restrictive measures. Some of them are briefly the following.
1. It is necessary to regularly comment on false statements by official contradictions. Falsification and disinformation are the instruments of Russian propaganda that require regular official response. To resist the influence of propaganda only by means of the independent media would be insufficient. Instead, regular official statements with strict definitions of every important event seem to be more efficient. Such statements can be issued by Ukrainian government and by all other parties involved. In other words, the influence of propaganda on the audiences in Russia and other countries may be overcome in the context of diplomatic and legal documents. There is a need of monitoring and public control over propaganda. It is also true that propaganda clichés and meanings enter Russian diplomacy, which could be treated in the same way, i.e. by regular official contradictions and comments.
2. Any further attempts of territorial expansion must be decisively stopped by sanctions. It is clear that every next step of expansion makes the aggressor stronger. Crimea has inspired military patriots in Russia, separatists in eastern Ukraine and people in other regions. Therefore any kind of agreement with aggressors should be considered as their promotion. To this belongs not only the annexation of further territories, but also preparatory steps towards disintegration of Ukrainian state. “Referendum” in Donetsk and Luhansk belongs to this kind of actions. It is a "legal" pretext for further illegal actions which will follow. “Referendum” is meant to interfere into political process in Ukraine by showing that there is disagreement in the regions, another number of polls, etc. and to reject the results of elections. People voting for separation may declare themselves in the occupied territory and call upon Russia to “protect” them. Such actions are irrelevant to the democratic right of self-determination; they should be immediately assessed as illegal and followed by sanctions.
3. Criminal actions and cases of violence need to be investigated as soon as possible. Due to rapidly developing situation, the events are quickly forgotten; mass media deviate public attention to breaking news. However, all criminal cases which remain unexplained tend to repeat. There were, for example, unidentified snipers in Kiev, the results of the inquiry are still vague; now, there are unidentified snipers in Mariupol and tragic events in Odessa. These facts have to be transmitted from the media context into legal context to avoid impunity. They must remain on the agenda of Ukrainian government and international institutions as the most important issues.
4. The experience of using disguised forces in Crimea and eastern Ukraine needs legal treatment. The so-called new type of war looks as a criminal action that needs to be estimated by international boards. This type of military action must be condemned; it violates not only morals, but also the principles of military profession. Moreover, it threatens to turn international affairs into competition between security agencies. Calls for violence and the people involved are also subject to legal treatment and additional sanctions. The same refers to propaganda that uses high-tech methods of psychological pressure. The norms of freedom of speech are not applicable in this case: Russian media should be banned in Ukraine until the resolution of conflict.
5. Ukraine sovereignty should enjoy political, financial and economic support of the EU and USA. The forthcoming elections and constitutional reform are political instruments of de-escalation; the OBSE observers guarantee the international acknowledgement of their results. Russia seems to be relying on separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine to start federalisation, which in today’s situation will lead to disintegration of Ukrainian state. Russian interference in the regions of the former USSR is based on the knowledge of historical background of their cultural identity. Ukrainian government should use the same instruments for saving its territorial integrity by including civil representatives of eastern regions into political life in Kiev and broader cooperation with local civil society. It seems that the plan of Russian identity in Donetsk region has little ground because historically it is a part of Sloboda Ukraine. Russian politicians have to realise that a provoked historical cultural identity in the neighbouring country, threatens to return back to Russia with a new dissolution of state. It is necessary to regulate the conflict, in accordance with its informational nature, through discussions and negotiations based on the right of plurality of political associations.
6. Russian language in Ukraine needs political support. It is very important that Russian speaking public in Ukraine could receive information in Russian language. Ukrainian government should support local media in Russian language, while the broadcasts from Russian Federation should be temporally banned. The demand in Russian language should be satisfied by local media. The same refers to the educational sphere that should continue supporting traditional Ukrainian/Russian bilingualism in Ukraine with variants of the educational programmes in the regions.
7. Russian expansion can be converted into virtual sphere. Modern information resources enable such conversion. That means supporting Russian language and showing respect to Russian cultural achievements, literature, science, people, traditions, etc. The EU and other countries can satisfy the desire of Russian expansionists to prove their greatness by the recognition of Russian human achievements and simultaneous denial of empirical pretensions as anachronistic. It is absurd to insist on territorial expansion for collecting Russian people in one jurisdiction, while people in modern world coexist as plurality of diaspora.
8. The ultimate goal of Russian expansion is the presence of Russia in Europe. This demand is motivated by the European origin of Russian culture and the desire to gain a firm position in the cultural area. The EU has to welcome this tendency if it is not accompanied by military aggression. EU can propose Russia a plan for future broader cooperation in economic, political, cultural and military spheres provided Russian government refutes their aggressive plans and illegal methods. Both sides are mutually interested in positive developments instead of military and political confrontation. Probably, the EU will find it possible to prepare a road map of moving in the direction of future closer cooperation.